Language and the Struggle of Identity in
Paradise Regained

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Milton’s basic monism, his unwillingness to separate soul and body, spirit and matter, stands behind his close identification of language and character. The famous assertion in the Apology that he who would write well “ought himself to be a true poem” is more than just an opinion about the proper preparation for a poet. It is an assertion that words and character are one, that, as the Lady in Comus artlessly puts it, “none/But such as are good men can give good things ….”1 Before the Fall, Adam is such a man, eloquent of his creator, because God has bestowed “Inward and outward both, his image fair ... and each word, each motion forms” (P.L.VIII.221, 223). But with the Fall, words and the things they signify are separated, and Adam and Eve come to resemble Satan, for whom speech is a mask, a concealment of character and not a true expression of it.2

Part of Christ’s task in Paradise Regained is to begin the repair of language through Christian eloquence. Therefore, one of the key issues of his debate with Satan is over the nature of language and especially its relationship to character. The issue has a particular importance for Christ that it can have for no one else, for Christ discovers the secret of his identity first through his own words, and then through the words of others. It is “By words at times cast forth” (I.228) that Jesus begins to manifest himself as the promised Redeemer, and his life before baptism is one of self-investigation, of matching himself to predictions. In a strange way, he learns about himself from his own speech, at the temple, for example, where he goes “to propose/What might improve my knowledge” or that of the teachers (I.212). Reading the prophets, he receives the unique revelation, “of whom they spake/I am” (I.262–263). Christ makes an assertion of eternal identity echoing God’s “I am that I am” at the moment he discovers, through reading, that he is the Redeemer promised in scripture.

Christ is therefore in the singular position of being both messenger and message, as what Boyd M. Berry calls “an acting message.”3 He is himself the fulfillment of the promise made to Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, and God’s purpose in sending him to earth is to “verify that solemn message” as well as
the one delivered to Mary (I.134). Christ’s task on earth is to proclaim himself, to preach the salvation that he represents, and his tactical problem is how to “Publish his Godlike office now mature…” (I.188). The redundancies of the baptismal scene emphasize Christ’s identity with the message he has been sent to announce. Christ hears himself proclaimed by John, “mee him (for it was shown him so from Heaven)/Mee him,” just as the Father’s voice pronounces “me his./Mee his beloved Son …” (I.275–276, 284–285). This scene is a complex of matching and doubling, with God’s voice repeating and validating John’s proclamation, and Christ doubling the assertion of identity each time as if to match it with what he feels of himself. As in Christ’s reading of scripture, there is an elaborate, redundant matching of words to character, a process of discovery and enunciation at once.

Even after this enunciation, however, Christ begins his wanderings in puzzlement:

while I consider
What from within I feel myself, and hear
What from without comes often to my ears,
Ill sorting with my present state compar’d. (I.199–201)

His struggle in the rest of the poem is to match what he feels to what he hears, to learn more about his identity even as Satan does, from his own arguments. In the very process of arguing and asserting himself against temptation, Christ clarifies his identity, using as his basic assumption the unity of language and character. Satan, on the other hand, is a dualist, basing all his arguments on the disparity between words and deeds, language and speakers. His most insidious method of attack is to separate Christ from his own words, to drive a wedge between prophecy and identity so as to pervert and prevent Christ’s office. All of Satan’s temptations can be seen as temptations to accept a definition of language as a provisional thing, and all of his attacks on Christ strike at language first, as a way of destroying the messenger by distorting his message.

The first temptation, that of the stones, shows clearly how the question of language is central to the struggle between Satan and Christ. When Christ scorns the physical bread that Satan invites him to create in favor of the food that sustained Moses in the desert, “each Word/Proceeding from the mouth of God” (I.349–350), he is actually confirming his own identity as the Word of God, an identity cast into doubt by Satan’s aspersion “if thou be the Son of God …” (I.342). The Word is God’s promise delivered to the wandering Israelites in the form of manna, and therefore, typologically, the Gospel as well, and ultimately Christ himself, who takes the place of manna in the Christian world. When Christ says “Why dost thou then suggest to me distrust” (I.355), he speaks as any Christian, who can repose in the truthful-
ness of God’s word, but also in his own unique character, because Satan has attacked the basis of that character by questioning the recent proclamation of Christ’s identity. Christ does not distrust God, “Knowing who I am ...” (I.356). The distrust that Satan suggests is not just of God’s providence but of Christ’s special office. His aspersions demean both God’s word, the proclamation, and God’s Word, Christ himself.

