In this essay I will argue that the elusive interlocutor in John Donne’s *Satyre* I (ca. 1595), the “fondling motley humorist,” can be imagined at certain moments of the poem to be Donne’s penis.¹ I suspect that such an interpretation has been often entertained in the classroom, but I can find no evidence of it in existing scholarship. It may seem to consign *Satyre* I to the ranks of juvenile bawdry, but I hope also to show that this reading can make it a more rather than less serious poem if we consider it in the context of what the historian and critical legal theorist Peter Goodrich has called the closure of the Anglo-American common law tradition.² It is often noted that Donne wrote *Satyre* I while studying law at the Inns of Court. It has not been noted that he also wrote *Satyre* I while, according to Goodrich, English common law as a cultural institution was in the process of closing itself off from—or, in Freudian terms, repressing its genealogy in—sexual desire, humanist ethics, and the literary imagination in order to present itself as impartial, impersonal, and rational.³ Like Horace, Augustine, and Montaigne before him, Donne in *Satyre* I reflects on whether law commands desire, ethics, and imagination—all comically embodied, as it were, in his penis—or whether
they command it. And Donne renews this debate in order to address the place of desire, ethics, and imagination in the studying, teaching, and reproducing of early modern English law.

“He quarreled, fought, bled”

To imagine the “fondling motley humorist” (I’ll just call him Fondling) as Donne’s penis in effect bridges the two standard solutions to the puzzle of his identity. On the one hand, classicizing or ethical readings view him as a literary reincarnation of the garrulous pest from Horace’s *Satire* 1.9 who attaches himself to the bemused Horace during a chance stroll down Rome’s *Via Sacra*. According to this reading, Fondling illustrates, if only by way of negative exemplum, key Horatian ethical values: liberty, moderation, friendship, and (Donne’s watchword) constancy. On the other hand, Christian or religious readings internalize the poem’s dialogue and treat Fondling as a personification of corporal sin, with whom Donne, as a figure of spiritual ambition, reenacts a medieval Christian *débat* between the body and the soul. The reading that I am proposing is clearly a variant of this internalized psychomachia. But, for reasons that will become clear, my reading also implies that Donne’s *débat* is not wholly internalized and that there remains an ironic, social, even legal distance between the poem’s two speakers, the kind of dramatic distance that is necessarily assumed by the ethical reading but that is minimized by the spiritual.

My reading is perhaps suggested most clearly in the poem’s catastrophic closing lines:

> At last his [i.e., Fondling’s] Love he in a window spies,<br>And like light dew exhal’d, he flings from mee<br>Violently ravish’d to his lechery.<br>Many were there, he could command no more;<br>He quarrel’d, fought, bled; and turn’d out of dore<br>Directly came to mee hanging the head,<br>And constantly a while must keepe his bed. (106–12)

Fondling’s romantic and, I am suggesting, Donne’s erotic catastrophe can be contrasted with the comically providential and expressly judicial demise of Horace’s pest, who in the final lines of *Satire* 1.9 is tracked down by an enemy litigant and dragged off to court:

> It now chanced that the plaintiff came face to face with his opponent [i.e., the pest].
> “Where go you, you scoundrel?” he loudly shouts, and to me: “May I call you as witness?” I offer my ear to touch [in agreement]. He hurries the man to court. There is
Partly because of the contrast between the two poems’ conclusions, critics have argued that Donne’s poem is a failure. Either it fails unintentionally because Donne, in what is presumed to be one of his earliest poems, simply was not up to the artistic standard that Horace, flush with confidence after having been accepted into Rome’s elite literary and political circles, set in *Satire* 1.9. Or it fails intentionally so that we can track in Donne’s subsequent satires the growth of a zealous Christian reformer.6

Donne’s classical borrowings are notoriously difficult to pin down; but there is another Horatian model that *Satyre* I seems to evoke, namely Horace’s own diatribe against the violent ravishing of lechery, *Satire* 1.2. In this poem, Horace targets fools who, instead of settling for sexual practices that are both physically gratifying and politically safe, rush from one extreme of lecherous desire to another. More specifically, these fools either seduce high-priced courtesans and noble matrons or they cavort with low-born show-girls and loathsome prostitutes. “There is,” Horace laments, “no middle course” (*nil medium est* [*Satire* 1.2.28]). The social danger that Horace identifies (there is no moral danger) is that adulterers will squander their fathers’ estates or ruin their families’ good names. To illustrate his point, Horace offers several case studies. One is the sex scandal that involved Villius, a figure from Rome’s not too distant Republican past. Villius was a lover of Fausta, the wife of Milo and daughter of the consul Sulla. In the story Horace recounts, Villius was unfortunate enough to discover Fausta in congress with yet another lover, Longarenus:

Because of Fausta…Villius…was punished rightly and more than enough, since he was beaten with the fist, assailed with the sword, and shut out of doors while Longarenus was within. If while facing such evils a man’s mind [*animus*] were to plead on behalf of his passion [*mutonis = of his cock*], “What are you doing? When my rage is at its worst, do I ask you for a dame [*cunnum = a cunt*] clad in a stola, the offspring of a great consul?” What would he answer? “The girl is a noble father’s child.” (*Satire* 1.2.64–72; translation revised)

Modern critics have praised Horace’s handling of this comic anecdote and especially his innovation of the talking penis, which combines the conventions of “the Cynic ‘talking abstraction’ and the *exclusus amator* motif” of Roman comedy.7 Horace also parodies the circumlocutory grandeur of epic by having the *animus* of a man who has witnessed Villius’s spectacle speak on behalf of his *muto*.8 Part of the comedy of the scene is that the *muto* voices the pragmatic and anti-elegiac view of sex that Horace’s poem on the
whole seems to endorse, while Villius (or the man who views the spectacle of Villius’s expulsion) unthinkingly reiterates the rejected premise that sexual desires can be marshaled to attain political goals.

