by well-chosen experiments, become the foundation . . ." (I am indebted to Professor M. Sabatini, of the University of Alberta's Department of Romance Languages, for confirmation of these points.)

These issues are not raised in order to detract from the value of this new translation. Rather, raising them is meant as an implementation of Professor Drake's injunction implicit in the last sentence of his Introduction. "For how can a reader gain more from another's words than by forcing himself to arrive at the best which he can conceive?"

PETER A. SCHOOLS, *University of Alberta*

Dudley Shapere. *Galileo: A Philosophical Study*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. Pp. xi, 161. Cloth: \$9.75; paper: \$2.95.

Professor Shapere introduces this work as "the first of a projected series of detailed studies, by the present author, of important episodes in the development of science," which "will involve an attempt . . . to give coherent interpretations of the cases . . . to extract any available generalizations and systematizations from those cases, . . . to provide critical analyses of interpretations of the cases by philosophers and historians." One subdivision of the last of these three tasks is " . . . to show how the historian's (and the scientist's) interpretations of the historical record are frequently distorted by conceptual presuppositions or confusions" (p. x). I will assume that the second of these tasks—to extract generalizations and systematizations—is one not undertaken in the present study (if it is, I don't know where) because I assume it to be a project which can be tackled only after a number of the "projected series of detailed studies" have appeared. What one can therefore expect from the present study is a coherent interpretation of Galileo's work, as well as a critical analysis of interpretations of Galileo's work by some philosophers and historians. The consistent attempt to provide both of these, in the context of two questions which are dealt with in the major portion of this study, constitutes its content. The two questions, or really sets of questions, are the following: (i) What, in Galileo's thought, is "the role . . . of the principle of inertia?" (Did he actually enunciate this principle? or "was he well on his way towards it"? "to the extent that he had not attained it, what, if anything, was characteristically new and 'modern' in his thought? "); (ii) What is "the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions? To what extent did he obtain his result by experiment? . . . What methodological doctrines were involved in his use of mathematics . . . ?" Was he a "Platonic rationalist" or an (Aristotelian) "empiricist"? (pp. 9-10).

The first two chapters, "Galileo and the Interpretation of Science" and "The Intellectual Background," provide the setting within which Shapere deals with these two sets of questions. The presentation of a coherent interpretation is handled mainly through an attempt to answer the first of these. Its specific context is chapter 3, "The Early Development of Galileo's Thought." The major portion of this part of the argument is found in chapter 4, "Galileo and the Principle of Inertia." This chapter also brings into focus the critical analysis of interpretations of Galileo's work by some philosophers and historians, particularly those of Koyré and Drake. Chapter 5, "Reason and Experience in Galileo's

Thought," attempts to deal more particularly with the question of methodology. Again, attention is given to diverse interpretations of scholars, in this case, to those of Mach (who takes Galileo to be an empiricist) and Koyré (who portrays him as a Platonic rationalist).

The argument, especially in the important fourth and fifth chapters, has been interestingly developed. The different themes have been intertwined in such a way that their relevance to one another, their interconnectedness, is constantly apparent without any belabouring of this point. When the different themes of a study are thus intertwined, it is important that the various strands of the argument be, nonetheless, kept clearly distinct. Without it, lack of clarity is inevitable. Throughout most of this study, Shapere has succeeded in presenting a clear case. There are, however, a few instances in which the clarity of the line of argument leaves something to be desired.

One way through which unclarity tends to sneak in is through the copious use of parentheses. For example, on pp. 53-54, three important versions of the "Impetus Theory" are distinguished. The third of these distinctions, "the self-corrupting impetus view," is made seemingly as an afterthought in a lengthy parenthesis at the end of a paragraph which deals with difficulties inherent in a second version of the "Impetus Theory," that of the *inclinatio ad quietem*. This way of drawing a distinction is hardly conducive to signalling the importance of the distinction made. Yet it is "the self-corrupting impetus view" which, because adopted by Galileo, becomes of greatest importance (cf. pp. 75, 78) as the argument is developed.

The part of the argument which, in terms of a discussion of the concept of inertia, attempts to present a coherent interpretation of Galileo's position seems to me the most successful. Of interest is the conclusion, drawn on p. 125, that the different interpretations of Galileo by Drake and Koyré do not come about because of obscurity on Galileo's part but because of a disagreement between Drake and Koyré about what is, and what is not, essential to the modern concept of inertia.

