Part of this energy could be otherwise analyzed as unease, and nervousness and sensitivity certainly emerge here. Very little else emerges, indeed, in the long, tedious correspondence with Bude: in substance, these letters consist almost entirely of accusations about what you said about what I said about what you said. Erasmus is working out left-over severe anxiety about his disagreement with Lefèvre (see CWE 5). Untoward anxiety is also aroused by Edward Lee, after all a very junior figure in relation to Erasmus.

Along with these symptoms of distortive nervous energy, however, there are convincing images in these letters of a much more friendly nature. The letters keep in touch with old friends, and recall happy personal scenes from years before (868). Of course they respond favorably to praise; they also respond warmly. Erasmus is not only gratified, but touched by the enthusiasm of Christoph Eschenfelder, customs officer on the Rhine, who when he discovers he is meeting Erasmus drags him home to be seen by wife, children and neighbors, and bribes the boatmen with wine to make them tolerate the delay (867: 50ff.). Erasmus writes a friendly letter back to him a few weeks after the encounter, telling a good story about the remarkable effects of Eschenfelder’s wine on the boatman’s wife (879).

The volume portrays not an untroubled but an ultimately positive personality. Through Erasmus’ choices and in the midst of his other vicissitudes, Christian Humanism develops to an important point and begins to undergo one of its greatest stresses. Professors Mynors and Bietenholz transmit this material to us as classical elocutio directs, clearly, aptly and elegantly. They are excellent students and Humanistic imitators of Erasmus, and encourage us to imitate them.

JOHN F. McDIARMID, Behrend College, Pennsylvania State University


In this boldly titled book, George Logan has set out to solve two of the most vexing problems in Morean scholarship. What were More’s intentions in writing Utopia? And what kind of work is it? Despite a plethora of studies in the many relevant disciplines, More’s Utopia has proven so resistant to even the most brilliant and rigorous analyses to which it has been subjected that there is no agreement on a solution for these (and other) problems. Professor Logan begins by telling us what the Utopia is not. It is neither a jeu d’esprit nor a mirror of normative political ideas, he claims. Nor is it to be viewed as satire, whether directed at England and/or Europe or at itself, and, more particularly, its second book and its narrator, Raphael Hythlodaeus. Logan is especially adamant in attacking the latter notion. He takes issue, then, with the many literary critics (who are otherwise too diverse in the critical principles they follow to be called a school in any formal sense) who—aware of the incongruities, real and apparent, in the presentation and substance of Utopia—have come to see the work, in part or whole, as undermining the radical idealism that the Utopia, read at face value, seems to espouse. If this view is followed to its logical conclusion, indeed, the Utopia becomes an anti-
Utopia. But how then can we interpret the cry for justice that animates the text? For this and other reasons, Logan argues that we cannot understand *Utopia* without understanding its context, by which he means Western political theory. And he aligns himself with the "humanistic" school of interpreters, that is, those who are in some sense historical in their orientation. The most important such interpreters, for his purposes, are J. H. Hexter, Edward Surtz, S.J., and Quentin Skinner. But their assumptions and specific interpretations are often more diverse, and more at odds with one another, than Logan altogether acknowledges. Both the achievements and the limitations of his own study, then, partially depend upon the degree to which he successfully modifies and integrates such different perspectives with a more explicitly literary analysis of a text that he reads as a piece of political theory. For Logan, in short, the *Utopia* is "a serious work of political philosophy" (p. ix) that takes the strict form of a best-commonwealth exercise and "deserves a place among the most advanced and creative political writings of its era" (p. x).