At the conclusion of Satire 1.2, Villius’s humiliation is re-imagined as a bedroom farce in which Horace himself is discovered in flagrante delicto by a cuckolded husband. As this second episode ends, we see Horace in flight: “With clothes disheveled and bare of foot, I must run off, dreading disaster in purse or person or at least repute. To be caught is an unhappy fate, even with Fabius as judge” (Satire 1.2.132–34; translation revised). With characteristic self-irony, Horace turns from the unhappy fate of the exposed adulterer to note that he has now taken an ideal lover: she is neither expensive to keep nor reluctant to gratify and, unlike the ominously named Fausta, she can be called by whatever name he pleases (126; this bit is copied by Shakespeare’s Benedick). Having charted a middle course between wanton recklessness and complete withdrawal, Horace need no longer fear incurring a fate similar to Villius’s. Or rather, given how vividly he paints the scene, he need no longer fear incurring such a fate again. Like the Villius scene, this concluding episode evokes the stock and trade of low comedy and stems ultimately from what R. W. Reynolds once called the tradition of “Adultery Mime.” Precisely because it is so conventional, the specific lesson of Horace’s “flight from priapic assertion” seems to be that, although the libidinal demands of the irritable muto are impulsive, sex as a social and literary practice “is always, inescapably scripted.”

I suspect that there are allusions to these two scenes from Horace’s Satire 1.2 in Donne’s Satyre I, especially but not only in its conclusion. Like Horace’s satire, Donne’s poem is plagued by an “itchie” prurience (38 and 74) that is exacerbated rather than alleviated by the ostensibly “refin’d manners” (28) of the sundry characters who populate its pages. It is an itch that marriage cannot scratch (Horace doesn’t even consider the option), certainly not the pseudo-marriage of constant friendship that Donne haplessly desires when he basically proposes to marry Fondling, “For better or worse take mee, or leave mee:/To take, and leave mee is adultery” (25–26; cf. 33–36). As in Horace’s poem, casual social encounters are laden with erotic potential and also wound up in the calculated acquisition of land, wealth, and power. Not only will Fondling “grin or fawne” over the “velvet Justice” (23 and 21) he meets on the street, but he will also “prepare/A speech to court his beauteous son and heir” (23–24). Addressing Fondling directly, Donne wonders, “wilt [thou] consort none, untill thou have knowne/What lands he hath in hope, or of his own” (33–34). And like Horace, Donne presents graphic alternatives of extreme sexual behaviour. He scorns Fondling for “approv[ing]” and enjoy-
ing a “plumpe muddy whore” or a “prostitute boy” (40). But unlike Horace, Donne is unable to settle on a sustainable mean between them. Donne and Fondling start off in “the middle street” (15) but soon deviate from it. At times Donne’s seedy cityscape seems to recall Juvenal’s Satire 2, in which “every street” is “packed with grim-looking perverts.” But Juvenal’s concern is with the political ineffectiveness of effeminate or sexually passive men, whereas Horace’s, like Donne’s I think, is with the social hazards that sexual desire precipitates.

The narrative action of Satyre I, then, mixes together the three key episodes of Horace’s Satire 1.2, viz., Villius being punished as exclusus amator, the muto berating its operator, and Horace fleeing from priapic assertion. If this is correct, there is a possible alternative to the standard readings of the poem’s conclusion in which Fondling is beaten either by his unfaithful lover’s other suitors or expelled by the workers at the brothel to which he has led Donne. In my reading, Donne and Fondling reprise the roles of Villius and his muto and together they re-enact Horace’s lecherous burlesque. Much like Villius’s irritable muto, Fondling is “violently ravish’d to his lechery.” Donne enters a brothel (“Many were there”) but he finds that he “could command no more.” Importantly, this phrase hints that it is not adultery but rather impotence—understood broadly as the out-stripping of sexual performance by erotic desire—that marks the poem’s narrative anti-climax. Fondling “quarreled, fought, [and] bled,” but could not command and could not conquer. Certainly the rapid action of line 110 sounds more like the clipped participial phrases of Horace’s Satire 1.2 (pugnis caesus ferroque petitus, exclusus fore [66–67]) than the equally brisk but more diffuse public alarm that concludes his Satire 1.9 (clamor utrimque, undique concursus [77–78]). Like the fugitive Horace, but unlike Villius and other excluded lovers, Fondling actually gets in and accesses his lover, or at least that is what “turned out of door” implies. Thus Fondling is not so much excluded as ejected. The phrase “turned out of door” connects Satyre I’s two terminal locations, the chamber and the brothel, by harkening back to the satiric speaker’s earlier, Prufrockian decision to hit the streets: “I shut my chamber door, and come, let’s go” (52). Thus Donne’s almost hallucinogenic chamber dialogue is linked to Fondling’s comic expulsion in much the same way that Villius’s comic expulsion is linked to Horace’s adulterous flight. Like Villius, Horace is all too familiar with fleeing from abusive rival lovers. And like Donne, Fondling is all too familiar with being shut out of doors.
“so might man have had the obedience of his lower parts”