In refuting these aspersions, Christ also presents one of the basic contrasts of the poem, that between God’s unity and Satan’s multiplicity. The issue of pagan oracles is not just a commonplace Milton happens to take up, but is his way of dramatizing the contrast between the singleness of the Word in the mouth of God and the multiplicity of Satan, who exists as “a liar in four hundred mouths ...” (I.428). Satan is the false word in the mouths of liars as Christ is the true one in God’s mouth. Christ says “lying is thy sustenance, thy food,” and shows how Satan feeds others with lies, as the force behind false oracles. But Satan cleverly accepts this rebuke, debasing himself as he will later in the poem, in order to win a rhetorical point. He admits to having been a tool of God in the trial of Job, and to having “glibb’d with lies” the tongues of the prophets of Ahab, but he does so only to reassert the distrust of God’s word that is his constant theme in this temptation.

Satan does this by attacking the reliability of language. First, he argues for a conception of truth that makes it merely words:

What wonder then if I delight to hear  
Her dictates from thy mouth? most men admire  
Virtue, who follow not her lore: permit me  
To hear thee when I come (since no man comes)  
And talk at least, though I despair to attain. (I.481–485)

With great suavity, Satan makes the truth into “talk at least,” as if there were some benefit from the words alone, even if they make no mark on the character. Here he is acting as truth’s parasite, feeding from the words only. The final twist he gives this role, however, is to use it to debase the words themselves:

Thy Father, who is holy, wise and pure,  
Suffers the Hypocrite or Atheous Priest  
To tread his Sacred Courts, and minister  
About his Altar, handling holy things,  
Praying or vowing, and vouchsaf’d his voice  
To Balaam Reprobate, a Prophet yet  
Inspir’d; disdain not such access to me. (I.486–492)

Of course, Satan has already had such access in the case of Job. Christ well knows, and has admitted himself, that the Father has allowed the hypocrite to handle holy things. Satan, however, wants to use this idea as a weapon, still
suggesting distrust by making liars of those who “minister” and “vow” on God’s behalf. His argument is that God’s voice is a thing indiscriminately scattered among many mouths, some truthful, some not, and is thus no more sure than the pagan oracles. Satan’s own doubt of God’s “Sovran voice” is apparent when he hears it declare Christ’s identity, but is still not convinced “Who this is …” (I.84, 91). This kind of doubt is also a danger to men, as Milton shows when it momentarily infects Mary, Andrew, and Simon in Book II. It is even dangerous to Christ, who begins his wanderings anxiously matching his inward feelings with what has been said of him. Satan tries to enlarge these doubts by painting a picture of God as a tactical user of speech, not someone who utters a single Word, but someone whose words are promiscuously scattered over the earth, whose voice may come to John, or even to Christ, without implying any particular exaltation.

Milton seems to have anticipated this argument with a redundancy. When Christ hears the Father’s voice proclaim his identity, it is “Audibly heard from Heav’n …” (I.284). The redundancy, like all the doublings and repetitions in this passage, seems a form of emphasis and a mimicry of the echo that Christ feels in himself as the proclaimer speaks. The message is both audible, resonating in the open air, and heard, resonating in the mind of Christ. The directness of the revelation and the answer it finds in the subject insure its truth. There is a direct correspondence between God’s words and Christ’s character, and thus between Christ’s own words and holy truth. Satan’s attempt to devalue the proclamation of Christ’s identity by diluting the truth of proclamations in general fails because Christ’s experience of the Word of God is so direct, because Christ knows himself to be the antithesis of those priests who only handle holy things without being holy themselves. Thus, at the end of Book I, Satan retires “with gray dissimulation,” while Christ stands composed, with “unalter’d brow.”

