Stoicism and History in Joachim Du Bellay’s
Antiquitez de Rome

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La collection de sonnets de Joachim Du Bellay, Les Antiquitez de Rome, est une réponse philosophique à la notion de translatio imperii. Au lieu de considérer l’histoire comme une succession de nations en compétition les unes avec les autres, Du Bellay la décrit plutôt comme le développement organique d’une seule entité mondiale. Cette approche repose sur trois principes de la pensée stoïcienne : le cosmopolitanisme, le déterminisme et le libre arbitre.

At first glance, Joachim Du Bellay’s collection of sonnets, the Antiquitez de Rome, may seem like a solemn, withdrawn meditation upon the ravages of time. And in many respects this is true. But the text is also much more. The Antiquitez actively engages in contemporary debates and draws upon Stoicism to make a profound critique of the imperialistic historiographies that flourished prior to its publication in 1558. Du Bellay uses the Antiquitez to propose an alternate philosophy of history.

Before turning to the Antiquitez, let us examine its cultural context—in particular, the notion of translation imperii, one of the great historical models of the time. This notion was a composite of various traditions inherited from Antiquity. To begin with, its vision of the relationship between God and earthly nations was drawn from the Old Testament, where God is the judge and arbiter of kingdoms, exalting the power of the virtuous and destroying that of the corrupt: “A kingdom is translated (transfertur) from one people to another, because of injustices, and wrongs, and injuries, and divers deceits” (Ecclesiasticus 10:8). Thus, the Old Testament shows us prophet after prophet not only rebuking Israel and Judah for their sins, but also speaking to the great kingdoms of the day: Ezekiel warning Egypt of its coming fall, Jeremiah warning the Philistines and Ammonites, Daniel prophesying the ruin of Babylon, etc.
Even in Antiquity, this general theory of divine intervention crystallized into a historical chronology. Particularly influential in this process was the book of Daniel and its vision of the four beasts. The book itself states that the beasts represent four successive kingdoms (7:17). The definitive identifications of these four kingdoms—at least in Western Europe—were offered in the fifth century CE, in Orosius’ *Historiae Adversum Paganos*. Here, he posits that the four kingdoms were, first, Babylon (grouped with Persia), then Macedonia, then Africa (Carthage), and finally Rome.³

Now, identifying Rome as the fourth kingdom had significant implications. The book of Daniel states that after the destruction of the fourth, all power will be given to an everlasting kingdom of the saints (7:26–27). In other words, the end of Rome would mark the end of the world. And thus it was believed that Rome’s power would never fail, never disappear, until the return of Christ. The traditional praise for Rome as the “eternal city” met with the Biblical vision of Rome as the end-time kingdom.⁴

This notion became increasingly problematic after the fall of the Western Empire. If Rome was to last until Christ’s return, how was such a collapse possible? The response that developed in the Middle Ages was that the process of *translatio* that had successively exalted the kingdoms of Antiquity continued on after the apparent demise of the Empire. Even if the Emperors had lost their power, Rome itself survived: the *imperium* had simply been passed on to a more worthy successor. The question, of course, was: who was this successor? Which nation had the right to rule over the others until the end of time? Not surprisingly, over the course of the Middle Ages, nearly every major kingdom made its claim to the imperial throne.⁵

In the sixteenth century, far from diminishing, the debate intensified. Papal Rome proclaimed its right, equating the Pope with the Caesars of old, proudly displaying the ancient monuments of the Capitoline Hill, and even defending the Donation of Constantine.⁶ The Holy Roman Empire continued to vaunt its heritage in the kingdom of Charlemagne—the true Empire revived in the West—and praised the virtue of the German people, as compared to the decadent corruption of the Italians.⁷ And France also had certain claims to the scepter, for it also had participated in the Frankish empire.⁸ The period saw an explosion of commentaries upon the book of Daniel.⁹

By the 1550s, the polemics surrounding the *translatio imperii* was arriving at a fever pitch in France. Through Geneva, the Lutheran historians, adamant
defenders of the German right to Empire, began to be translated into French. Johannes Carion’s *Chronicon* was translated in 1553 and Johann Sleidan’s *De Quattuor summis imperiis*, in 1557. The French historians responded in kind. Guillaume Postel lashed out directly against Carion and Nauclerus, defending France’s right in his *Raisons de la Monarchie* (1551), the *Apologie de la Gaule*, and the *Expeditons… faictes par les Gaulois* (1552). Similarly, in his *De Prisca Celtopaedia* (1556), Jean Picard de Toutry sought to establish the priority of the ancient Gauls over the Romans in order to demonstrate their right to rule over Italy. The *translatio imperii* had become an ideological weapon in the rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the Valois.

It is against this background that we find Joachim Du Bellay, recently returned from Italy, publishing a small collection of sonnets, *Les Antiquitez de Rome*. The year was 1558, and Du Bellay was certainly aware of the buzz concerning the *translatio*. Indeed, Gilbert Gadoffre has convincingly argued that the work is nothing less than a direct attack upon the notion. In the *Antiquitez*, Du Bellay forcefully insists that the succession is over and the Empire is gone forever. “Rome n’est plus,” he states bluntly in the fifth sonnet. Never again will such a kingdom return into the world: “et ne se peut revoir /Pareille à sa grandeur, grandeur sinon la sienne.”

Accordingly, Du Bellay laughs at the imperial claims of each of the nations of the contemporary world. He certainly rejects the pretentions of the Renaissance Papacy. This current Rome is not even a shadow of the ancient Empire. It is a “dusty plain” (XV 14), a “nothing” (XIII 13). Today’s visitor to the city sees “nothing of Rome in Rome” (III 2). And if Du Bellay is cruel to the Italians, he is even harsher with the Germans. He treats them as silly impostors, a crow disguised as an eagle (XVII 9–10). Du Bellay even seems to dismiss the French arguments for succession. The *translatio imperii* has come to an end.

What’s more, Du Bellay does not content himself simply to reject the notion. He goes further and deeper. In the *Antiquitez* he constructs an entire philosophy of history, a philosophy that is fundamentally incompatible with the hawkish speculations of his contemporaries. Indeed, the collection is a vast inquiry into the forces that move time. In particular, Du Bellay searches for the reasons for Rome’s decline. He explores politico-historical explanations, such as internal strife, foreign invaders, and even natural disasters. He also examines mor-
alistic explanations, asking whether its destruction was not divine vengeance against Roman hubris, and if civil war was not the inevitable result of moral decadence. He even proposes broad, cosmological explanations, inquiring whether Rome’s decline was not part of the general decaying force of time itself, the inevitable ending for all things of this mortal world.