I would not, of course, claim that imagining Fondling as Donne’s penis makes sense of every bit of the poem’s dialogue or every encounter Donne and Fondling share on their eventful walk through London, though it does raise some interesting possibilities. (What is the “gay sport” [76] known to but not dared by apprentices and foreign schoolboys? Is there another reason, besides ostentatious courteousness, that Fondling like a fiddler stoops low to hit the high notes [77]?) But if the end or goal of Donne and Fondling’s journey is ultimately erotic—be it seduction, adultery, or simply controlled sexual climax—and if this goal is ultimately frustrated, then the poem turns into a tale of sexual misadventure that falls somewhere between Sir Guyon’s march through the Bower of Bliss in Book Two of The Faerie Queene (1590) and Thomas Nashe’s pornographic pilgrimage to a brothel in “The Choice of Valentines” (ca. 1580s). Moreover, although we are more familiar with the aggressive phallic posturing of Donne’s Elegies, it should not be altogether surprising that Donne could write a satiric poem about phallic failing. Christopher Ricks has written perceptively about Donne’s “postcoital sadness and revulsion” and about “how unhealthily his poems end.” And more recently Georgia Brown has shown that the generation of London poets who came of age in the 1590s trafficked in their own shame and shamelessness as a strategy of professional self-promotion. But Ricks does not mention Satyre I and Brown says very little about Donne’s poetry at all.

Still, Brown is right to suggest that the problem of impotence had been given greater urgency and more profound psychological implications by the Christian West’s great theorist of sexual shame, Augustine. In his discussion of Edenic sexuality in The City of God (413–26), Augustine explains at length that, because of the Fall, men are unable to control the movements of their penises:

Man … should have sowne the seede, and woman have received it, as need required, without all lust, and as their wills desired. For as now we are, our articulate members [membra…articulata] doe not onely obey [our] will, our hands, or feete, or so, but even those also that we wove but by small sinews and tendons, we contract and turne them as we list: as you see in the voluntary motions of the mouth and face. … Even so might man have had the obedience of his lower parts, which his owne disobedience debarred.

Augustine goes on to note that even now certain men can wiggle their ears, shrug their hairlines, vomit, fart, and even sweat on command. If sinful men can do these things, certainly “God could easily have made him with all his members subjected to his will, even that which now is not moved but by lust.”
But Adam and Eve violated God’s commandment and men no longer procreate as voluntarily and dispassionately as they plant their crops or wiggle their ears. Curiously, Augustine’s logic at once idealizes dispassionate sexuality and trivializes it. He intimates that, but for the Fall, men might have found a variety of entertaining uses for their penises. Perhaps they would have been able, like Fonding, to grin, smack, and shrug. More likely the opposite would have been the case: it is telling that Augustine’s final example of extreme voluntary control of bodily members is the priest Restitutus who was able to draw himself “into such an extasie, that he lay as dead, senseles of all punishing, pricking, nay even of burning.”20 Were it not for the Fall, our “members of generation” might have likewise been capable of such willed senselessness. As it is, they are no longer obedient. Men, in Donne’s words, “command no more” (109). Or rather, they command (“Away thou Fondling motley humorist” [1]), but are not obeyed. Like Donne in Satyre I, men “follow headlong” (12) what they should lead (“He followes, overtakes, goes on the way” [94]). And they shamelessly expose what should remain private: “‘Stand still, must you dance here for company’” (86)?21 As Augustine says, the “contention, fight, and altercation of lust and will” is “the plague of the sinne of disobedience: otherwise these [lower] members had obeyed their wills as well as the rest.”22 Especially after the Reformation revived Augustinian spirituality, Donne’s reprisal of classical adultery mime can be read as a satiric reference to this conflict between lust and will.

Roman poets, including Horace, had touched on the theme of impotence.23 But there is nothing in their poems like Augustine’s existential crisis originating in a primal scene of legal transgression. At worst, the Roman poets are angry at having been victimized by circumstances and momentarily stripped of their manliness, which they hope to reclaim by wittily capturing the moment in verse. It seems clear that Satyre I refigures this classical theme and handles Fondling’s inability or unwillingness to “stand still” in expressly Augustinian terms. Before emerging onto the street, Donne contemplates Adam’s “first blessed state” (45) and, throughout the poem, he bandies about the language of carnal sinfulness and spiritual introspection (cf. 49–50 and 65–66). Donne seems to be outlining Christian subjectivity through the problem of impotence much as other Reformation theologians and Renaissance poets approached it through the problem of wet dreams. As Debora Shuger has demonstrated, the problem of wet dreams was taken seriously by Augustinian Christianity, in its canon laws as well as in its imaginative literature, because wet dreams reveal the “domain of psychological experience that falls between the voluntary and the involuntary: the images, memories, sensations, and longings that stream unwilled into consciousness
and at least partially escape rational control.” The primarily masculine problem of nocturnal emissions became a paradigm for the haunting “powerlessness to silence, steer, or stimulate” the “‘inner-most’ core of Christian selfhood.”24 Like the literary works Shuger discusses (namely Spenser’s Faerie Queene and Milton’s Maske [c. 1634]), Donne’s satire is a riot of “interlaced and unwilled” “images, pleasures, feelings, sensations, [and] thoughts.”25 But the spiritual and sexual topography of Donne’s satire is not “the hinterground of the mind”; it does not feature labyrinthine forests like those that surround Archimago’s hermitage and Comus’s lair. Donne’s poem offers only brief vistas of romantic, pastoral, and elegiac irrationality. There is “I for my lost sheep stay” (93), a line that plays not only on the image of the dejected pastoral poet but also on the good shepherd of Luke 15:3–7, who does not “stay” for his “lost sheep,” but actually goes and looks for it. There is also the atmospheric “like light dew exhal’d” (107), about which more later. And there is the pathetic “Directly came to mee hanging the head” (111).26 But these vistas into the hinterground of the mind are obstructed by the pressing material vice of the city. The scene of Donne’s libidinal crisis is the urban street leading from his student’s chambers to a brothel. Donne’s satire is thus closer in proximity than either Spenser’s romance or Milton’s masque to the social, political, and legal institutions in which the conflicts of lust and obedience were regulated and judged. This seems to be the point of Donne mixing together bits from Horace and Augustine. In Horace, a penis mocks its operator; in Augustine, a lower member revolts against the will; in Donne, the poet mocks his penis who revolts against his (Donne’s) will. Donne, in other words, introduces sin and shame into Horace’s folly-ridden cityscape and introduces civility and ethics into Augustine’s hinterground of the mind.