The verbal struggle over the nature of language that takes place after the failure of the first temptation continues into the later books. Though the struggle is one that might involve anyone, as it involves all those who witness Christ’s baptism, it begins in subsequent books to concern Christ more specifically in his role as mediator. It especially concerns Christ’s function as prophet. Milton gives the prophetic function two parts in the Christian Doctrine: “the promulgation of divine truth” and “the illumination of the understanding.”6 That is, Christ declares what is true, and clears the understanding of those who hear him so that they can receive the truth. The importance of eloquence and persuasion in this has been stressed by Merritt Hughes, Arnold Stein, John Steadman, and others.7 As Christ says, his function is “By winning words to conquer willing hearts,/And make persuasion do the work of fear …” (I.222–223). This persuasion will not rely on clever arguments but on the simple expression of the virtues of the speaker. It therefore depends on the absolute identification of the speaker’s words and his
character. As Milton says in the *Apology*, “they express nature best, who in their lives least wander from her safe leading ….”

Satan shows by his flattery of Christ at the beginning of Book III that he understands this principle:

Thy actions to thy words accord, thy words  
To thy large heart give utterance due, thy heart  
Contains of good, wise, just, the perfect shape. (III.9–11)

Yet, in the course of the second temptation, in which Satan offers the various satisfactions and glories of the world, he attempts to separate action and words, words and “heart,” in order to pervert Christ’s office as prophet. Satan follows in this the general outlines of his earlier argument that the character of the person who “ministers” is indifferent to the nature of the ministry. His offer of food to Christ in Book II is an echo of the food imagery with which that argument is expressed in Book I. Satan does not understand why Christ should refuse this food not “proffer’d by an Enemy, though who/Would scruple that, with want oppress?” (II.330–331). Satan’s claim is that a gift cannot be tainted by its giver, but Christ counts these “specious gifts no gifts but guiles” (II.391). Like the lady in Comus, he turns down a gift because he knows that good things proceed only from good men.

This is, in fact, the unifying principle behind all of Christ’s renunciations in the second temptation, that he will accept a gift “Thereafter as I like/The giver” (II.321). His characteristic retort to Satan’s offers is a retort against their source, as when he deprecates Satan’s offer of the world’s glory as coming from those “Of whom to be dispraised were no small praise” (III.56). Satan asserts that the source of praise should be indifferent, especially to the Son of God:

Think not so slight of glory: therein least  
Resembling thy great Father; he seeks glory,  
And for his glory all things made, all things  
Orders and governs, nor content in Heaven  
By all his Angels glorifi’d, requires  
Glory from all men, from all men good or bad,  
Wise or unwise, no difference, no exemption … . (III.109–115)

This is a Satanic hymn of glory, and is in itself an example of how a perfectly truthful statement can be perverted by the character who offers it and the intention with which it is offered. The key to Satan’s intention can be found in the insinuation behind the words “therein least/Resembling thy great Father.” Satan wishes to make worldly glory a condition of god-head, not a consequence of it, to make the proof of Christ’s identity rest on his acceptance of glory, not on his rejection of it. This is an attempt to make Christ’s identity subject to worldly approval, to make him “live upon thir tongues” and live
only there, not in the mouth of God. It is a repetition of Satan’s attempt to replace the singleness of Christ’s character as the Word of God with the multiplicity of his own, existing in the mouths of the world in the form of glory and notoriety. In Satan’s insistence that the source of praise does not matter, the separation of speech and character logically leads to the separation of Christ from God by making Christ’s identity something that can be validated by any kind of praise. But Christ’s identity as Son of God is shown most clearly when he refuses glory in self-abnegation: “I seek not mine, but his/Who sent me, and thereby witness whence I am” (III.106–107).