Throughout, Du Bellay draws heavily upon one particular philosophical school: Stoicism. There is no doubt that Du Bellay both knew the Stoa and recognized it as a systematic doctrine. In the Deffence et illustration de la langue française, he directly cites Cicero’s De finibus, a key source on Stoic ethics, and recites an anecdote from the De natura deorum, a key source on Stoic theology. He clearly admired Seneca, whom he imitates in numerous poems. Furthermore, the Antiquitez are full of evocations of the Stoic poet, Lucan, and of Virgil’s Aeneid, whose Stoic influences were doubtless known to the poet. In addition to these Latin sources, certain passages indicate that Du Bellay had at least a limited familiarity with Greek Stoicism as well.

Stoicism is one of the pillars of the Antiquitez’s inquiry into historical causes. Du Bellay makes this clear in the ninth sonnet, which opens with a dizzying list of Stoic and Epicurean theories of causality:

Astres cruelz, et vous Dieux inhumains,
Ciel envieux, et marastre Nature,
Soit que par ordre, ou soit qu’à l’aventure
Voyse le cours des affaires humains,
Pourquo jadis ont travaillé voz mains
A façonner ce monde qui tant dure? (IX 1–6)

Du Bellay does not mention any school specifically by name—he never does throughout the entire collection—but he clearly evokes two conceptions of causation. On the one hand, he describes the Stoic view, which insisted upon the orderliness of historical events (ordre, 3), the methodical unfolding of Fate, and upon astrology: astres cruelz (1), ciel envieux (2). On the other hand, he also evokes the Epicureans, who insisted upon chance (l’aventure 3), in gods who care not for human affairs (Dieux inhumains, 1), and in the cruel indifference of Nature (la marastre Nature, 2). He seems to entertain both schools’ explanations, accepting both as possibilities.
In contrast, the closing lines strongly reject a third Hellenistic school, Aristotelianism:

Je ne dy plus la sentence commune,
Que toute chose au dessous de la Lune
Est corrompable, et sugette à mourir:
Mais bien je dy (et n’en veuille desplaire
A qui s’efforce enseigner le contraire)
Que ce grand Tout doit quelquefois perir. (9–14)\(^\text{33}\)

Du Bellay scoffs at the Aristotelian contrast between the unchanging heavens and the mutable sub-lunar world, proclaiming instead that the universe as a whole, heavens included, must be destroyed. In fact, the sonnets not only mark the poet’s rejection of the Scholastics, but also make another implicit nod at the Stoics and Epicureans, both of whom argued for cosmic destruction.\(^\text{34}\) In other words, Sonnet IX announces that the philosophical orientation of the \textit{Antiquitez} will be a departure from traditional university Scholasticism, towards more edgy Stoicism and Epicureanism. And indeed, the vision that arises from the work is exactly that: an eclectic mixture of the two Hellenistic schools, with Platonic overtones.

This study, then, will examine Du Bellay’s use of Stoicism (leaving aside the question of Epicureanism).\(^\text{35}\) We will see that he uses the Stoa to build a conception of history that fundamentally opposes the theory of the \textit{translatio imperii} and its hawkish implications.

Three aspects of the Stoic philosophy of history particularly inform the \textit{Antiquitez}. The first point to note is the vast universalism of the school. The Stoics believed that a single rational force suffuses the entire world, animating every being.\(^\text{36}\) This force, whether called “god,” “fate,” or “nature,” rationally and methodically moves the cosmos towards its preordained end. In the \textit{De natura deorum}, Cicero’s Stoic representative, Balbus, describes the matter thus:

The nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely ‘craftsmanlike’ but actually ‘a craftsman,’ whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in
every detail (*provida utilitatum oportunitatumque omnium*)... Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus every event in the world, every movement and every change, among the living and the non-living, is guided by Providence. All things are united within its all-embracing plan.

This universalism has powerful implications for the concept of the nationhood. Rather than viewing humans in separate categories, classes, and races, Stoicism insists upon their common heritage. Citizenship in individual states is eclipsed before citizenship in the universe as a whole. For, as Marcus Cato says in Cicero’s *De finibus*, the world itself is one great city, and all humans are its citizens:

It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will (*numen*); it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus, the Stoics are often considered to be some of the earliest and strongest proponents of “cosmopolitanism.”\textsuperscript{39}

And consequently, the Stoa argued that historians should not view the course of events in terms of individual nations or personal achievements. On the contrary, history is the story of all humanity, the story of a single, universal city, whose fate is inscribed in the stars themselves. It is Diodorus Siculus who most strikingly described the project of Stoic historians:

Furthermore, it has been the aspiration of these writers to marshal all men, who, although united one to another by their kinship, are yet separated by space and time, into one and the same orderly body (*σύνταξις*). And such historians have therein shown themselves to be, as it were, ministers of Divine Providence. For just as Providence, having brought the orderly arrangement of the visible stars and the natures of men together into one common relationship, continually directs their courses through all eternity, apportioning to each that which falls to it by the direction of fate, so likewise the historians, in recording the common affairs of the inhabited
world as though they were those of a single state (πόλις), have made of their treatises a single reckoning (λόγος) of past events and a common clearing-house of knowledge concerning them.  

Finally, we should note that, although the Stoic idea of a single, universal city seems to have been primarily an abstract ethical concept, many later authors tended to associate it with historical world empires. Plutarch, for example, says that Alexander the Great made into reality what Zeno had only dreamed of. Virgil, in the *Aeneid*, clearly associates the universal city with Rome: the city of fate, without borders or temporal limits. More down to earth, Cicero argues that Rome should at least seek to incarnate the justice of the cosmic city within its hegemony.  

Du Bellay’s vision of Roman history, in the *Antiquitez*, arises directly from this Stoic notion of cosmopolitanism. First of all, in the Virgilian tradition, Du Bellay explicitly associates Rome with the universal city. “Rome fut tout le monde, et tout le monde est Rome” (XXVI 9). He justifies this association in multiple ways. First of all, from a political perspective, Rome was the world because it had hegemony over all other nations. He describes it as the unique and all-encompassing authority of the ancient world, the city “de qui le pouvoir / Fut le pouvoir du monde” (VI 6–7). Second of all, the poet defines Roman universalism in a geographical sense, poetically insisting that the Empire was so huge that it literally covered the entire globe: “le plan de Rome est la carte du monde” (XXVI 14). Du Bellay also proposes a kind of ethnic universalism: just as the world is the common dwelling place of all beings, similarly, the Empire united within its vast borders a vast spectrum of peoples and civilizations, from the Moors in the West, to the Scythes in the East (IV 1–3). Finally, Du Bellay equates Rome and the world in a cultural sense: the Empire heaped together all the art and knowledge of the ancient world. Sonnet XXIX enumerates the cultural traditions that it encompassed: Egyptian pyramids, Asian luxury, African wonders, and Greek architecture, art, and philosophy.  