There is a third instructive analog to Donne’s satire, one that like Augustine portrays male impotence as conditioned by images, pleasures, feelings, sensations, and thoughts, but that, unlike Augustine, treats these non-rational aspects of the mind as malleable and potentially useful. It is Michel de Montaigne’s famous essay, “Of the Force of Imagination” (1580). This essay has been given considerable attention by modern historians of sexuality, primarily because it mentions the notorious case of Marie Germane, the twenty-two-year-old girl who one day, “leaping, and straining himself [sic] to over-leape another,” “wot not how, but where before he was a woman, he suddenly felt the instrument of a man to come out of him.” For modern critics, this story demonstrates that gender in the early modern period was fluid, culturally constructed, and capable of being externally manipulated.27 So absorbing is the exceptional case of Marie Germane that it is sometimes
forgotten that the bulk of the essay is about impotence. Montaigne takes up this subject, as he does elsewhere, partly to explore his personal experience, but also partly to counter the superstitious fear of *nouements d’aiguilettes*. These “knots of cord” affected newly-wed grooms with impotence and were thought to be effected by witchcraft (they were imagined as charmed cords tied through a wedding-ring). They had apparently created something of a national hysteria: Montaigne calls them “pleasant bonds, wherewith our world is so fettered, and France so pestered.”

Montaigne had little tolerance for witchcraft hysteria and the kinds of extreme legal action it fostered. His essay thus offers an alternative, naturalistic account of how the male imagination, as opposed to female witchcraft, can both cause and cure impotence. For example, he recommends that before taking possession of a wife, a man ought by sallies, and divers times, lightly assay and offer himselfe without vexing or opinionating himselfe, definitively to convince himselfe. Such as know their members docile and tractable by nature, let them only endeavour to countercosin their fantasie. Men have reason to checke the indocilie libertie of this member, for so importunately insinuating himselfe when we have no need of him, and so importunately, or as I may say impertinently failing, at what time we have most need of him; and so imperiously contesting by his authority with our will, refusing with such fierceness and obstinacie our solicitations both mentall and manuall.

Montaigne opposes Augustine (he cites *The City of God* twice) by casting the male imagination, like the male hand, as an instrument with which to control the importunate insinuating, impertinent failings, and imperious contesting of the penis. Montaigne insists that the real force of the imagination is its perfect neutrality, which allows it to amplify both the fear that causes impotence and the desire that cures it. To demonstrate this point, Montaigne tells a wonderful story about the ordeal his friend James Peletier underwent on his wedding night. Playing the “part of a true friend,” Montaigne prepared and saw through a “miraculous” remedy for the performative difficulties that Peletier inevitably experienced on the night of his wedding because “his mind was so quailed, and his eares so dulled, that by reason of the bond wherewith the trouble of his imagination had tied him.” The plan Montaigne devised was this: if he should encounter difficulties in his nuptial bed, Peletier should leave his new wife on the pretext of having to urinate. In the lavatory, he would find Montaigne’s own nightgown, in which he would find a supposedly magical medal that had been tied to a ribbon. When alone, Peletier was to repeat a charm Montaigne had composed, “girt” the ribbon around his waist, and “very carefully place the plate thereto fastned, just upon his kidneys.”
With the ribbon in place and the charm said, “[Peletier] should then boldly and confidently return to his charge….“30 In effect, Montaigne dissolves the knot of impotence with a knot of potency, not because he believes that his ribbon, medal, and charm have any real magical powers, but precisely because they do not: “Their inanitie gives them weight and credit.”31 Though Montaigne refuses to be held to it—he is, after all, “a vowed enemie” “to constancie”—his argument in effect hinges on the idea that the imagination can exonerate what the law incriminates.32 Montaigne sums up this argument by imagining a trial in which the penis is arraigned and granted leniency because of extenuating circumstances:

