of his later life in service to the Church and his personal qualities as a Christian should suffice to attest to his goodness and virtue.

Beccadelli’s biography, then, approaches hagiography. Contarini’s life becomes an exemplum of both the virtuous man of faith and the perfect cleric. Just as Della Casa’s work looks backwards to the ideology of Republican civic humanism, Beccadelli’s looks forward to the ideology of post-Tridentine hagiography, confessional literature and the role of the ideal bishop (a part in which Beccadelli himself is often cast).

Therefore, Fragnito, in bringing together her analysis of these two lives, has done far more than increase our understanding of the enigmatic personality of Contarini. She has indicated the effects that the patterns of his life had on two categories of his contemporaries. From her discussion emerge questions on the nature of history, biography and ideology, viewed by gifted men of strong principles. To accomplish this, Fragnito has recreated the complex environment that conditioned the biographies, providing material on all aspects of the production of the texts. She is obviously well versed in her sources and uses them effectively, although her tendency to quote at length in Latin without translations might intimidate those readers without classical educations. The intellectual environment of mid-cinquecento Italy, with all of its contradictions, is brought into relief through this study of Della Casa and Beccadelli’s biographies of Contarini; and this represents a remarkable achievement.

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As Mario Santoro, editor of the recently founded journal, Esperienze letterarie, points out in his foreword, the present volume is a reworking of an earlier work, now out of print, with an updated bibliography and the addition of four new chapters that more fully trace the political and social development of Italian intellectual life in the period beginning with Ariosto and ending with Tasso. Of the 15 chapters that compose the book, at least 8 deal directly with the theme of fortune that Santoro pursues from the year 1494, the date of the invasion of Italy by Charles de Valois, to the last decades of the 16th century. It is Santoro’s contention that to examine the theme of fortune against the background of disconcerting political and social changes is to discover fundamental aspects, problems, interests and attitudes of 16th-century civilization.

As a defense against fortune, Renaissance civilization, in Santoro’s opinion, relied on prudence as a rational attitude towards life, not as a substitution for virtù, which humanist culture often set off against fortune, nor the prudence of medieval literary tradition recommended as a remedy against fortune. The term prudence was invested with new meanings and values acquiring a concreteness unknown in the past. The relationship between fortune and prudence assumed a radically new interpretation of man and his destiny, which properly belongs with its extraordinary variety of forms, to the literary conscience of the times.

It is essential to be aware of this particular relationship and its effect on man
with his merits, his defects and his renewed faith in the liberating mission of letters in order to comprehend adequately the literary civilization of the 16th century with its view of reality conditioned by man’s perception of himself as a unique part of his universe combined with his belief in an eternal life after death. According to Santoro, a new period of Italian history opens with the descent of Charles VIII into Italy. Not only Guicciardini and Machiavelli but a number of other historians shared the conviction that the invasion had a profound effect on man’s perception of his times introducing an element of confusion and disorder, of the unforeseen and the irrational into life. Witnesses of this critical moment in Italian history describe their reactions in a similar manner and the term fortune is no longer seen simply as a recurring medieval theme but as something disturbingly real that questioned traditional values, among them, faith in virtù.

Santoro then goes on to examine his thesis in the works of Giovanni Pontano, Antonio de Ferraris, Bernardo Rucellai, Tristano Caracciole, A.P. Fregoso and others, as well as those of Machiavelli and Guicciardini. As a defense against fortune Pontano recommends prudence, which permits a man to distinguish between good and evil, and warns him of possible dangers ahead. Pontano understood prudence in the light of St. Thomas’ interpretation of Aristotle of the concept that represented for him the most positive and useful virtue of all in guiding man in the pursuit of his ends. Prudence had to be supported by an active, tenacious will in the struggle against the unforeseen forces of life constantly threatening man. In proposing a rational mode of behaviour that he learned through his classical readings and observation of contemporary political life, Pontano was in effect suggesting a practical precept based on the lessons of history.