Logan rightly insists upon reading "consecutively" (p. x) in developing his case, and he treats the three parts of *Utopia* in the order in which More arranged them. Chapter One is devoted to the too-frequently ignored prefatory letter to Peter Giles, viewed as an introduction to the whole work. Logan points to puzzles with respect to chronology, etc., and sketches some of the many questions the text raises about its matter, order, style, and purpose. He also acknowledges the peculiar mode of the work, noting how the latter both calls attention to itself as fiction and mocks itself, an observation that could have been pursued, since it raises questions about the idea of *Utopia* as political philosophy that are not wholly worked out. But Logan’s major concern, a crucial one, is to clarify Utopia’s original audience. This is characterized as humanists, that is, "sophisticated literary scholars" (p. 23) who shared More’s ideas and concerns. It follows, for Logan, that *Utopia* cannot be a *speculum principis*, for it would be absurd to imagine More offering "a disguised rehash of humanist prescriptions" (p. 26) to such an audience. The point is valid so far as it goes, but Logan’s sense of audience seems to me too narrow. Most of More’s fellow humanists were administrators as well as literary scholars: Peter Giles was secretary of Antwerp and the title-page of the *Utopia* identifies More as a citizen and sheriff of London. Additionally, More wrote to Erasmus in September, 1516, asking him to obtain letters of support from well-placed statesmen as well as intellectuals. It seems, then, that the *Utopia* was intended for persons with first-hand experience with problems of governance in an autocratic and power-hungry period. This is a point with far-reaching implications; for Logan, the *Utopia* is an abstract and rigorous intellectual construct, rationally following its own premises independent of the contemporaneous situation, whereas I think More expected readers who would bring a strong sense of political and social actualities to a work which impresses, in part, by its feignings and concreteness.

Logan’s second chapter juxtaposes sections treating portions of the dialogue in Book I with sections where political theories are described at length. The connections between foreground and background are not always obvious, especially when the proof offered is more speculative than textual. But Logan’s sense of
More’s “systemic” or holistic view of society and his concern with the methods More used are salutory. Arguing that More anticipated modern model theory, he turns to Renaissance theorists in Northern Italy and to classical political thinkers to explain More’s preoccupation. He divides the former into two groups, the pre-humanists, who stressed the need for the virtuous citizen, and the scholastics, who stressed the good institution and the machinery of government, and he maintains that Hythlodaeus has affinities with the latter. I am not convinced by this apparent parallel, since it is not clear that public interest meant the same thing to both parties and since the particular system that Hythlodaeus describes seems quite opposite to the political model assumed in Italy, where class structure remained and factions were controlled, not eliminated. In any case, Logan admits that there is no real evidence for More’s familiarity with these Italian theorists. He does, however, argue for the influence of Greek and Roman political theorists, whom he divides into two groups: one, rhetorical, Roman, and Stoic, he portrays as influencing the early humanists; the other philosophical, Platonic, and Aristotelian, as influencing the scholastics. Asking the crucial question—what is the best form of the polis—this second tradition led to the city-state preoccupations of the Italian humanists. By contrast, the Northern humanists remained true to a Stoic and normative point of view. But such distinctions, it appears, are broken down in the course of Utopia. For Logan argues that More is trying “to fuse humanist and scholastic political theory” and to grapple with the classical works behind them (p. 94). The conclusion he draws is twofold. On the one hand, he remarks that More is less original than he is usually viewed. On the other, he grants that More significantly deviates from this classical pattern of political analysis. Unlike the Greeks, in other words, More is interested in testing the experiment and in the use of imaginative models. And he is preoccupied with the question of what is expedient and what is moral. These differences seem to me even more radical than they do to Logan. In fact, I think that one of the most important contributions this chapter makes is its repeated recognition of More’s vital concern with the relationship between honestas and utilitas.