To conclude, I would urge in defence of my client, that it would please the Judges to consider, that concerning this matter, his cause being inseperably conjoyned to a consort, and indistinctly: yet will not a man addresse himselfe but to him, both by the arguments and charges, which can no way appertaine to his said consort. For, his effect is indeed sometime importunately to invite, but to refuse never: and also to invite silently and quietly. Therefore is the sawcinesse and illegalitie of the accusers seene. Howsoever it be, protesting that Advocates and Judges may wrangle, contend, and give sentence, what, and how they please, Nature will in the meane time follow her course: who, had she endured this member with any particular priviledge, yet had she done but right, and shewed but reason.33

In Charles Cotton’s 1685 translation of this essay the phrase “my client” is glossed in the margin as cazzo, Italian slang for penis. The “consort” to which the cazzo is “inseperably conjoyned” is the female genitalia. In comparison to her’s, Montaigne implies, the cazzo’s erratic behaviour must perforce seem unaccountable and even illicit. But the main point is that while the “Advocates and Judges” “wrangle, contend, and give sentence” about the criminality of libidinous men (and the suspected witches who afflict them), Nature will “follow her course” and male genitalia will consort with female genitalia.34

Montaigne’s essay may not be a formal model for Donne’s satire, but it does help to explain how the language of ethics—of friendship, companionship, and constancy—can intercede amid conflicts between imagination and libido. In Satyre I, this ethical language is primarily one of togetherness, of constancy (11 and 112), companionship (11, 36, and 86), and consorting (3 and 33).35 The initial question of whether Donne will leave or stay in his chamber becomes on the street a more circumstantial question of “whither, why, when, or with whom [Fondling] would’st go” (64). Donne figures the formal ties that bind us together in language that is both corporeal and legalistic. At the poem’s beginning, Donne is “consorted” with books that represent the conventional branches of humanist learning. “[G]rave Divines” and “the
Philosopher” trade in universals, in God’s profundities and nature’s secrets (5–6). History and poetry, by contrast, are local, vernacular affairs, bound to “each land” in which they are produced (9–10). Uniting them are “jolly Statesmen, which teach how to tie/The sinewes of a city’s mystique body” (7–8). Like a statesman, Donne requests a variety of oaths and promises in order to secure Fondling to him. Fondling likewise seeks to make “jointures and marry [his] deare company” (36). Though more impulsive and indiscreet, the ties that Fondling seems to want to tie are also legally binding. The contrast between the statesmen’s sinews and Fondling’s jointures works, as it had for Augustine, to distinguish between ties that are soft, mysterious, and voluntary and those that are hard, legal, and involuntary.

Together Horace, Augustine, and Montaigne offer three possible views of the relationship between desire and law or, put more narrowly, three possible understandings of whether or not law in its various forms can control where, when, and with whom mens’ penises go. Horace’s *Satires* 1.2 and 1.9 both conclude when the law interjects itself as an authoritative, even providential antidote to social folly. But in *Satire* 1.2 Horace implicates the law in the very social follies that it pretends to judge (the Fabius whom Horace imagines punishing him was a notorious adulterer). Augustus, fashioning himself as defender of traditional Roman *mores*, would criminalize adultery in 18 BCE. But based on the evidence of *Satire* 1.2, written about a decade earlier, it does not appear that Horace would have agreed that imperial decrees can tame adulterous desires. For Augustine, the violation of the law by desire is even more fundamental, since sinful carnality thwarts any voluntary effort to be disciplined or constrained. In his account of Edenic sexuality, Augustine argues that the hypocrisy of the law has its genealogical origin in the very origin of human genealogy and so cannot be averted as it would be in Horace by an ethic of sensible moderation. Lawlessness or what Paul characterized as the “war” between “the law in [his] members” and “the law in [his] mind” (Rom. 7:23) is the very subjective condition of fallen humanity. Lastly, like Augustine, Montaigne derides the law as ineffectual, but, like Horace, he also asserts a positive (or at least neutral) view of natural desire. “Advocates and judges” can inveigh against and incriminate the unreliable *cazzo*. And they can hunt and try the witches whose spells purportedly tie the *nouements d’aiguillettes*. But they cannot keep nature from following its course and they can do nothing to suppress the perfectly neutral force of the imagination. Montaigne implies that the very substance of the law, as opposed to the emptiness of the imagination, makes it ineffective.

By imagining Fondling as Donne’s penis, then, we can put *Satyre* I within this tradition stretching from Horace through Augustine to Montaigne
in which male impotence becomes a thematic in which individual subjectivity is expressed in terms that are at once imaginative, erotic, and legalistic. *Satyre* I thus shows Donne characteristically mingling classical ethics, Christian spiritually, and Renaissance skepticism. But it also evokes Donne’s more immediate historical context, namely, the culture of the Inns of Court in the 1590s. Donne critics have recognized the influence of Inns culture on Donne’s early career. Thus we typically think of the Inns as a “socioliterary environment” where erudite and insecure playboy wits flouted institutional authority in an ironic and usually frustrated attempt to gain it for themselves. But Donne’s own protestations notwithstanding—in a 1612 letter he wrote that the “study of law” was his “best entertainment and pastime”—there is no reason to think that Donne wasn’t intellectually engaged by it as well. In fact, Jeremey Maule has recently shown that, throughout his life, Donne was deeply engaged with the terms of law as secretary, prose controversialist, preacher, and poet. Extending Maule’s argument, it may be possible to reconsider *Satyre* I as part of the institutional history of English law described by Goodrich. His analysis of early modern law, before it succumbed to its “reverie of a comprehensive system and perfect order of rational rule,” takes special note of the manifest influence of the body and the imagination in what we typically think of as the rational and systematic process of studying, teaching, and reproducing law. Goodrich’s analysis of Inns culture is quite different from but surprisingly complementary to that kind of socioliterary environment that Donne scholars have described, even though it takes as its analysand not a person (the young John Donne) but an institution (the still open Anglo-American common law tradition). This institutional history reveals Donne’s *Satyre* I to be a serious poem, or at least one engaged with the legal culture of its times, even if it is possible to imagine one of its characters as a talking penis.

