Throughout her book, Cooper implies that romance has always been a genre to pick up the changes and resonances of the moment that produced it. The changes, Cooper shows, were reflected both in printed and manuscript romances. (One of the many values of this book is that it takes into account, albeit selectively, manuscript romance, which few critics have examined thus far.) Yet culture and history are only discreetly invoked. Cooper’s book is a sound analysis of the literariness of romance, of the ways romance signifies, means, and works as a literary structure, not a mirror of, or an agent solely within, material cultural production. Her encyclopedic approach to the history of the genre and the catalogue-like exhaustiveness of the memes that constitute romance represent a good example of British empirical scholarship in literary studies and also make this book an important resource for anyone wishing to grasp what the early modern romance was about and how it was structured. Fellows’ and Moore’s editions expand the canon of Renaissance literature and Cooper’s book will change what we know about romances and how we read them. All three books will be of use to scholars working on romances, to students encountering them for the first time, as well as to critics of the early modern period looking for new topics to quibble with.

GORAN V. STANIVUKOVIC, University of Sheffield


In this welcome addition to recent scholarship on women’s participation in the English civil war, Katharine Gillespie attempts to establish an alternate tradition of liberal political thought—one that does not reduce to the antifeminist premises of Locke and Hobbes, but rather establishes women’s claims as originators of genuinely transformative and emancipatory political discourse. In doing so, Gillespie clearly hopes to save revolutionary women pamphlet-writers, preachers, petitioners, and prophets from the feminist rejection of liberal rights and contract theory and to encourage a revaluation of their political innovations. She takes on the sacred cows of liberalism one by one in chapters on the separation of church and state, contract theory, possessive individualism, and the free market, demonstrating that women’s appropriations and creative transformations of these ideals do not merely repeat or derive from the “masculinist tradition” strenuously condemned by critics like Carol Pateman, Catherine MacKinnon, and Seyla Benhabib. By extension, then, Gillespie also implicitly defends liberal rights theory, both against its attackers, and against its lukewarm defenders: as she puts it, “it is my hope that this book will lead to the conclusion that something called ‘feminism’ should neither reject something called ‘liberalism’ out of hand as an inherently sexist tradition, nor should it settle for seeking out the ways in which that male-authored body of thought may or may not have ‘trickled down’ to
benefit women down the line” (30). Indeed, Gillespie wants to have us ask how we ended up with only these options—that is, how the alternative tradition she recuperates got buried in subsequent generations of political philosophy.

A first chapter, which should have been the book’s introduction, outlines the problem—the false choices and oversights that bedevil scholars who write about women sectarians—and points toward some of the texts and conclusions Gillespie will consider. She takes some provocative positions, challenging for instance the assumptions that women must resist the control of “the state,” that community must trump individuality, or that capitalism must be perceived as monolithically oppressive. In each of these cases, careful study of dissenting women’s thought shows that these assumptions did not, at least for early women, have sole sway. In her second chapter on Katherine Chidley and Anna Trapnel, for instance, Gillespie tracks the complex interrelationships of privacy and publicity, arguing that each of these figures “erects a boundary between the public realm of government and a private sphere of guaranteed protection (or ‘rights’) against interference by authorities” (65), not because “they wished to be enclosed” in an unequal domestic sphere, but because they wanted freedom from the public sphere which required mandatory attendance at government-sanctioned churches (65). Gillespie looks at the function of actual and metaphorical houses, domestic and religious: “The Lord’s house is to be built outside the sphere of state control and within the privacy of the freely choosing congregation; from within these walls the public voices of women and petitioning messengers will issue” (84–85). Chapter 3 focuses on Elizabeth Poole’s prophecies, which invoke the idea of marital rape to suggest “that the wife has an interest and a body that is separate from her husband’s and that, as a result, she cannot be forced into a sexual relationship” (148). Metaphorically, Poole argues that the people possess the quality of chastity and must consent even after they enter into a political contract with a ruler. Abuse laws, Gillespie points out, actually disproved the idea that the wife simply merged into the husband’s identity after marriage; since one could and would not beat oneself, the need to legislate makes the case against full coverture. With this independence of existence, chastity and choice, women (or all citizens) who entered into contracts did not—could not—merely give themselves into slavery.

In her chapter on Sarah Wight and Anne Wentworth, Gillespie explores the issue of sovereign individuality. If Poole’s writing embraces the idea of possessive individualism, Wight and Wentworth devolve sovereignty itself onto the individual and away from the monarch by asserting a sovereign subject status conferred by God. Gillespie here resists the idea of a merely fragmented, fluid, or multivalent version of women’s selves available in some criticism, pointing out that “precisely because individuals (especially women)...should be ‘riven’ or interpellated by various collective overdeterminations...they had to be reminded that there was a secure and stable sense of self that acted as a counter to those pressures—and that was the God within” (171). Finally, in her chapter on Mary Cary, Gillespie traces how a capitalist model is appropriated by a woman dissenter to establish authority: in this case, the servant’s role, obedient, submissive, correctly hierarchical, is extrapolated out of Cary’s rela-
tionship to God, which of course gives her special agency and ascendancy. If God was the master, then ministers and magistrates who did not recognize their true duty could be cast as treasonous and disobedient servants, in need of correction from their more enlightened peers. Cary, Gillespie further argues, speaks “from within the logic of enclosure and improvement, not from without…predicating her argument on a labor theory of property, one in which individuals gain the right to preach because they labor to do so” (236).

Gillespie covers a great deal more ground than I can represent here—nearly every chapter is chock full of contextual material, and she touches on the works of far more women in the period than merely the central figures of each chapter. Her approach is careful and scholarly, yet genuinely contests some recent feminist certitudes about political theory. Readers who are devoted to the case against liberal rights theory will find holes in her work, not least in the missing connections that would bring her positions on these early women to bear on current political practice and thought, but those holes cannot legitimately be held against the book given its more limited goals. It is a useful and provocative piece of critical work on writers who are still too often overlooked or mishandled. I would point out, however, that this book did need much better editing and advice in its preparation: Gillespie’s writing is often tortuous, her overuse of scare-quotes distracting in the extreme, and the volume cries out for a Works Cited and a better index (for such a complex project covering such unusual material, more than a name-and-title index is essential). All of these shortcomings could have been remedied with the help of a better editor who required further revision and demanded a more usable setup.

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Finucci’s extremely energetic and scholarly book opens a portal to the dramatic and ultimately disturbing effects of misogyny on the beliefs surrounding bodies, procreation, and sex in Western civilization, by providing a learned, passionate, and visceral synthetic reading of the literature of the early modern European period. The Manly Masquerade brings a dazzling display of erudition to the topic of the performative aspects of masculinity, and femininity as well. Finucci uses the work of Freud as her basic lens in this work of primarily literary analysis, but also profitably brings in contemporary feminist theory (Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Kristeva), and the work of Foucault, Thomas Laqueur, and Piero Camporesi, among others. As the author writes, “masculinity is a construct, a masquerade, a display, a performance, just like femininity” (166). The seven essays that comprise this work all involve the problems surrounding the successful performance of gender and procreative sex.