In and of itself, such a view of Roman universalism is completely compatible with the theory of the *translatio imperii* and its exaltation of Rome as the “eternal city.” But Du Bellay pushes the concept in a different direction, towards greater philosophical abstraction. Accordingly, in Stoic tradition (tinted with Platonism), he constantly equates Rome with the All, “le
And just as Cicero, in the *De finibus*, described the world as the common dwelling place of gods and men, in the same way, Du Bellay describes Rome as the summation of all things natural, human, and divine: “Qui voudra voir tout ce qu’ont peu nature, / L’art, et le ciel (Rome) te vienne voir” (v. 1–2).

And so, in the spirit of Diodorus Siculus, the poet imagines the growth of Rome as the gradual development of a single universal force. He uses numerous metaphors to express this vision:

Comme lon void de loing sur la mer courrouceee  
Une montagne d’eau d’un grand branle ondoyant,  
Puis trainant mille flotz, d’un gros choc abboyant  
Se crever contre un roc, où le vent l’a poussee,  
Comme on void la fureur par l’Aquilon chassee  
D’un sifflement aigu l’orage tournoyant,  
Puis d’une aelle plus large en l’air s’esbanoyant  
Arrester tout à coup sa carriere lassee:  
Et comme on void la flamme ondoyant en cent lieux  
Se rassemblant en un, s’aguiser vers les cieux,  
Puis tumber languissante: ainsi parmy le monde  
Erra la monarchie: et croissant tout ainsi  
Qu’un flot, qu’un vent, qu’un feu, sa course vagabonde  
Par un arrest fatal s’est venue perdre icy. (XVI)

The history of the ancient world is viewed as the steady growth of a single power. Du Bellay uses metaphors of elements—water, wind, and fire—that blend together and merge into one. The smaller wildfires combine to form an inferno. The great tide pulls the smaller waves within its current. In each case we witness the progressive agglomeration of multiple elements into a unified global identity.

The same vision of history appears in Sonnet XX. Here, Du Bellay uses another metaphor, comparing the rise of the Empire to the process of evaporation:

Non autrement qu’on void la pluvieuse nüe  
Des vapeurs de la terre en l’air se soulever,
Puis se courbant en arc, à fin de s’abrever,
Se plonger dans le sein de Thetis la chenue,
Et montant derechef d’où elle estoit venue,
Sous un grand ventre obscur tout le monde couver… (XX 1–7)\(^50\)

Again, we find an image of countless particles gathering together to form a single body. The great cloud that covers the earth results from vapours coming together from all across the lands and the seas. Du Bellay recognizes a periodic process of rises and falls (evaporation and precipitation); but these are not successesions of conflicting powers, but rather phases of a single entity.

The same holistic vision returns when Du Bellay contemplates the fall of the Empire. After describing the internal unrest, the revolts and civil wars that tore Rome apart, he compares the situation to the end of the universe:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Ainsi quand du grand Tout la fuite retournee} \\
\text{Où trentesix mil’ ans ont sa course bornee,} \\
\text{Rompra des elemens le naturel accord,} \\
\text{Les semences qui sont meres de toutes choses,} \\
\text{Retourneront encor’ à leur premier discord,} \\
\text{Au ventre du Caos eternellement closes. (XXII 9–14)\(^51\)}
\end{align*}
\]

In this striking portrait of cosmic destruction, we find the poet again insisting upon the fundamental universalism that Rome represented, the “grand Tout.”\(^52\)

In fact, the Empire’s process of decline is exactly the same as its process of formation, simply in reverse. After the coming-together of multiple elements, seen in the previous sonnets, here we see their separation. The end arrived when Rome’s constitutive elements simply ceased to work together and disbanded.

Thus both the rise and the fall of the Empire appear as self-contained processes, based upon the organization (or disorganization) of its internal components. There is no sense of an exterior, of foreign threats, of enemy nations to conquer or by which to be conquered. Du Bellay’s Rome is a veritable cosmos, in the Stoic sense of the term: a world containing everything, outside of which nothing exists.\(^53\)

Du Bellay’s Stoic vision of history fundamentally contradicts the *translatio imperii*. As we have seen, the *translatio* envisioned the ancient world as
a field of separate, rival nations, all competing with each other for supremacy. Orosius himself stated this in his *Historiae adversum paganos*:

But if powers are from God, how much the more are the kingdoms, from which the remaining powers proceed; but if the kingdoms are hostile to one another, how much better it is if some one be the greatest to which all the power of the other kingdoms is subject.¹⁴

In contrast, we have seen that Du Bellay’s Roman universalism assumes a single, monolithic power. In his view, the appearance of rivalry and competition is but an appearance. The successive kingdoms of Antiquity were unwittingly working together to build the single, universal city. All were members of this city, its constitutive elements, whether they realized it or not. And consequently, for Du Bellay, it is absurd to ask which nation now holds the imperial scepter. All the nations can lay claim to this heritage, for all participated in the Roman Empire. His model rejects the need for competition, insisting instead upon collaboration. Furthermore, if all nations inherited the greatness of Rome, in the same way, all nations also inherited its ruin and destruction: “Rome vivant fut l’ornement du monde, / Et morte elle est du monde le tumbeau” (XXIX 13–14).¹⁵ The fall of Rome was the fall of the world as a whole.¹⁶ In the wake of that catastrophe, there is no longer anything for which to compete.

And thus, Du Bellay’s Stoic cosmopolitanism condemns the imperialistic polemics of his contemporaries. There is no need to fight over the fallen crown of Rome, for it belongs both to everyone, and to no one.