“their native humidite dried up”

Although we now typically think of law as a profession distinct from the other humanist disciplines, Goodrich argues that in early modern England law was “simply one stage in a continuum of disciplinary and normalizing discourses which might very loosely be said to run from educational discourses, the rules of grammar, etiquette and the social, political and moral aspects of collective existence, through to the more explicitly coercive languages of psychiatry, therapy, law and religion.” Over the course of *Satyre* I, Fondling proves himself oblivious to a whole range of these “disciplinary and normalizing discourses.” He will not be restrained by the lofty ideals of humanist education (e.g., 5–10), by the public conventions of etiquette and
decorum (e.g., 67–70 and 85–93), or by the stronger principles of ethics, especially its ideals of constancy, that enable “collective existence” itself. Although Fondling’s venalities are manifold and manifest throughout the poem, he seems to be compelled by sexual desire and to set sexual conquest as his final goal. Fondling falters when he is “[v]iolently ravish’d to his lechery” (108). At this moment, other disciplinary and normalizing discourses fail and Fondling is drawn towards a crisis of ethics, religion, therapy, and law that is analogous to similar moments from Horace, Augustine, and Montaigne.

Since early modern law was still part of this continuum of the liberal arts and sciences, it was also enmeshed in non-rational discourses of spiritual perfection and corporeal discipline. Consequently, Goodrich argues, despite its reputation for rowdy permissiveness, the Inns of Court sought to forge a common bond among its members through the denial of the flesh. This agenda stands behind the quasi-monastic regulation of student conduct at the Inns of Court. There were institutional regulations, for example, concerning behaviour (no noise), hygiene (no beards), and clothing (no foreign fash-

And in *A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Lawe* (1600), William Fulbecke likewise requires of prospective lawyers “a restraint of mind from all voluptuousness and lust, as namely, from covetousness, excess of diet, wantonness, and all other unlawful delights.”41 In fact, William Prest’s standard history of the Inns of Court in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries includes a chapter on various measures designed to curtail intra- and extra-
mural hooliganism.42 These regulations were designed to curb the excesses to which Inns members, like Fondling, were apparently given. At the very least, the existence of such institutional regulations and professional admonitions implies that they were needed: apparently it was not at all uncommon to see law students quarrel, fight, bleed, and get turned out of door.

According to Goodrich, the cumulative effect of these regulations, admonitions, and other pedagogical practices was to bind Inns members “to a common role and order of productivity” and to form them into an “intimate and exclusive community of law.” This community “is precisely figured in ceremonies that deny the body” and that implied a “perfect and so abstract law extrinsic both to contingency and to contact.” The ideological institution of the law was modeled on “a transition from body to spirit,” but it did not aim on transcending the business of this world. Instead, it sought to create a “bond of homosociality” by excluding its “theological correlates of pol-
lution, uncleanness and lust." Goodrich’s account of Inns culture makes evident the institutional significance of *Satyre* I, whether we read it as an ethical discourse about the bond of homosociality, a religious meditation on the transition “from body to spirit,” or some combination of these two. In what remains the only book-length study of the *Satyres*, M. Thomas Hester has argued that Donne’s reforming religious agenda gave him common cause with a host of zealous Elizabethan preachers (e.g., Henry Smith, John Jewel, and Horace’s first English translator, Thomas Drant). But in the early 1590s Donne was separated from these preachers not only by age, but also by professional affiliation (to say nothing of religious fervour). We need not look so far beyond English law as it was being studied, taught, and reproduced to find ethical and even religious ideals that might influence the youthful Donne. Fondling might be said to represent what the institutional regulations, admonitions, and practices sought to repress: contingent uncertainty (“Wither, why, when, or with whom” [64]) and physical contact (“He them to him with amorous smiles allure,/And grins, smacks, shrugs” [74–75]). Fondling draws Donne away from his study of the continuum of “disciplinary and normalizing discourses” of which law was just one component, he violates the bond of homosociality that the study of law was meant to establish, and he quite specifically induces Donne to uncleanness and lust.

