missioned particular works elsewhere—the Santa Casa di Loreto, for example, or the altarpieces that Cardinal Giulio de' Medici wanted from Raphael for the cathedral in Narbonne—and Clement VII focused the bulk of his patronage on Florence not Rome. As Hall points out, these reflected patterns in the city. Robertson, however, picks out the Villa d'Este at Tivoli, the Villa Farnese at Caprarola, and the Villa Lante at Bagnaia as examples of sites close to Rome that cardinals developed for pleasure despite the stress on austerity promoted by the post-Tridentine ecclesiastical hierarchy in the 1560s. The models for these, she points out, were the Villa Madama and Villa Giulia, papal commissions, but made before the conclusion of the Council of Trent and much closer to the center of Rome. The Villa d'Este and others suggest, then, that while Roman monuments remained important, the influence of the sitting pope could quickly wane beyond the city walls.

This is an impressive, lucid, and well-edited collection (although the claim that Augustus was “the emperor who recognized Christ as the Savior” [283] suggests too close a proximity to sixteenth-century polemicists!). There is no doubt that for those of us who work on the visual arts of Rome without being by training or employment art historians—and here this reviewer should declare his hand—this is a rewarding and satisfyingly useful volume. The same would also be true, presumably, for beginning graduate students. Professional art historians, on the other hand, might turn directly to the full bibliography and look beyond; and I expect that undergraduates would find that they are supposed to know a little too much about Catholicism, Antiquity, and topography—some detailed maps of the city would definitely enhance the book, particularly given how eloquently the contributors write about changes, and their functions, in the urban fabric—for this collection to engage them. If I am right about the audience, the format of the book sits a little awkwardly with the function. It is lavish, hefty, and pricey (3½ lb and \$120 in the US). Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly the considerable care that has gone into the illustrations, which include several valuable non-canonical images, some taken especially for the volume. But the price in particular is likely to deter potential researchers and librarians; and it would be a real pity if as a consequence the book did not find the readers it deserves.

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David Colclough. *Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv, 293.

This important book offers an innovative account of how freedom of (political) speech was understood and practiced in early Stuart England. Bringing the techniques and perspectives of intellectual history, political history, and literary criticism to an impressive variety of sources, Colclough aspires “to trace the traditions and languages on which early Stuart discussions of freedom of speech relied, and to

describe and analyse their subsequent application” (4). Crucially, Colclough avoids the teleological trap of framing this story as the progressive unshackling of a unitary, transhistorical “right” of free speech; instead, he insists convincingly that the category of freedom of speech must be situated historically within shifting intellectual, cultural, and political contexts.

Colclough contends that contemporaries understood freedom of speech primarily as an attribute of good counsel. A good monarch sought counsel from many sources and allowed counsellors to speak frankly. Without frankness, counsel became flattery. But in an ordered monarchical polity, the lines between frank counsel and licentious or seditious speech were fuzzy—those lines had to be carefully negotiated and could be redrawn to suit immediate polemical and political needs. Thus, Colclough explores not only “how freedom of speech was conceived positively” (1) in the early Stuart period, but also how it became a site of contest and conflict.

The book opens with a consideration of the classical roots and early modern appropriations of the rhetorical figure of “frank speech”—*parrhesia* or *licentia*. In the classical republican tradition, frank speech was an attribute and duty of the *vir civilis*, the active citizen engaged in politics for the public welfare. By the end of the sixteenth century, English commentators had adapted this tradition to contemporary political circumstances: *parrhesia* now signified “both the act of speaking frankly and the complex framing apologies” for it. This modified understanding fit well in a monarchical polity where “counsel was obliged to be at once frank and decorous” (77).