Antonio de Ferraris, nicknamed the Galateo, who reflects the concerns of Pontano’s circle, nevertheless, reveals a distinctly original personality. A friend of Alfonso II of Naples, whose life was a continual struggle of virtù against fortune, Galateo saw in the king’s abdication a clear example of prudence. A moralist, preferring the contemplative to the active life, Galateo perceived in man’s affairs the presence of fortune that he believed to be inextricably bound to the concept of divine providence.

Turning to the first of the four chapters added to by the author, Santoro recalls Guicciardini’s description of the sack of Rome in 1527 as the culmination in a series of devastatingly unforeseen events beginning in 1494 and underlining the overwhelming impact of fortune on man. Among other commentators of that apocalyptic year, the Florentine ambassador of the Medici, Francesco Vettori, also a friend of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, in his vivid account of the sack of Rome, written a short time after it occurred, recognizes the uncontrollable presence of the irrational in man’s life. The prudence and the virtù of the then reigning pontiff Clement VII were of no avail, noted Vettori, who saw in this episode an example of the superior might of fortune, unrestrainable and varied.

For Saba da Castiglione, a Catholic intellectual writing for the edification of the “Christian gentleman” after the formation of the Tribunal of the Inquisition in 1542, the word “prudent” is usually described as “wise” and the prudent man is above all a Christian. In his Ricordi, Castiglione’s outlook is conditioned by his adherence to Catholic orthodoxy. Unlike Machiavelli who bases his argument on historical precedent, Lucio Paolo Rosello, in his treatise on the prudence of princes
published in dialogue form in 1552, uses as his model the Gran Duke Cosimo of Florence, a contemporary. Rosello’s concept of the prince is that of a benevolent leader, endowed with the virtue of prudence, who would rely on the counsel of a “parliament” and of discreet advisers. The princes’ prudence would, in Rosello’s view, reduce the effect of sudden changes of fortune. And finally, Argisto Giuffredi, one of the best representatives of Sicilian culture in the late Renaissance, counsels his sons in a treatise addressed to them, in the manner of an Alberti or a Della Casa, on a variety of matters, family, social and political. Giuffredi’s treatise, while striving to maintain a strict observance of the doctrines of the Counter Reformation, betrays its intrinsically utilitarian purpose of self-preservation. The treatise, in which substituted for prudence and discretion is the word moderation, masking a calculating self-interest, stands out as a fine example of a typical product of the Counter Reformation.

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Hiding behind an obscure title and an introductory chapter plagued by errors of substance and style is a collection of materials that serves as a useful introduction to the field of Medieval Studies.

The eleven essays in this handsomely-produced volume were originally brought together as contributions to an interdisciplinary course at the University of Rochester Medieval House in 1972. This circumstance gives a certain unity to the otherwise disparate essays. The stated purpose of this collection is to “provide an introduction to the dynamic of relationship between the medieval idea of referral and its application...to describe how this central premise of medieval Christian thought shaped and ordered — and in turn itself was modified by — centrifugal forces of cultural experience and a characteristically centripital [sic] and ideal pursuit of understanding” (p. ii). In fact most of the essays attempt something less grandiose, and more useful.

Several contributors approached their task by surveying some particular area of medieval culture. Bruce Smith introduces the field of medieval music in his essay “The Contest of Apollo and Marsyas: Ideas About Music in the Middle Ages.” Russel A. Peck does the same for medieval numerology in “Number as Cosmic Language.” John W. Abrams, in “The Development of Medieval Astronomy,” gives in twenty pages a brief but careful account of the history of astronomy from Antiquity through the Middle Ages.

Other contributors have addressed more specific questions, and thereby introduce the reader to important issues in their respective fields. David Wilkin’s “Meaning of Space in Fourteenth Century Tuscan Painting,” Richard W. Kaeuper’s “Societas Riccardorum and Economic Change,” and Laurence Eldredge’s “Concept of God’s Absolute Power in the Later Fourteenth Century” are well written and nicely argued pieces that stimulate interest in the broader fields of late medieval art, economics, and theology. Others of the same type, though less successful, are Patrick Grant’s