The conclusion of *Satyre* I can be read as a parody of prescriptive advice about bodily control from early modern legal texts. Fulbecke, for example, insists that the institutional policing of Inns members had to be matched by the corporeal regulating of their thinking. Inns members were thought to be especially susceptible to an acute form of judicial melancholy and Fulbecke urges them to recognize the host of influences on their emotional states. The most important influence, of course, is God, without whom knowledge of law is but “a sword in the hand of a frantike person.” Fulbecke saw no contradiction between this Christian piety and the second influence he describes, astrological determinism. He explains that the “Starres do not qualifie the minde, but the bodie only, which being a cotage of clay, must needs beare the wind and weather, the alteration and impression of the Planets.” If astrology is defensible because the stars influence the body and not the mind, this distinction collapses when Fulbecke proceeds to explain that the constitution of the body influences the working of the mind. He is particularly concerned to recommend regular, diurnal study habits. Explaining why students should study early in the morning, he claims that the bodie in the night time waxeth more dulle, so that the minde cannot use it as a convenient instrument. For when the stomacke is full and stuffed with meate, the thicke aire being round about us, stopping the poore, the great store and abundance of humors is
carried, as Aristotle saith to the head, where it sticketh for a time, and layeth as it were a lump of lead upon the braine, which maketh us drowsie and proane to sleepe. … For by late watchinges their [i.e., students’] vitall spirits through too much intension are weakened, and their native humidite dried up.48

This account of sleepiness might serve as a gloss to Fondling and Donne’s mock-epic nocturnal (e)mision. As a medical account, it is inconsistent, perhaps even contradictory. On the one hand, at nighttime and especially after eating, the body’s pores close up so that the head becomes filled with a “great store and abundance of humor” and thus heavy and prone to sleep. Fulbecke’s authority for what might be called the wet version of sleepiness is Aristotle, who uses “exhalation” as a technical term for the transfer of immaterial vapors from one medium to another, a sort of synonym for expiration or correlative action to inspiration viewed from the perspective of the giver rather than of the recipient. For example, vital spirits are exhaled from food to the blood during digestion; likewise, the soul is exhaled from the first principle to the body at creation and exhaled from the body at death.49 In his poetry and prose, Donne likewise uses “exhale” for the transmission of the spirit or other precious matter either from the divine to the human or vice versa.50

On the other hand, “night watchings” weakens students’ minds by drying out their “native humiditie.” Fulbecke’s authority for this second, dry version of sleepiness is the Galenic physician Levinus Lemnius’s De habitu et constitutione corporis (1569). In this popular work, Lemnius warns against “unseasonable study” immediately after expounding on the humoral causes and effects of “carnall lust and Venerous act[s].” Using a logic that might also explain why Satyre I begins with the confined scholar and ends with the ejected lover, Lemnius asserts that too much study and too much sex have identical humoral consequences. Both leave students too dry and thus too exhausted to think properly.51 Ever the advocate of balance and moderation, Lemnius observes that “seasonable and tempestuous [i.e., timely] coiture rideth away great store of Phlegme, and scowreth away other humours, which being engendred within a man, damnifie and annoy the body and minde.”52 But when Fondling “flings” from Donne’s speaker “like light dew exhaled,” he flings “violently,” not seasonably.53 This exhalation of dew signals the final drying up of Fondling’s character-defining excess of humor. Dried up rather than scoured clean, worn out rather than seasonably balanced, Fondling returns directly to bed, sexual and scholarly irregularity alike leading to soporific head-hanging.

Of course, Lemnius’s humoral theories are not specific to students of law and Fulbecke’s advice recalls any number of humanist programs of study
that struggle to figure scholarly labour in sexual terms. But the key point is that such humoral theories and sexualized conceptions of legal scholarship were a part of early modern legal discourse. They might be characterized as openings that existed in law and other humanist disciplines, and that were in the process of being forgotten, repressed, or closed as our modern ideal of the law took shape (imagine a judge today recusing her or himself because of a humoral imbalance). Because of the openness of the law, a simile such as “like light dew exhaled” can be read as an image of sexual climax, corporal lassitude, and ethical failing. Thus it emphasizes the non-rational basis of early modern legal practice. As I have already suggested, this simile can also be read as a moment of generic self-definition, i.e., as a fleeting glimpse of pastoral or romantic naturalism in an otherwise satiric cityscape. In this regard, satire can be seen as the perfect genre with which to envision the closure of the law from humoral theories like those of Limnius and Fulbecke. As Paul Allen Miller has recently argued, in its classical Roman form, satire is “essentially bereft of the idea of regenerative force” and “privileges by negation the closed, the solid, and the finished over the open, the fluid, and the boundless.” Satire is obsessed with what it would exclude and is filled with images of “the open, the fluid, and the boundless.” Donne’s satire too is filled with similar images, from the “plump muddy whore” to the opening and closing of doors to the “wild uncertaine” (12) Fondling himself. When Fondling returns to “his bed” (112), he completes the circular path of Donne’s erotic quest and thus privileges closure over openness, but only by means of a negative or non-regenerative exemplum.

To conclude, if it is possible at least at times to imagine Fondling as Donne’s penis, then it is also possible to place Donne’s satire within an institutional history of English common law in which the roles of desire, ethics, and imagination were themselves being increasingly diminished or even repressed. This argument assumes that Donne was capable of and interested in writing about early modern law in a purposeful or even serious but satiric way. This assumption runs contrary to the one that seems to have governed our understanding of Donne’s Satyres, namely that that they “tell us more about the satirist than the thing satirized” and that their “full effect” depends “upon dramatic irony, upon our perception of the speaker’s unconscious or preconscious relationship to his subject.” In the context of early modern law at least, such distinctions between person and institution and between conscious and unconscious (or preconscious) attitudes may be too sharply drawn. Institutional regulations at the Inns and advice manuals about the study of law addressed what students like Donne and Fondling should do at night because the night “was the time of fantasy or imaginings, of images
and women, and all were perceived as threats to the capacity, probity, and reason of law.” As it was studied, taught, and reproduced, law “constantly spill[ed] from … the text into life” through “little slips, repetitions and compulsions, melancholic moods or hysterical outbursts, that hint at the transgressive movement … from conscious to unconscious law.” The moment that Fondling flings from Donne “like light dew exhal’d” may be just such a slip, a transgressive, unconscious movement that prepares us for the fuller, more conscious and idiosyncratic inquiry into the lawfulness of desire, ethics, and imagination in Donne’s four subsequent formal verse satires.