With superficial politeness Satan tries to rescue his basic point from defeat: “Of glory as thou wilt, said he, so deem./Worth or not worth the seeking, let it pass …” (III.151–152). But such urbane indifference is possible only because Satan has no particular stake in the individual arguments he advances, nor in the words he uses. This can be seen again when Satan tries to turn Christ into a pagan philosopher in Book IV. The same bland phrases return:

The trial hath indamag’d thee no way,
Rather more honor left and more esteem;
Mee naught advantag’d, missing what I aimed.
Therefore let pass, as they are transitory,
The Kingdoms of this world …. (IV.206–210)

Satan can be so calm where Christ is so fierce precisely because the arguments and temptations he uses exist at one remove from him. The words that have passed between them have not touched either speaker, in his analysis, since words are simply picked up as convenient and can be allowed to “pass” whenever they seem ineffective. What may seem most inoffensive to readers, Satan’s easy-going blandness, is actually one of his lowest characteristics, while Christ, like Milton in his political and ecclesiastical pamphlets, marks himself by the heat of his temper as a man who is vitally engaged in every word he uses.

These divergent attitudes toward words are the essence of the temptation of learning that follows. Satan’s basic recommendation of pagan wisdom is a practical one, since “with the Gentiles much thou must converse”: 

How wilt thou reason with them, how refute
Thir Idolisms, Traditions, Paradoxes?
Error by his own arms is best evinc’t. (IV.233–235)

The fallacy here is that the arms of error can be assumed without involving one in error. It is a natural culmination of Satan’s whole line of argument that there is no necessary connection between words and speakers, of Satan’s belief in tactical speech, and of his attempt to convince Christ to define his role as teacher and prophet in purely tactical terms.
Much has been written about Christ’s response in an attempt to explain his “rejection” of classical learning and to explain the contrast between Christ’s reply and Milton’s relative toleration of all learning in earlier works, especially *Areopagitica*. But, as Irene Samuel points out, Milton favors toleration even of mistaken ideas in *Areopagitica* because the body of the truth, like the body of Christ, has been scattered to the winds. In *Paradise Regained* Christ is alive, and alive with the truth, and the temptation of learning is nothing more than the suggestion that this truth be scattered, that the crucifixion be hurried by the abandonment of the message Christ lives and proclaims. Thus one of the underlying objections to pagan philosophy is that it is multiple. The “many books” are wearisome not just because they are many, but because they are so various, and their very variety evinces their ignorance of the truth represented by Christ himself. And the many pagan poets simply reflect their many gods:

they loudest sing  
The vices of thir Deities, and thir own  
In Fable, Hymn, or Song, so personating  
Thir Gods ridiculous, and themselves past shame. (IV.339–342)

The gods and heroes of pagan literature are simply large-scale men with large-scale vices. Pagan poets both personify and impersonate their gods, celebrating their own vices and giving them a specious grandeur. This impersonation is a fallen version of Christ’s duty to express God. For him to assume the words and arguments of the pagan world would be to exchange that divine form of expression, which brings him to a resemblance of God, for a fallen one, which would bring him to resemble the vicious gods of pagan times. The ultimate issue is, as Barbara Lewalski concludes, “Christ’s own unique status as the True Oracle, the one who, as Image of the Father’s wisdom, may communicate in a special way with the Fountain of Light: ‘he who receives light/Light from above, from the fountain of light,/No other doctrine needs’ (IV.288–290).” To tempt Christ with learning is finally to ask him to become a receiver instead of being part of the source, auditor instead of the message itself.

Even the third temptation, less a temptation than an attack, is prepared for by a line of Satanic argument that asserts the provisional nature of language and the separation of it from character. Chief among Satan’s tactics is his constant reiteration of the necessity of “means.” At first this appears simply as a piece of worldly wisdom: “Great acts require great means of enterprise” (II.412). But soon, the real motive behind this obsession with means appears:

thy Kingdom though foretold  
By prophet or by Angel, unless thou  
Endeavor, as thy Father David did,
Thou never shalt obtain; prediction still
In all things, and all men, supposes means,
Without means us’d, what it predicts revokes. (III.351–356)

The lack of means is another way for Satan to attack Christ’s identity, calling into question again Christ’s resemblance to a father. The father here is David, and the throne only an earthly one, but the underlying argument is that Christ will fail to come into his true identity without the use of certain means. So Satan harps on the provisional nature of predictions:

