misleading and ignores what we know of Donne and casuistry from works by Camille Slichts (The Casuistical Tradition [Princeton, 1982]) and A.E. Malloch ("Donne and the Casuists," SEL 2[1962], 57-76). And all this is not even to mention a curious reference under CASUISTRY to I, 180-84 that promises a four-page discussion of casuistry but does not deliver it. The pages actually overlap two sermons on completely different texts and refer again to false reasoning rather than to casuistry. I must conclude by reiterating that despite its obvious utility, the unreliability of such a necessary work makes it dangerous indeed to the inexperienced. The carelessness of the first volume is easily checked. But the inadequacies of the cross-referencing (indicated by my SCANDAL example) and the power to perpetuate misleading definitions (indicated by my CASUISTRY example) in the third volume indicate only too clearly that the work must be used with discretion as well as imagination, and with a healthy mistrust of this way of knowing Donne through his sermons. In the end, despite the many things that have been brought together in these volumes, they are still no substitute for careful observation, systematic note-taking and imaginative cross-referencing.

JEANNE M. SHAMI, University of Regina


The earliest account of Montaigne's mishap at the gates of Rome is to be found in the Discours préliminaire that Meunier de Querlon wrote for the first edition of Le Journal de Voyage de Michel de Montaigne en Italie, which was published simultaneously in Paris and in Rome in 1774. There we can read: "Les deux premiers Livres des Essais furent imprimés pour la première fois à Bordeaux en 1580; ils parurent, par conséquent, au moins quelques mois avant le voyage de Montaigne en Italie, puisqu'il trouva cet ouvrage à Rome entre les mains des Examinateurs, dont il avoit déjà subi la censure." (Quoted from p. 60 of the Dédéyan edition.) The Journal gives us further details that allow us to understand better what happened. Smith's first chapter contained the pertinent passages in full, but regrettably in his English translation, without page references to the Dédéyan ed. of the original: "[Montaigne's] cases had been inspected by the customs men as he entered the city . . . furthermore, all the books that had been found in his cases [is cases the best translation of coffres?] had been taken from him to be examined" (Smith, p. 15). Nearly four months later, on March 20, 1581, the Essais were returned to their author, "chatiés selon l'opinion des Doctours Moines" (Dédéyan ed., p. 232). The chief censor had to engage the help "d'aucun Frater François" to make sure of every reprehensible passage. Then, "il remit à ma conscience de rabiller ce que je verrois etre de mauvés gout." What were the bones of contention? Six had been sorted out when the Essais were returned to Montaigne. Each objection becomes the substance of a chapter in Smith's book, beginning with Montaigne's frequent use of the words fortune (173
times in the 1580 ed., "with a variety of meanings"). Smith asks the obvious question, "What is there about the word ‘fortune’ that could cause a censor to frown?" and he answers, "Behind this word there lurked the shadow of the goddess Fortuna, a frequent subject of that ancient pagan poetry so often denounced by early christian theologians" (p. 24). The value of Smith’s study resides mainly in the fact that he goes far beyond a delineation of the infractions. It was not easy to unravel how Montaigne reacted to the censorship. We are fully informed about the adjustments made by the accused, who was well aware of the likelihood that the Maestro del sacro palasso (the chief censor) would not turn sleepy after having been so alert. With regard to the diplomacy used by Montaigne to make Fortuna more tractable, Smith observes, "In later editions of his book, Montaigne retained his earlier use of ‘fortune’, but in several chapters he added unobtrusive glosses on what he meant by the word, gently hinting at the edifying nature of his use of the concept" (p. 30). Other incriminations were due to [2] "d’avoir nommé des Poètes haerétiques, [3] d’avoir excusé Julian, et [4] l’animadversion sur ce que celui qui prôit, devoir être exampt de vitieuse inclination pour ce temps; item [5] d’estimer cruauté ce qui est audelà de mort simple; item [6] qu’il falloit nourrir un enfant à tout faire" (Journal, p. 232). The headings used by Smith clarify what is involved: "Montaigne’s praise of Theodore Beza’s poetry;” “Montaigne’s defence of Julian’s statesmanship;” “On prayers and repentance;” “Humane executions;” and "Liberal education. Being able to do anything.” “The goddess Fortuna” has already been mentioned.