Let us now turn towards a second aspect of Stoic historical theory that Du Bellay adopts: the strong notion of internal determinism. The Stoics developed a specific notion of Fate.¹⁷ We have seen that they argued for a single universal force guiding the whole universe. This force, then, does not simply control individuals like puppets, from the outside. On the contrary, it animates the world from within. The Stoics argued that it manifests itself in individual beings as a kind of “breath” or “fire,” giving life to every plant and animal.¹⁸ And in turn, this breath is also the link between the universal and the particular, between cosmic fate and personal destiny. In other words, it is the divine agent, implanted within each of us, that harmonizes our own actions with the over-arching Providence of the world as a whole.¹⁹
This concept is rather abstract. And so Stoics illustrated it using multiple metaphors. Of particular note is that of the seed. The tiny, humble seed contains the plans for the entire life of the plant. For example, Seneca describes how the seed determines the pattern of growth of wheat, programming its passage from green shoot, to tall stalk, and finally to golden grain. This principle also pertains to human sperm, which predetermines the age when babies grow teeth, youth enter puberty, and hair turns white. Seeds are roadmaps for each living creature’s entire course of existence, both its growth and its decline. The Stoics used this metaphor to describe the work of the divine breath, a kind of “seed of destiny,” preordaining the lives of individuals. They applied this model to every level of existence, from plants and animals, to the stars, and the universe as a whole—for they viewed the world itself as a vast living being born of a divine seed, the “semenal reason,” the σπερµατικος λογος.

It is important to note that the Stoa believed that this process also manifested itself at the political level. Just as Providence organizes the lives of individual animals, in the same way it guides the growth of cities and empires. Again, in Cicero’s De natura deorum:

Nor is the care and providence of the immortal gods bestowed only upon the human race in its entirety, but it is also wont to be extended to individuals. … But if they care for these who inhabit that sort of vast island which we call the round earth, they also care for those who occupy the divisions of that island, Europe, Asia and Africa. Therefore they also cherish the divisions of those divisions, for instance Rome, Athens, Sparta and Rhodes.

Thus, the same divine reason that manifests itself in the biological development of a plant also manifests itself in the historical development of the city. And just as the seed predetermines both the growth and the decline of plants, Providence plans out the rise and fall of nations.

Now, this “semenal” view of fate is precisely Du Bellay’s vision of Roman history. In Sonnet XIX, the poet elaborates this analogy:

Tout le parfait dont le ciel nous honnore,
Tout l’imperfect qui naist dessous les cieux,
Tout ce qui paist noz esprits et noz yeux,
Et tout cela qui noz plaisirs devore:
Tout le malheur qui nostre aage dedore,
Tout le bonheur des siecles les plus vieux,
Rome du temps de ses premiers ayeux
Le tenoit clos, ainsi qu’une Pandore.
Mais le destin debrouillant ce Caos,
Où tout le bien et le mal fut enclos,
A fait depuis que les vertus divines
Volant au ciel ont laissé les pechez (XIX 1–12)

In this poem, Du Bellay contemplates the birth of Rome, relating it to the birth of the universe. The ancestors (les premiers ayeux, line 7) are veritable “seed-bearers,” containing within themselves all the future developments of the nation, and as such, likened to the original Chaos of the universe (line 9). The entire destiny of Rome was already there in potentiality: its greatness and its weakness, its triumphs and its failures. The role of history was simply to “sort out” (débrouiller) this Chaos.68

In numerous other sonnets, Du Bellay reiterates this “seed-based” view of determinism.69 Again and again he states that the fate of Rome was implanted within its earliest ancestors. From the beginning, they held in themselves the virtue and courage that would later make the Empire great:

Et tant fut la vertu de ce peuple feconde
En vertueux nepveux, que sa postérité
Surmontant ses ayeux en brave auctorité.
Mesura le hault ciel à la terre profonde (VIII 5–8)70

And, from the beginning, these same ancestors also bore within themselves the vices that would later cause the Empire to fall. Accordingly, in Sonnet XXIV, Du Bellay evokes the story of Romulus slaying his brother:

Estoit-ce point (Romains) vostre cruel destin,
Ou quelque vieil peché qui d’un discord mutin
Exerçoit contre vous sa vengeance eternelle?
Ne permettant des Dieux le juste jugement,
Voz murs ensanglantez par la main fraternelle
Se pouvoir asseurer d’un ferme fondément. (XXIV 9–14)

The destruction of Rome was thus not a historical accident; it was not due to the untimely invasion of an enemy army. Rather, it was a destiny that was implanted in the Romans from their very origins. Civil violence was woven into the nature of the people themselves—and the text traces this violence through the entire course of their history.

And thus, both the rise and the fall of Rome followed a predetermined plan. In this spirit, Du Bellay reprises the Senecan metaphor of wheat, comparing the stages of Roman history to the growth of a field:

Comme le champ semé en verdure foisonne,
De verdure se haulse en tuyau verdissant,
Du tuyau se herisse en epic florissant,
D’épic jaunit en grain que le chaud assaisonne:
Et comme en la saison le rustique moissonne
Les undoyans cheveux du sillon blondissant,
Les met d’ordre en javelle, et du blé jaunissant
Sur le champ despouillé mille gerbes façonne:
Ainsi de peu à peu creut l’Empire Romain.
Tant qu’il fut despouillé par la Barbare main (XXX 1–10)

Here we find a beautiful application of Stoic seed theory to classical history. Rome’s development followed a natural pattern of growth and decline, organically integrated into the order of the cosmos itself.

This Stoic view of historical determinism also represents another critique of the \textit{translatio imperii}. We have seen that the theory nurtured a highly dynamic view of history: it focused on the twists and turns of fortune, on the sudden rises and falls of nations, the transferrals of power from one to another. Du Bellay opposes this with a less volatile conception. In his view, the appearance of change and movement is in some ways an illusion. The historical plan has been fixed in time and eternity—it is only its temporal unrolling that we witness. Before this inexorable force of Fate, human efforts seem flimsy and futile. Rather than fighting Destiny, humanity should humbly recognize the hand of Providence and accept its offerings.
In this light, the vanity of contemporary efforts to revive Rome and its ancient glory becomes clear. If the Empire was fated to fall, then no human action can ever counteract that.

Now, this deterministic doctrine of the Stoics raises troubling ethical questions. For if all things are fated, and no one can resist their destiny, then what remains of personal responsibility? The Stoic responses to this question form a third important philosophical aspect of the *Antiquitez*.