Aim at the highest, without the highest attain’d
Will be for thee no sitting, or not long
On David’s Throne, be prophesi’d what will. (IV.106–109)

On David’s Throne, or Throne of all the world,
Now at full age, fulness of time, thy season,
When Prophecies of thee are best fulfill’d.
Now contrary, if I read aught in Heaven …. (IV.379–382)

Of gaining David’s Throne no man knows when,
For both the when and how is nowhere told,
Thou shalt be what thou art ordain’d, no doubt;
For Angels have proclaim’d it, but concealing
The time and means …. . (IV.471–475)

The desire to see predictions as provisional, as apt to be revoked if not matched by means, begins early for Satan. “Long the decrees of Heav’n/ Delay” is his rueful, half-hopeful comment when it seems that the means of his demise have finally arrived in the fulfillment of God’s promise to Eve. Satan emphasizes means out of self-interest, hoping that the promise will not come to complete fulfillment. Christ, as Lee Cox has shown, always falls back on “what is said” as a simple defense, an assertion that prediction and fulfillment are not separable.13 His basic answer, repeated with variations, is “Truth hath said” (III.183). This defense is particularly important for Christ, whose very existence is established by God’s declaration, both as the Word of God14 and as the man who learns from God’s prophets “of whom they spake/I am.” The great irony of the third temptation is that in his obsession with Christ’s supposed lack of means Satan provides the very means that are needed, and himself exposes the fallacy of his tactical separation of God’s words and their fulfillment. As Milton dryly observes, “But contrary unweeting he fulfill’d/The purpos’d Counsel pre-ordained and fixt/Of the most high …” (I.126).

Long before the third temptation Satan has realized that Christ is “to be my fatal enemy” (IV.525), but he still attempts to elude that fatality by quibbling over names. This quibbling is an attempt to suspend the prediction by smudging its terms. Satan is determined to show that the name Son of God
“bears no single sense,” and does so by applying it to himself: “The Son of God I also am, or was,/And if I was, I am; relation stands ...” (IV.18–19). Here Satan seems to be asserting the consistency of terms and their inflexibility. But in actuality he is using the same tactic he used to subtly defame the predictions of prophets in Book I. He dilutes the force of the name by applying it promiscuously, as he tried to dilute the force of God’s voice by showing that it had been granted to many men. As in Book I, he also tries to pervert the term “Son of God” by polluting it with his own presence. If Satan can be called “Son of God” as well as Christ, what distinction is there in the term? Satan’s "I am" here is an echo of Christ’s at I.263, but a false echo because Satan cannot make the simple assertion of identity that Christ can. Satan can hardly be genuinely puzzled about this, when he seems so sure elsewhere that he and Christ are enemies. Rather, he evades his own knowledge and wishes to shake Christ’s. His appropriation of the term is just as much an attack as his physical placement of Christ on the pinnacle.

Christ’s standing on the pinnacle is the definitive “I am,” which dispels the clouds Satan has thrown around Christ’s name, and dashes the argument of means. This is accomplished not so much by the actual statement “Tempt not the Lord thy God,” but by the absolute congruence between word and action implied by “he said and stood” (IV.561). Arnold Stein says of this demonstration, “The flesh becomes word. Christ says it, then becomes it .... The intuitive is confirmed in thought, word, and deed.”

Christ’s fixity of purpose, expressed in his words, and his physical fixity refute Satan’s arguments about the fluid connection between words and character. Christ’s use of the name “the Lord thy God,” which may seem ambiguous, can also be seen in this context. Milton spends a great deal of time in the Christian Doctrine discriminating between the names of Christ and those of Jehovah, and when it is obvious that Christ does at times speak in the name of Jehovah, Milton says “the name of Jehovah signifies two things, either the nature of God, or the completion of his words and promises .... If it signify the completion of his words and promises, why should not he, to whom words suitable to God alone are so frequently attributed, be permitted also to assume the name of Jehovah, whereby the completion of these words and promises is represented?”