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Notes


3. Goodrich defines repression this way: “Repression is a positive and internal act, it lays out a space within the institution; in the case of law the space is one of images, of flowers, ornaments, aesthetic judgments, tastes, emotions, lifestyles, and fantasies, a space consonant with all of those disciplines and discourses that doctrine and law conceived to be incidental, accessory, merely rhetorical, contingent or other to the tradition (ius non scriptum) or established practice of law” (Goodrich, Oedipus Lex, p. 13).


8. See for example, Virgil, *Aeneid*, 6.158. Thomas Fulton cites this passage from Horace’s *Satire* 1.2 as evidence that Donne’s satires are intended to be read (in part) as interior dialogues between the body and the soul (see “Hamlet’s Inky Cloak and Donne’s *Satyres*,” *John Donne Journal* 20 [2001], pp. 74–75). He does not note the bawdy pun or the mock epic style. A more likely classical source was Persius, who first parodied Horace’s trademark chattiness by admitting that he created a fictional interlocutor purely to have someone to argue with (cf. *Satire* 1.44).


13. Compare the penultimate verse paragraph of Everard Guilpin’s *Satyre* 5, which closely imitates Donne’s *Satyre* I:

   In is he gone [to a brothel], Saint Venus be his speed,
   For some great thing must be adventured.
   There comes a troop of puisnes from the play
   Laughing like wanton schoolboys all the way.
   Yon go a knot to Bloom’s ordinary—
   Friends and good fellows all now, by and by
   They’ll be by the ears, vie stabs, exchange disgraces,
   And bandy daggers at each other’s faces. (161–68)

14. Compare Hester’s observation: “the poem is a comic study in failure, a witty dramatization of the radical and seemingly irremedial gap between the intentions of the satirist and the obduracy of his *adversarius*. By the end of the poem Donne’s scholastic speaker has himself been ‘ravish’d,’ metaphorically at least, by the inconstancy of the town” (17). I am suggesting that Donne’s metaphor might be more explicit than Hester suggests.

15. For the sexual connotations of *caesus* < *caedo* = beat, cut, strike, see J. N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 145–49.


20. *Ibid*.

21. Augustine observes that not even boastfully amoral and dog-like cynics will have sex in public (*Of the Citie of God*, Bk. 14, chap. 20).


31. Montaigne, pp. 97

32. Montaigne, pp. 103.


35. The prefixes ‘com-’ and ‘con-’ occur fifteen times in *Satyre* I, but only five times in *Satyre* II and once in *Satyre* III, poems of roughly the same length.


41. Quoted in Goodrich, 82. In terms that are suggestive of Donne’s contrast between the chamber and the street, Fulbecke contrasts “Civilitye called Urbanitas,” which “is onely
to be seen in public meetings and assemblies” and “Curtesy,” which “sheweth within a man’s private walls, or chamber, and may be used betwixt man and man” (Fulbecke, A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Lawe [London, 1600], 16r).


44. See Hester, pp. 8–9.

45. For melancholia juridica, See Goodrich, Oedipus Lex, pp. 1–15.

46. Fulbecke, 10r.

47. Fulbecke, 11.

48. Fulbecke, 19r.

49. For anathumiasis in this sense, see Aristotle, On Sleep, 456 b; and On the Soul, 405 a.


51. Levinus Lemnius, The Touchstone of Complexions, trans. T. N. (London, 1633), pp. 119–20. Unsurprisingly, Lemnius urges sexual moderation for those with a “moist complexion” as well. But his treatment of the “harms of venery” for them is much longer and even includes an account of “yong lusty Damosels and Virgins” who have “Night-mare[s]” that lead to “effluxions of seed” (Lemnius, pp. 168–72).

52. Lemnius, p. 169.

53. For another crudely sexual and strictly dualistic use of the word “fling,” compare the concluding lines of “Community”: “Changed loves are but changed sorts of meat, / And when he hath the kernel eat, / Who doth not fling away the shell” (22–24).

54. For example, if Donne’s ethical watchword, constancy (cf. 11 and 112), sends us to Justus Lipsius’s influential treatise De constantia (1584), we find that Lipsius urges young scholars not to confuse learning with wisdom. If they do, they might become either like Penelope’s profligate suitors who, unable to obtain their goal (Penelope = wisdom), fall in love with her handmaids or, contrariwise, like “tender virgins” who refuse to be “conjoined with the manly courage of wisdom.” Seeking a mean between the scholarly extremes of profligacy and virginity, the best image Lipsius can devise for learning that is appropriately sexual (i.e., reproductive) and political (i.e., useful) is arborial: students hoping to use learning as a “directory unto virtue” are like “trees that will bear no fruit, except they growe neere unto others that be of the male kind” (Justus Lipsius, Of Constancie, trans. John Stradling [London, 1595], pp. 68–69). Constancy of friendship is gained at the cost of dehumanization.


57. Goodrich, Oedipus Lex, p. 3.