Montaigne’s maneuvers are fascinating. He accommodates without selling out his principles and without resorting to duplicity. After having placed De Bèze and Buchanan among the "bons artisans" near the end of “De la Praesumption” (together with Daurat, L’Hospital, and Turnèbe), a modest accolade that was enough to draw censure, Montaigne did not renge on his praise of de Bèze as a poet. Rather, in “Sur des vers de Virgile” (about 1586) Montaigne claims for himself the same licentiousness that “mesme des hommes ecclesiastiques des nostres et plus creestz jouissent en ce siècle” (Villey-Saulnier ed., p. 888). And there follows a quotation from De Bèze’s Juvenilia (of which Montaigne possessed a copy) which refers to the lady’s rimula in no uncertain terms. Similarly, we find in "De la vanité," on p. 989 of the same edition: "J’ay veu en ma jeunesse un galant homme presenter d’une main au peuple des vers excellens en beauté et en desbordement [i.e., licentiousness], et de l’autre main en mesme instant la plus quereleuse reformation theologienne de quoy le monde se soit desjeune il y a long temps." Thus Montaigne did not withdraw his appreciation of De Bèze’s poetry (still beautiful), but he did reprimand the Protestant churchman who indulged in such libertine language.

Just as Montaigne upheld the merits of De Bèze’s poetry, he defended the statesmanship of emperor Julian, “the Apostle” (b. 332) who is known chiefly for his attempt to substitute paganism for Christianity and to organize a pagan church. Nevertheless he was “un tres-grand homme et rare... et... il n’est aucune sorte de vertu dequoy il n’ait laissé de tres-notables exemples” (II, xix, “De la liberté de conscience,” ed. cit., p. 669). And the praise continues, although “en matière de religion il estoit vicieux par tout.” Julian, like De Bèze, had undeniable qualities, but they were vitiated by the wrong religion.
It is perfectly safe to accept Smith as our guide through the often intricate passages that show us how Montaigne cleverly accommodated the censors while giving up only a minimum of his original thought. Smith’s sound piece of detective work sheds light on an important remark made by Pierre Villey in his *Montaigne devant le postérité*: “Quelque peine que nous ayons à la comprendre, il faut admettre que, pour un catholique du XVIe siècle, il y avait là une liberté d’esprit choquante” (p. 92).

However, it is regrettable that the author has not made a better assessment of his potential audience. This is a work that cannot hope for popular appeal and therefore it is inappropriate that the French original has not been kept. One might be more forgiving on this score if the translations offered were smooth and correct. I am afraid they are not. By way of a sample, one should compare the passage dealing with De Bèze, on p. 46 of Smith’s book, with the corresponding sentence at the bottom of p. 756 of Frame’s *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*. It is also not at all helpful that Smith refuses to give page references. With regard to specific *essais* he leaves us floundering by telling us, “about three-quarters of the way through” (p. 46), “and a little later” (p. 70), “near the beginning” (p. 101). At least it is conceded that “it would do no harm for the reader to look at Montaigne’s original French, if possible, for many parts of Montaigne are difficult to translate” (p. 13). “If possible” could only apply if we were asked to check on the original editions Smith used in the British Library, an unreasonable expectation.

BODO L.O. RICHTER, *State University of New York at Buffalo*


The decade of the 1590s was for England a time of extraordinarily rich and varied literary production, and at least one of the results of this burgeoning was the birth of a new form, the minor epic. Although every major Elizabethan writer except Sidney wrote a minor epic, it is today a neglected form, and, were it not for its major exemplars, Shakespeare (*Venus and Adonis* and *The Rape of Lucrece*) and Marlowe (*Hero and Leander*), it would be an almost forgotten one. The reason for this neglect, according to Hulse, is that we tend to privilege literature’s “timeless values,” the qualities that transcend temporality, whereas the minor epic can only be properly understood within its historical context. The ambitious promise of Hulse’s *Metamorphic Verse* is to provide such an historical context, to restore the minor epic to its place in “the network of Elizabethan theory and practice.” It is a promise he admirably fulfills, and in doing so, not only does he construct a poetics for the minor epic, but he provides an important model for the criticism of Renaissance literature in general.

The genre of minor epic refers to a body of narrative verse that, although comprising a variety of subjects and approaches, nevertheless draws on two main sources: classical myth and the English chronicles. The term Hulse uses to describe the minor epic is “metamorphic,” and he does so first because the largest