Christ’s standing on the pinnacle and his resistance to Satan signify the completion of the promise that Milton mentions at the beginning of Paradise Regained, that Christ shall bruise the head of the serpent. Christ appropriates God’s words and name when that promise to man is fulfilled. Thus he refutes Satan’s arguments about the ambiguous nature of the name “Son of God,” and simultaneously refutes the objection of means. By simply standing he shows the singularity of word and deed for God, and proves the inevitable connection between his predictions and their fulfillment.

Christ is the means that Satan has been so obtusely demanding. As the Son of God he is, God says, the one “in whose hand what by Decree I do ...”
(P.L. VI. 683). As the Word, he is "the first of the whole creation, by whom afterwards all other things were made both in heaven and earth," what Merritt Hughes calls "the invincible bond of the world." As Jesus Christ, he is the one who proves by his unwavering consistency that there is no gap between his words and his character, and therefore no gap between the word of God and its fulfillment, no gap for means to fit into. Saying, standing, and the destruction of Satan are one unified whole, mocking Satan's attempts to reduce Christ by abstracting his speech. Christ has performed according to Mary's injunction at the beginning of the poem: "By matchless Deeds express thy matchless Sire" (I.233). This fulfillment is signalled when the angels hail Christ for consistently, in "whatever place,/Habit, or state, or motion, still expressing/The Son of God ..." (IV.600–602). The prediction of the angelic hymn at the end of Paradise Regained is certainly meant to reflect the fact that Christ's power comes from his true expression of the Father: "hee all unarm'd/ Shail chase thee with the terror of his voice ..." (IV.626–627). Christ works unarmed, without means, because his voice is sufficient. The terror of the voice that sends Satan tumbling in amazement is its direct connection to the power of God, its immediate demonstration that what it says is true, so disconcerting to a creature for whom the voice is more often a surrogate identity or a mask.

This argument over language and character exists as a background to all Satan's temptations. As he varies the nature of the temptations, he also varies the exact thrust of the argument, but it remains a central theme of his discussion. Christ is therefore called upon to affirm the identity of language and character in different ways, each appropriate to some aspect of his nature. As a man he is alone in trying to discover, then disclose to others, a unique identity. In both cases, the congruence of language and character is a principle he asserts in self-defense against the "distrust" that is the essence of Satan's first temptation. As a prophet of himself as a divine message, Christ must resist the temptation to substitute other messages, where Satan's suggestion is that messages are indifferent, unconnected to the nature of the messenger. Finally, as the Word of God, the fulfillment of God's promises, the means by which paradise will be regained, Christ stands as a refutation of Satan's insistence on the necessity of worldly means. This insistence is simply an attempt to drive a wedge between God's words and earthly reality. Christ's fixity on the pinnacle is the climax of the poem because its subject is the realization of promises. It is the fit emblem for the whole poem, because in effecting an exact identity of saying and standing, Christ defeats Satan and begins the ministry that will renovate mankind.

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Notes

1 John Milton, Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Odyssey Press, 1957), p. 106. This edition will be used throughout for both Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained. All line citations will be to Paradise Regained, unless accompanied by the abbreviation P.L., for Paradise Lost.


6 The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patterson et al (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), XV, 289. This edition will be used for all of Milton’s prose, and will be referred to hereafter as Works.


8 Works, III, 287.

9 Two basic explanations for Christ’s repudiation have been advanced. The first is that Christ rejects pagan learning because it is ignorant of God, and therefore of the new knowledge represented by himself (Stein, pp. 107–108). The second establishes a hierarchy of knowledge, with Christian knowledge at the top (Irene Samuel, Plato and Milton [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947], pp. 101–129).

10 Samuel, pp. 63–64.


12 Pope covers the exegetical background to this idea on pp. 87–89.

13 Cox, p. 225.

14 Works, XIV, 189.

15 Stein, pp. 128–129.

16 Stanley Fish also emphasizes the fixity of Christ and the rigidity of his words in “Inaction and Silence: The Reader in Paradise Regained,” in Calm of Mind, ed. J.A. Wittreich, Jr. (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1971), pp. 25–47, but with his own special emphasis on the challenge this directs at the reader.

17 Works, XIV, 295.

18 Works, XIV, 181.

19 Hughes, p. 274.