Colclough then turns to the Scriptural validation of godly freedom of speech, in which bold speaking to either God or man was “an obligation laid on the speaker by the operation of the Holy Spirit” (79). He notes that Latimer legitimated his admonitory sermons to Edward VI by presenting himself in the role of the “plain-speaking prophet” (86), and observes that while this godly frank speaking faded from later Elizabethan and early Stuart court sermons, it could resurface in other places. Thomas Scott’s pamphlets attacking Jacobean foreign policy, for instance, claimed the mantle of frank speaking and honest counsel from both classical and scriptural discourses, allowing Scott to fashion an “authorial identity that fuses the roles of prophet and citizen” (115).

Of course, James I saw Scott’s pamphlets not as legitimate counsel but as “licentious” speech that threatened authority and required suppression. Similar clashes of perception lie at the heart of Colclough’s account of freedom of speech in early Stuart Parliaments. Working through the sessions chronologically from 1604 to 1629, Colclough usefully situates the Commons’ repeated protestations of their right to freedom of speech not only within multivalent political discourses of privilege, counsel, and liberty, but also alongside the Commons’ simultaneous attempts to suppress the reckless speech both of members and outsiders. High political historians of the Russell school will feel perhaps that Colclough fails to do justice to the factional politics and localist pressures shaping Parliamentary sessions, and that he does not adequately situate the speech acts he tracks within their strategic contexts, but his provocative conclusions pose a powerful challenge to revisionist privileging of ideo-

logical consensus over ideological fragmentation. For instance, Colclough contends that MPs not only argued “for the necessity of freedom of speech to good counsel” but also “invoked neo-roman theories of freedom and unfreedom to show how the right to speak freely was intimately linked to their other rights both as members of Parliament and as subjects”. Moreover, he notes, MPs sometimes elided Parliament’s liberties with the liberties of the subject, thus implying “that Parliament was arguing that all Englishmen”—or at least all “propertied Englishmen”—“could be counselors, and speak frankly to the king” (195).

These remarks preface Colclough’s excellent discussion of the manuscript commonplace books and miscellanies into which contemporaries transcribed various forms of political news—seditious tracts, parliamentary speeches, and verse libels. His archival base here is not exhaustive, but it is new and rich; it includes manuscripts collecting the poetry of John Hoskyns, who was imprisoned for his incendiary speeches delivered during the 1614 Parliament, and three neglected miscellanies from the 1620s, including a particularly fascinating compilation owned by the Shropshire minister Robert Horn. On this material, Colclough grounds a series of provocative arguments that, while in need of balance and modification, provide an invaluable addition to recent scholarship on scribal news culture. Colclough argues that compiling and preserving a miscellany was an inherently politicized act: “Even when an individual’s motives in collecting and responding to texts were not allied to a republican or ‘oppositional’ agenda, the very practices of transcription or annotation are acts that place him or her in a critical and active relationship to the civic world” (198–199). He also insists that the full meaning of these miscellanies emerges only through an analysis of the interrelationships among different elements of the collection. Read in relationship to each other, he writes, these miscellanies’ copies both of parliamentary materials and of scabrous verse libels “can be seen as part of a wider concern about the counsel that was allowed to reach the king and the range of information that was allowed to reach his people” (203). Colclough’s comments on potential reader responses to verse libel are especially intriguing. He reconstructs fragmentary contemporary legitimations of this widely-practised but much maligned genre, and he notes that rhetorical codes allowed contemporaries to read libels “with an ear to *vituperatio* as a formal effect” within “a context in which the praise of virtue and the censure of vice was commonplace, and an important part of one’s identity as both *homo rhetoricus* and *vir civilis*” (249). “Rather than being primarily attacks on persons,” he concludes, “libels acted as an unofficial means of counsel to which individuals might have recourse when more acknowledged fora, such as Parliament, appeared to have failed or to have been restrained by the crown” (205).

Such provocative analysis is typical of this well-written, ambitious and intelligent interdisciplinary work. Colclough has produced a major book that all historians of early Stuart political culture must read and debate. He has also successfully retrieved the history of freedom of speech from both whiggish teleology and revisionist neglect.

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