Faced with a dilemma that opposed Fate and personal responsibility, the Stoics did not flinch. Chrysippus, the so-called second founder of the school, daringly argued that cosmic determinism is, in fact, completely compatible with moral responsibility. He insisted that individuals choose their own actions, even though these same actions have been fated for all eternity. His explanation for how this is possible is reported by two sources to which Du Bellay had ready access: Cicero’s *De Fato* and Aulus Gellius’ *Noctes Atticae*. Chrysippus states that although rational beings make their own choices, the decision-making process itself is pre-conditioned. Each being has been given a specific nature, a physical body that predisposes it towards certain virtues or vices:

…”There are differences in the natures (naturae) of human beings that cause some to like sweet things, others slightly bitter things, and make some licentious and others prone to anger or cruel or proud, while others shrink in horror from vices (vitia) of that sort…”

And thus, Chrysippus argued that foul-natured individuals, due to their foul personality, willingly choose to pursue evil. “It is in the nature of things, so to speak, fated and inevitable that evil characters should not be free from sins (peccata) and faults (errores).”

We might further note that while this response seeks to defend both personal responsibility and fatalistic determinism, it largely rejects a third causal factor: environmental pressures. Responsibility for actions is defined in an exclusive dialogue between the individual and Fate. It is true that the Stoics admitted that other external factors can intervene—for example, they insisted upon the importance of education in developing human reason. But even in such cases, they noted that these factors are, themselves, controlled by Fate. Accordingly, responsibility for them ultimately returns to the divine breath.
These Stoic doctrines underlie Du Bellay’s examination of Roman history. The same tension between Fate and personal responsibility returns. On the one hand, the poet constantly accuses the gods of causing Rome’s demise, bemoaning the decisive role of time and mortality. On the other hand, he chastises the Romans for bringing their punishment upon themselves. Their arrogance and hubris were what provoked the anger of the gods, and their jealousy and ambition led them into civil war. Who, then, is to blame for the fall of Rome?

Du Bellay ultimately offers the Chrysippean solution to the problem. It appears in Sonnet XXIII. Here, the poet recognizes that the ancient Romans—in this case, Scipio Nasica Corculum—discerned the Roman vices and sought to control them. But despite such wisdom, he states that the inborn, turbulent character of Rome inevitably won out:

Aussi void-on qu’en un peuple ocieux,
Comme l’humeur en un corps vicieux,
L’ambition facilement s’engendre. (XXIII 9–11)

In the Chrysippean tradition, Du Bellay does not portray Fate as forcing corruption upon the innocent Romans. On the contrary, we see them choosing this path themselves, by allowing themselves to fall into opulent inactivity. However, again following Chrysippus, the poet notes that this tendency itself was predetermined. Just as the philosopher spoke of our natures being predisposed towards specific vices, so the poet speaks of the Roman tendency towards ambition as the weakness of a vice-inclined (vicieux) body towards certain passions (humeur).

Thus, Du Bellay follows the Stoics in insisting upon Fate and personal choice as the two fundamental causal forces in human history. And in doing so, he also follows them in minimizing the role of environmental pressures. In fact, on this point, he is quite adamant. He repeats that no external force, no foreign enemy or natural disaster, could ever fundamentally change Rome’s character or destiny:

Ny la fureur de la flamme enragee,
Ny le trenchant du fer victorieux,
Ny le degast du soldat furieux,
Qui tant de fois (Rome) t’a saccagee,
Ny coup sur coup ta fortune changee,
Ny le ronger des siecles envieux,
Ny le despit des hommes et des Dieux,
Ny contre toy ta puissance rangee,
Ny l’ebranler des vents impetueux,
Ny le débord de ce Dieu tortueux
Qui tant de fois t’a couvert de son onde,
Ont tellement ton orgueil abbaissé,
Que la grandeur du rien, qu’ilz t’ont laissé,
Ne face encor’ esmerveiller le monde. (XIII)

Du Bellay relentlessly lists out the forces that could not alter the Romans’ fate. Their inborn character—in this case, their pride (line 12)—remained steady in the face of every obstacle. Similarly, though on a more positive note, Sonnet XXI details how another aspect of Roman character—courage—remained steadfast through all history. Du Bellay fundamentally discounts the role of external factors.

This view of Fate and personal responsibility also represents an attack on the notion of the *translatio imperii*—at least in its aggressive Renaissance manifestations. We have seen that Du Bellay’s contemporaries justified the transferral of power by evoking the greater virtues of the successor: for example, German strength, compared to Italian decadence, necessitated the translation of power to the north. And in this context, it was traditional to cite historical precedents: Lutheran historians used the Gothic sacking of Rome as a symbol of this power shift, just as French historians cited the Gaulish sacking. In other words, such historians attributed responsibility for Rome’s fall primarily to the invaders.

Du Bellay, in contrast, rejects such notions. When he mentions the Goths, in Sonnet XI, it is to note that they were but tools of the gods, thrown away after use. As Sonnet XXXI declares, Rome’s destiny did not lie in the hands of external factors:

Tu n’en n’es pas coupable, ô quiconques tu sois
Que le Tygre, et le Nil, Gange, et Euphrate baigne:
Coupables n’en sont pas l’Afrique ny l’Espaigne,
Ny ce peuple qui tient les rivages Anglois,
Ny ce brave soldat qui boit le Rhin Gaulois,
Stoicism and History

Ny cet autre guerrier, nourrisson d’Alemaigne.
Tu en es seule cause, ô civile fureur… (XXXI 3–8)

This poem is not simply a commentary on Roman history. It is also a direct response to contemporary polemicists of the *translatio imperii*. This is clear in the poem’s striking anachronism. Du Bellay does not name the traditional “barbarian invaders” of Antiquity—Goths, Vandals, Huns, etc. Instead, he invokes the great powers of contemporary Europe: *les Anglois, L’Espaigne, L’Alemaigne*, and the Ottoman Empire (the people of *le Tygre, le Nil*, and *l’Euphrate*). And, in line 7, he also quietly dismisses the *Gaulois*. To all of these peoples, his message is simple: you bear no responsibility for the matter, “tu n’en es pas coupable.” In the Stoic tradition, the only two responsible parties are Rome itself—*la civile fureur*—and Fate.

Let us now turn back to the historical context of *Antiquitez*. From the perspective of contemporaries, the collection of sonnets must have seemed rather odd. We have seen that in 1558 the *translatio imperii* was arriving at the peak of its popularity: France was roiling with commentaries on Daniel and polemical histories of the Gauls and Germans. Du Bellay was running straight against this cultural tide. Furthermore, he attacked this doctrine with an unusual philosophical tool: that of the Stoics. This was in striking contrast to the Aristotelianism of the University and the Platonic tendencies of his poetic comrades. Given such a “counter-cultural” stance, one would have expected his voice to be completely drowned out.