The weakness of this book lies in its inadequate discussion of the "cluster of questions regarding the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions." It is hardly excusable in a work that announces the question of methodology as one of the "two questions which will prove to be central to the issues" (p. 9) to read that "For reasons of space, we have ignored . . . the development of the Aristotelian conception of scientific method, which was an important movement at the University of Padua in the years before Galileo's arrival there" (p. 60). Certainly inexcusable is a statement like: "There are three other main aspects of Galileo's discussions of scientific method which have not been considered in this book: his distinction between methods of 'resolution' and 'composition'; his distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities; and his advocacy of atomism . . . their importance (and especially that of the discussions of method in *The Assayer*) for understanding Galileo and his work seems to me to have been greatly exaggerated." This out-of-hand dismissal of both context and content may well be indicative of Shapere's own "conceptual presuppositions or confusions" which, in this instance, seem to "distort" his "interpretation of the historical record." This impression is strengthened by the all-too-easy identification of "rationalism" with "Platonic rationalism," specifically that of Plato's *Timaeus* period. It is further strengthened by the sometimes uncritical use of concepts (as in "Bradwardine's mathematical approach to the analysis of motion . . ."; p. 57) which, in a context of a discussion of the "new science," have acquired specific technical meanings.

Shapere's *Galileo* makes worthwhile reading. However, it does not present one with a coherent interpretation of "the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions."

PETER A. SCHOOLS, *University of Alberta*

André Rochon. *Les écrivains et la pouvoir en Italie à l'époque de la Renaissance*. Paris: Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1974. Pp. 325.

The volume is composed of five chapters entitled: "Empirisme ou égotisme. La politique dans 'La Cassaria' et les 'Suppositi' de l'Arioste," "Les fêtes à Urbino dans 1513 et la 'Calandria' de Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena," "Machiavel historiographe des Medicis," "Culture et politique à Florence de 1542 à 1551," and "Idéologie monarchique et propagande dynastique dans l'oeuvre de Gianbattista Giralaldi Cinzio."

In the essay on Ariosto, the author strives to determine the extent to which Ariosto's early theatre was predisposed to the authority of the Este family. To this end, Mon. Clouet diligently correlates the essential themes of the plays, "La Cassaria" and "I Suppositi," and the political conditions dominant in Ferrara in 1508-1509. The relationship between these two elements is based on certain elements of dialogue within the plays; that is to say, certain remarks are interpreted as expressions of Ariosto's attitude towards his sovereigns. Mon. Clouet focuses on those scenes which present a veiled critique of the Este opulence to sustain his thesis that Ariosto allowed himself to be intimidated, to the point of restricting himself to making certain pusillanimous gestures of defiance through his characters. Ultimately, Mon. Clouet chastises Ariosto for effete refusing to defy his "protectors" by suggesting a doctrine of reform.

The second essay, written by A. Fontes-Baratto, refers to a similar dilemma in Urbino during the years 1512-1515, while it discusses papal interference in the actual presentation of plays (and of "La Calandria" in particular) during the 1512 carnival. Madame Baratto documents extremely well Bibbiena's posture, precariously perched between artistic integrity on the one hand and the censorship of Pope Julius II on the other. Not unlike her colleague, Mme. Baratto exploits the role of the play's central character to verify her premise, which is that Bibbiena, like Ariosto, saw fit to criticize the corruption of Church and State but in an extremely delicate fashion.

Perhaps the study on Machiavelli is best, simply because there is an attempt made to preserve the statesman's integrity throughout the degrading episodes which preceded the composition of the *Istorie Fiorentine*. Mlle. Marietti initiates her thesis with an outline of the political status of Florence in 1512, placing special weight on the collapse of the Soderini government, Machiavelli's abrupt dismissal and his subsequent efforts to have himself reinstated through Vettori. Machiavelli's overriding concern for the welfare of the Republic is not understated.

This biographical synopsis is followed by a perfunctory examination of some of the political innuendos contained in "La Mandragola," performed in Florence in 1518. And, in keeping with the leitmotif of the entire text, the *Istorie Fiorentine* are then surveyed to establish the precise quantity of bias present in Machiavelli's depiction of the role played by the Medici dynasty in shaping fifteenth-century Florence's history. Such a pro-