When he comes to Book II of Utopia, Logan abandons his consecutive reading, choosing instead to define and discuss the constituents of the best-commonwealth exercise that, he believes, More is both replicating and criticizing in his Utopian republic. Logan identifies four steps in this exercise, which finds its prototypes in Herodotus, Plato’s Republic and Laws, and Aristotle’s Politics, and has “at its core the conception of the polis as a system of reciprocally-affecting parts” (p. 132). Step 1 is the determination of the best life for the individual; step 2, the overall goal of the commonwealth; step 3, the elaboration of the component parts; and step 4, the forms these must take (p. 136). We could recognize this pattern immediately, Logan maintains, were it not for the form More adopted. By substituting a model for Greek dialectics and by presenting that model “as a fictional travelogue” (p. 139) More has doubly suppressed or disguised his dialectical substructure and reorganized his topics “for the rather different order (or disorder) of the traveler’s tale” (p. 140). Logan subsequently recreates the “cornerstone” or step 1 of More’s model, namely Utopia’s moral philosophy. This philosophy of virtuous pleasure (or pleasurable virtue) is inherently paradoxical. Logan grants this, but aims to reduce it to a “logical sequence” (p. 147). It seems to me that he
has paraphrased its constituent parts instead, for as paradox it often relies on verbal sleights and errors in logic. To put this another way, not only is Utopia’s Epicureanism “contaminated” (p. 155) by Stoicism; it is radically altered by concealed Platonic and Christian concepts that could lead us to ask what Epicureanism comes to mean in Utopia. I am, then, less convinced than Logan is that “purely rational considerations” (p. 180) operate here (or at those points in Book II where More seems to be creating red herrings), although I would agree that this section of _Utopia_ is central to our understanding of what Utopia is.

Logan further argues that “the main aspects of the Utopian constitution” follow from Utopian conclusions about the best life (p. 182) and that _all_ the substantial features of Utopia are related to the section on moral philosophy (p. 185). He insists, then, that there is no necessary connection between England (or Europe) and Utopia: only in “indifferent features” (p. 193) may the two agree, as in the case of Utopia’s location in the new world. Here and elsewhere I think Logan discounts evidence, both intrinsic and extrinsic, regarding relationships (which are sometimes inverted or reversed mirror-images) between the actual world and More’s fictive one. Utopia’s geography is deliberately antipodean, and Erasmus’ point (in his letter to Ulrich von Hutten) about More’s writing _Utopia_ with the English constitution in mind deserves consideration, as do the marginal glosses. But if Logan is not much interested in the details of life in Utopia or in the nature of Utopian negation, and virtually ignores the first half of Book II, he does not ignore the unpleasant aspects of this state, wrestling, for example, with the thorny problems of war and foreign policy. Admitting that these are unsolved (and perhaps unsolvable), he sees them as the logical result of More’s best-commonwealth exercise. He argues, too, that More is well aware of the tensions between Utopian values and Utopian actions; national security and the need to equalize pleasure collide, as do the goals of freedom and stability (and this explains Utopia’s repressiveness). His own final view of _Utopia_ is double. As a best-commonwealth exercise of “unprecedented sophistication” (p. 248) it is, he says, both “a protest against the ideas of secular theorists” and “a corrective to the naive optimism” of More’s fellow Christian humanists (p. 249). It is deeply indebted to classical political theory, and is preeminently a product of Renaissance humanism. But it cannot be read as prescriptive theory. Rather, it is a thoughtful critique of humanistic ideals and an attack upon _realpolitisch_ tendencies.

This is an ambitious interpretation of a perplexing text, and it would be utopian indeed to expect complete agreement from any one reader. I find More’s _Utopia_ a much funnier (though no less serious) work than Logan does, and accordingly would interpret individual passages rather differently. I worry about his tendency to treat the fictive elements as so much sugar-coating: like other aspects of the work, the aesthetic too is unusually sophisticated and accomplished. And I would urge a much less restrictive sense of context; More’s intentions, I believe, were more complex, and the resulting work more protean, flexible, and fully imagined and felt than the one portrayed here. But _The Meaning of More’s “Utopia”_ is a significant exploration of theoretical political aspects. Bringing an enormous amount of material to bear upon our understanding of _Utopia_, it reopens fundamental issues that much recent criticism has evaded. Logan’s concern for a historical perspective and his determination to redress readings that may trivialize
or otherwise diminish a major work impress, as does his willingness to tackle the truly tough, central questions. And I would agree that a "primary purpose of Utopia was to stimulate political thought" (p. 252), or, more particularly, to exercise the mind, imagination, and moral sense of the reader on the question of the best commonwealth.

ELIZABETH McCUTCHEON, University of Hawaii