But this was not the case. On the contrary, Du Bellay seems to have been a fore-runner. From a philosophical perspective, it is clear in hindsight that the poet was an early example of what would become one of the major ideological movements of the coming decades: Neo-Stoicism. Justus Lipsius would publish his *De Constantia* in 1583, and Guillaume Du Vair, his *Philosophie morale des stoïques* in 1585. Montaigne began to publish his *Essais*, steeped in Senecan thought, in 1580, and D’Aubigné was already at work on his *Tragiques* in the 1570s. Du Bellay’s application of Stoic cosmology and ethics to Roman history was thus a strikingly avant-garde gesture.

Equally avant-garde were the political views that Du Bellay expressed in the *Antiquitez*. His attack on the *translatio imperii*, far from being isolated, would become increasingly common in the following decades. The theologians
of Geneva were already calming their fiery speculations, and historians such as Jean Bodin would soon question the validity of the notion. Meanwhile, although the nationalistic histories of the Gauls continued to flourish, they no longer served as support for imperialistic polemics. Rather, interest in the Gauls turned more towards an examination of French character and customs, internally rather than externally focused.

Now, it would be a gross overestimation of Du Bellay’s influence to think that his little collection of sonnets single-handedly caused this cultural shift. Greater forces were at work. The new political context of the 1560s necessarily changed attitudes, as the religious wars began in France and the Netherlands, as Protestant nations sought to consolidate their gains and establish their legitimacy, and as it simply became clear that no single nation had the power to conquer all the others. Du Bellay had benefited from a privileged position from which to recognize this new state of affairs. In Rome, he had listened to news and rumours from all across Christendom. And during his voyage home, he had stopped in Geneva where, as he says in Regrets CXXXVI, he had seen them with his own eyes! The clear-eyed political realism of the Antiquitez was simply the fruit of these experiences.

And yet, the fact remains that Du Bellay was among the first to announce this cultural shift. Both in its political perspective and in its philosophical model, the Antiquitez de Rome was ahead of its time, a work of stunning depth and vision.

Notes


2. The edition consulted is the Douay-Rheims Bible: *The Holy Bible Translated from the Latin Vulgate, Diligently Compared with the Hebrew, Greek, and Other Editions in Divers Languages* (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1914), p. 721.

4. For more information on the tradition of praising Rome as the “eternal city,” see Charles Stinger, *the Renaissance in Rome* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1985), pp. 292–96. See also Kliger, pp. 73–74.


7. The Holy Roman Empire had a rich tradition of invoking the *translatio imperii*. Even in the twelfth century, Otto von Freising had insisted that the authority of Rome had been transferred to Charlemagne. In the fourteenth century, Konrad von Megenberg affirmed this in his *De Translatione Imperii*. And in the early sixteenth century, German humanists such as Jakob Wimpfeling and Johannes Nauclerus would repeat these same claims to legitimacy. For more information, see Kliger, pp. 79–80, and especially Arthur Geoffrey Dickens, *The German nation and Martin Luther* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 3–4, 27–28, 38–39.


10. For more information on Johannes Carion’s *Chronicon* and Johannes Sleidan’s *De quattuor summis imperiis*, see Dubois, *Conception*, pp. 430–43 and Kliger, pp. 84–85.

11. Dubois’s *Celtes et Gaulois* remains the foundational study on these works, pp. 47–84.


13. “Rome is no more” (V 5). “No greatness equal to her greatness, except her own, will ever be seen again” (VI 7–8). Hereafter, sonnet and line numbers will appear in parentheses in the main text as, for example, (V 5). The translations are by Richard Helgerson, from the following edition: Joachim Du Bellay, *The Regrets, with the Antiquities of Rome, Three Latin Elegies, and The Defense and Enrichment*


15. The question as to whether Du Bellay accepts or rejects the notion of the translatio imperii in the case of his beloved France remains highly disputed. The poet seems to waver in different texts. Eric MacPhail, for example, has revealed an unabashedly imperialistic Du Bellay in a contemporaneous Latin epigram: the “De laudibus Galliae ad Annibalem Carum,” pp. 71–81. Fernand Hallyn highlights the ambiguity of the question in the partner piece to the Antiquitez, the Songe: “Le Songe de Du Bellay: de l’onirique à l’ironique,” in Le Sens des formes (Geneva: Droz, 1994), pp. 81–94.

It should also be noted that Du Bellay’s position on the translatio studii—partner to the translatio imperii—was also highly complex. On this topic, see Jean-Claude Carron, “Imitation and Intertextuality in the Renaissance,” New Literary History 19.3 (1988), pp. 555–79.

16. For example, Sonnets X 9–14; XXII 1–8; XXIII 5–14; XXIV 1–8; XXXI 9–14.

17. Sonnets XI passim; XXX 9–11; XXXI 1–8.

18. Most notably, in Sonnet XIII.


20. Sonnets XI 5–6; XVIII 5–11; XXIII 5–11.


24. In numerous passages, he speaks of the Stoics as a coherent philosophical school. One example can be found at the end of a plaintive letter to his uncle, Cardinal Jean Du Bellay, where he even applies Stoic emotional therapy to his own life:

Ce pendant je prendray patience le mieulx qu’il me sera possible, et avec les Stoiciens essayerai à me persuader que l’homme n’est point malheureux pour la perte des choses externes, mays seulement pour avoyr commis quelque acte
He quotes the *De finibus* in the *Deffence et Illustration*, Book I, Chapter 12. Later, in Book II, chapter 2, he tells an anecdote about the disciples of Pythagoras found in the *De natura deorum* I.10. It is perhaps important to note that, while Du Bellay clearly knew other Stoic texts, he could have found all of the theories discussed in this article simply by closely reading the philosophical works of Cicero. Accordingly, as much as possible, I have sought to use examples from Ciceronian texts.

Two examples: first, *Regrets 51*, which seems to echo arguments from Seneca’s *De Providentia* 12 and *De tranquillitate* 7. A second example can be found in Du Bellay’s celebrated Latin elegy, *Neminem aliena iniuria miserum esse*, whose title and opening section follow various arguments made in Seneca’s *De ira*.


Du Bellay surely knew about the Stoic influence upon the *Aeneid* through Renaissance commentaries on the work. In this regard, the most notable figure is Cristoforo Landino. For example, at the end of book four of the *Disputationes Camaldulenses*, the Florentine humanist explicitly notes the Stoic notions present in Anchises’s speech in *Aeneid* VI. As a translator of Virgil himself and an admirer of Renaissance Neo-Platonism, there is little doubt that Du Bellay had consulted this work.

See, for example, the opening of the *Hymne de la surdité*:

> Je ne veulx estre icy de la secte de ceulx
> Qui disent n’estre mal, tant soit-il angoisseux,
> For celuy dont nostre ame est atteincte et saisie,
> Et que tout autre mal n’est que par fantaisie. (lines 61–64)

Du Bellay chooses to conclude this tight summary of the Stoic doctrine of evil with a psychological term taken from Greek Stoicism: “fantasie,” φαντασια, rather than the Latin term “opinio” preferred by Cicero (see, for example, *Tusculanes* III.11). That said, his rather disparaging use of the term implies some Platonic influence as well.

29. The terms “cause” and “causality” are employed here in their modern sense. For more information on the stricter, materialistic definition of the term αἰτία, used by the Stoics, see Susanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 18–21.

30. “Cruel stars and you inhuman gods, envious heaven and stepmother nature, whether the course of human affairs proceeds by design or by accident, / Why did your hands once labor to fashion this world which is so enduring?”

31. The word “order” was key to the Stoic definition of Fate, for example in Chrysippus’s definition, reported by Aulus Gellius, in *Noctes Atticae* VII.1: “Fate, ‘ he says, ‘is an eternal and unalterable series of circumstances, and a chain rolling and entangling itself through an unbroken series of consequences (aeterni consequentiae ordines), from which it is fashioned and made up.’” The translation is from Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, 3 vols, trans. John C. Rolfe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), vol. II (books vi–xiii).


33. “I no longer repeat the commonplace that everything beneath the moon is corruptible and subject to death, / But I do say (with no offense to him who would teach the contrary) that this great All must one day perish.”


35. The question of Epicureanism in the *Antiquitez* deserves a separate article in itself. Tucker, for example, has noted the strong Lucretian overtones in certain passages of the work: see p. 190.


   These contemporary debates focus primarily upon the political doctrines of the early Stoics and their evolution over time. Thus, they do not have serious implications for Du Bellay. As we have seen, his knowledge of the theory was pri-
marily based upon the later, Roman authors, whose ideas on this matter are less objects of controversy.


44. “Rome was the whole world, and the whole world is Rome.”

45. “[This city] whose power was the power of the world”

46. “The map of Rome is the map of the world.”

47. He evokes “le grand Tout” twice in the collection: IX.14; XXII.9. In its various forms, the word “tout” is almost omnipresent in the collection, appearing 35 times in a collection of 32 sonnets.

48. “Whoever wishes to see all that nature, art, and heaven have been able to do, let him come see you, Rome.”


49. “As one sees from afar on the angry sea a mountain of water cresting with violent motion, then, pulling along a thousand waves, crashing with a huge shock, break against a rock on which the wind has flung it, / As one sees the fury driven by Boreas whipping up the storm with a deafening roar, then, with a broader wing sporting in the air, suddenly cease its wearied course, / And as one sees the flame rising from a hundred places, gathering itself in one, flare up toward the heavens,
then fall back spent, so throughout the world / Wandered empire and rowing like a wave, like the wind, like a flame, its errant course by the decree of fate came to an end here.”

50. “Just as the rain-filled cloud rises in the air from earth’s vapors, then bending in an arc, to slake its thirst plunges into the bosom of gray-haired Thetis, / And, rising once again to the place from which she had fallen, covers the whole world under her great dark belly…”

51. “So when the course of the great All has turned back on itself, or when thirty-six thousand years have measured their flight, the natural harmony of the elements will be broken, / The seeds, which are mothers of all things, will return once again to their primal discord, closed forever in the womb of Chaos.”

52. It should perhaps be noted that the passage in fact expresses a mix of Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of cosmic destruction. As Chambers notes (p. 940), Du Bellay is here following the Stoic poet Lucan, evoking the Stoic concept of the magnus annus, the revolution of the entire heavenly sphere, which brought the periodic destruction of the universe. But rather than imagining this destruction in traditional Stoic fashion—the great conflagration, consumption by fire—Du Bellay turns towards the Epicurean view of atomic dissolution.

53. Du Bellay would have most likely encountered this doctrine in Cicero, De natura deorum, II.13–14. For other Stoic authors who treated this question, see Bobzien, p. 30.


55. “Alive Rome was the ornament of the world, and dead she is the world’s tomb.”

56. Sonnets IX.14 and XX.14.


58. See, for example, Cicero, Natura Deorum II.19.


60. See, for example, Cicero’s De natura deorum, II.32 and De divinatione I.128. For the specifically Stoic use of the seed metaphor, see Bobzien, pp. 53–56. For more
information on the notion of the “seed” and its variations both in Antiquity and during the Renaissance, see Maryanne Cline Horowitz, *Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Marian Rothstein has also examined the broad, eclectic uses of the theme during the sixteenth century, in “Etymology, Genealogy, and the Immutability of Origins,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 43.2 (1990), pp. 332–47.

64. *De natura deorum* II. 65–66, p.281
65. The Stoic view of historical causality and its strong insistence upon Fate was distinct, and can be contrasted with other major philosophical schools of Antiquity. For example, Aristotle and Polybius also emphasize the need to search for causes, but they generally confine their search to the concrete situation, with emphasis upon material factors and psychological motives. Paul Pédech has analyzed this matter with great clarity and precision. See *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1964), pp. 64–68, and 78–80.
66. It should be noted that Du Bellay’s familiarity with the theory of seeds seems to be eclectic, a mixture of Stoicism, Platonism, and Epicureanism. Certain of his poems reiterate the concept in distinctly Stoic terms, as in one chanson from the *Vers Lyriques*:

   Du chault et de l’humidité
   Procede la fecondité
   Des semences du monde… (*Chanson* 21)

   This idea of cosmic seeds born of heat and water is a classic Stoic theory, found in sources such as Seneca’s *Quaestiones Naturales* III.13 and Diogenes Laertius’s biography of Zeno, *Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers*, VII.142 and 146. That said, it is possible that Du Bellay found this doctrine in the eclectic writings of later writers, such as in Ovid, *Fasti* IV.709–16.

   While Du Bellay sometimes follows the Stoics closely, at other times he displays a more composite notion of seeds. One such example can be found in *Regrets* CXVII, where the poet describes the soul as the seed of a divine fire:
Celuy vrayement estoit et sage et bien appris,
Qui cognoissant du feu la semence divine
Estre des Animans la premiere origine,
De substance de feu dit estre noz espritz. (Regrets 117, v.1–4)

Here also, the doctrine is unquestionably Stoic. However, the wording seems
to derive not from a purely Stoic source, but rather from Aeneid VI.730–32. Fur-
thermore, the development of the theme in the second half of the sonnet, dealing
with the physical decline of the soul, seems to draw heavily on Lucretius’s De re-
rum natura II.1122–43.

Other such examples of “eclectic” seeds appear in Olive 54 and A Magny sur les
perfections de sa dame v.217–24, where the notion has more strongly Neo-Platonic
overtones.

On the Neo-platonic adoption of seed theory, see R.E. Witt, “The Plotinian
eclectic treatment of the theory of seeds is examined in Michael Paschalis, “Semi-
na Ignis: The Interplay of Science and Myth in the Song of Silenus,” The American

67. “All the perfection with which heaven honors us, all the imperfection that is born
beneath the heavens, all that feeds our minds and our eyes, and all that devours
our pleasures, / All the misfortune that takes the gilding from our age, all the good
fortune of the most ancient times, Rome, like a Pandora, held in store from the
time of her first ancestors. / But destiny, sorting out this chaos in which all good
and ill were contained, has since arranged that the divine virtues, / Mounting to
heaven, have left behind the sins.”

68. This image of temporal development being a “sorting out” of Fate was in fact a
standard metaphor used by the Stoics. Du Bellay could have seen it, most notably,
in the exposition of Stoic doctrine found in Cicero’s De Divinatione I.28, where
Quintus Cicero equates time to the unrolling of a rope (rudentis explicatio). For
further information, see Bobzien, p. 54.

69. Four poems in the Antiquitez evocatively use the terms “semence” or “semer”: X 3,
9, and 14; XX 11; XXX 1; and XXXI 9. Françoise Giordini has also noted the im-
portance of the notion of germination in the text: “Utilisation et description sym-
boliques de l’espace dans les Antiquitez de Rome de Joachim Du Bellay,” Du Bellay et
ses sonnets romains, ed. Yvonne Bellenger (Paris: Champion, 1994), pp. 19–46, and
especially 42–45.
70. “And such was the virtue of this people, fertile in virtuous offspring, that its descendants, surpassing their ancestors in audacity, extended their empire from high heaven to the depths of the earth.”

71. “Was it, Romans, your cruel destiny, or was it some ancient sin that with mutinous discord wrought everlasting vengeance upon you, / The just decree of the gods denying your walls, bloodied by a brother’s hand, a firm foundation?”

72. For example, here, in Sonnet XXIV, the poet speaks of early Rome. The preceding sonnet, XXIII, followed Lucan in evoking the civil war that opposed Caesar and Pompey. And the sonnet before that, XXII, had referred to the internal turmoil at the twilight of the Empire.

This chronological amalgamation has been noted by Karen Collins, though with a different interpretation from the one presented here. See Karen Collins, “Les Antiquitez de Rome: Du Bellay Crosses the Rubicon,” in Rome in the Renaissance: the city and the myth, ed. P.A. Ramsey (Binghamton: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), pp. 293–300. Tucker also brilliantly compares the various sources and traditions that Du Bellay melds together in these sonnets: see pp. 149–55.

73. “As the seeded field abounds in greenery, from the greenery springs a green stalk, from the stalk bristles a flourishing ear, from the ear yellows the grain, which warm weather ripens, / And as in due season the farmer harvests the waving locks from the golden furrow, lays them out in loose bundles, and from the yellowing wheat makes a thousand sheaves on the denuded field, / So the Roman Empire grew little by little until it was cut down by a barbarian’s hand…”

Du Bellay describes this progressive, internal development in more concrete historical terms in Sonnet XVII, where he traces the progression from simple shepherds, to kings, to consuls, and finally to emperors.

74. By far the richest study on this topic is in Bobzien, pp. 234–329.


77. See, for example, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistulae morale, 38.2.

78. Bobzien comments on this point, pp. 30–31, 52–53.

79. G.W. Pigman comments extensively upon this contradictory attitude towards Fate and personal responsibility in “Du Bellay’s Ambivalence towards Rome in the An-

80. Du Bellay accuses the gods in Sonnets IX and XVIII. He bewails time in Sonnets III, XXVII, and XXXII.

81. The poet speaks of Roman hubris in Sonnets IV, XI, XII, and XXIV. Jealousy and civil war are evoked in Sonnets III, X, XXI, XXII, XXIII, and XXXI.

82. This was, in fact, Cicero’s objection to Chrysippus’ theory, in De Fato V. Could not vicious individuals correct themselves through the practice of right reason?

83. “Thus in a nation with too much leisure, ambition is easily born, like illness in an unhealthy body.”

84. “Neither the fury of raging flame, nor the sharp edge of victorious steel, nor the destruction of the furious soldier, which have so often pillaged you, Rome, / Nor vicissitudes of your changing fortune, nor the destruction of envious time, nor the spite of men and gods, nor your own power turned against yourself, / Nor the shock of impetuous winds, nor the overflowing of that twisting god who has so often flooded you with his waters / Have so lowered your pride that the greatness of the nothing they have left you does not still amaze the world.”

85. Samuel Kliger comments on the use of the Gothic historical precedent by the Lutheran polemicists, p. 80. Numerous French authors instrumentalized the Gaulish precedent. The essential work on this topic remains Dubois’s Celtes et Gaulois.

86. “O whoever you may be who bathe in the Tigris or the nile, the Ganges or the Euphrates, it is not your fault… Nor is it the fault of Africa or Spain, nor of the people that lives on the English shores, nor of the brave soldier who drinks from the Gallic Rhine, nor of that other warrior, the offspring of Germany.”


89. This is the spirit of Étienne Pasquier’s Recherches de France and Noël Taillepied’s L’Histoire de l’Estat et Republique des Druides. See Dubois, Celtes, pp. 91–100 and 115–18.
Even the Huguenots undergo a similar change. In the later sixteenth century, the Protestant historians praise the Gauls less for their conquering force than for their culture and nobility. François Hotman insists upon the liberty of the Gauls in his *Franco-Gallia* and Pierre de la Ramée, in his *Liber de moribus veterum gallorum*, insists upon their philosophical finesse, their prudence, and their “republican” government. On Hotman, see Dubois, *Celtes* pp. 110–15. On Pierre de la Ramée, see Dubois *Celtes* pp. 107–10, and especially Desan pp. 79–99.

90. See, for example, *Regrets* 78.