celui de la *Démonomanie*, au profit du glorieux auteur de la *République* et de l'*Heptaplomeres*.

J. Roger rétablit à son tour la hiérarchie et la cohérence des concepts bodiniens, articulés sur la liberté et la toute puissance divine, que confirme la nécessité même des démons. La convergence de ces interprétations laisse augurer au mieux des prochaines analyses qui se feront à l'écoute de ces sept savants discutant de religion, lesquels sont, rappelons-le, Hyerome Senamy, sceptique ou synerétiste (selon le P.J. Lecler), partisan de la soumission au culte de l'Etat où l'on réside, Paul Coroni, catholique libéral vénitien, chez qui se tiennent les réunions, Octave Fagnola, chrétien converti à l'Islam, Friderich Podamic, luthérien peu tolérant, Diegue Toralbe, adepte de la religion naturelle, Anthoine Curce, calviniste, Salomon Barcasse, juif, jugé comme le porteparole ordinaire de Bodin. C'est du moins l'opinion reprise à Angers par K. Davies, que ses travaux sur les variantes ont rendu aussi familière avec les nuances de sens de l'*Heptaplomeres* qu'à celles de la forme.

C'est encore à elle que nous devons une solide étude de la filiation des textes latins et un prudent stemma, tandis que F. Berriot a dressé de son côté un répertoire des copies manuscrites. L'édition Droz contient enfin la version latine et grecque des poèmes intercalés et une courte lettre de Bodin sur la difficile éducation "latine" de ses enfants, en 1586!

PIERRE-LOUIS VAILLANCOURT, *Université d'Ottawa*

Barbara McClung Hallman. *Italian Cardinals, Reform and the Church as Propers, 492-1563*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xii, 232. \$35.00.

One of the puzzling elements in the English-language historiography of later medieval and early modern Europe is the relative indifference among scholars to the most advanced bureaucracy of the period. There exists no study in the English language that does justice to the organizational complexity of the Curia Romana. The papal administrative system dealt early with problems that other governments would try to solve at a later date. Like the ancient regime generally, the papacy had to find the means of providing justice and financing armies and civil servants as well as paying for the personal artistic tastes of the rulers within a governmental system which was becoming ever less elastic. As was true for these other governments, the popes were not successful in finding long-term solutions to their problems, and their short term solutions soon turned into new long-term problems. In some ways, since it differed from the kingdoms of France and England, lacking the social and feudal dynamics that limited centralized government, the Curia offers the historian a rather pure test-case of how European government and administration developed and what made the task of governing in early modern Europe seemingly so impossible.

Despite the obvious attraction of curial history to the institutional and economic historians, the scholarship on the Curia is remarkably limited. Much of the best material is over seventy years old, written in German and informed with the premises of

nineteenth century institutional history. Only recently have a few scholars – and almost all of them are German – tried to go beyond the recitations of offices and their holders or the price list for bulls, to discuss the broader questions of governmental organization and the administrative culture of the bureaucracy. But this is still a grossly underworked field which has not been integrated into the broader contours of European history.

Two examples should indicate how valuable the study of the Curia Romana could be. Venality of offices was a seemingly essential device used by early modern states to staff their offices and was to be one of the most intractable problems of the ancient regime, a necessary evil which ultimately came to dominate the opportunistic governments that favoured it. But venality originated in the Curia at the end of the fourteenth century. By the beginning of the sixteenth the Curia was well on its way to making all non-spiritual offices venal and inventing new ones for sale. The popes had to find a means of obtaining a ready cash-flow to pay for wars (the major papal expenditure) as well as expensive building programs. Venality was the solution that brought in the money, but it tied bureaucracy to vested career interests. Well before France and the other secular states hit upon this "solution," the Curia had auctioned itself off to a *noblesse de robe*. Yet, there is no modern study of venality of the Church save for a few, short articles. Similarly, nepotism can be seen as a precursor of the rule of favorites, but again how many English speaking scholars know of Wolfgang Reinhard's *Papstfinanz und Nepotismus unter Paul V (1605-1621)* (Stuttgart, 1974). Ignorance of such a work should be seen as a major defect in any historian of early modern government, finance or diplomacy.

No doubt the religious quality of the Curia Romana alienates many modern scholars or makes them see it as somehow unrepresentative of what was going on in secular governments. But this is a narrow view. The Curia Romana (if I may rephrase a *bon mot* of Edward Peters) is related to religiosity, as Washington DC is related to patriotism. Administrative centres have to do with administration, just as financial centres have to do finance; all other considerations are secondary. The Curia and the men connected with it lived in a real work of grand and petty bureaucracy, of financial exigencies, and of minor family dynasties; the historian should deal with them within these contexts. The indifference toward curial history is especially ironic since every textbook devotes much space to detailing the economic excesses of the Renaissance popes without their authors understanding the administrative, economic and political problems facing the popes (and usually knowing next to nothing about the character and operations of the Curia).

It is one of the merits of Barbara Hallman's book on Church property that she understands that the Curia was an institution that had real economic problems which could cut across and frustrate the broader politico-religious aims of the popes – just as the bureaucracy of any state can frustrate the political aims of a king or elected president. Professor Hallman investigates the cold economic facts relating to the College of Cardinals, men who had the responsibility of helping to rule and reform the Church at the very time when they were the major beneficiaries of the system that made reform not much more than a personal ideal and always a threat to social and family position. To highlight the problems facing the cardinals and their willingness to direct their energies to economic questions, she has investigated

the Vatican Library and Archives and found much valuable information.

A Renaissance cardinal was a prince who was expected to live in a grand style and mirror the magnificence of his office in his personal activities. This required money, a good deal of it. To acquire the necessary wealth, the cardinals became experts at utilizing (and abusing) every economic source open to them. Professor Hallman has analyzed the 102 Italian cardinals of the High Renaissance and early Counter-Reformation as economic actors. These men were skilled at extracting monies from their religious offices. Benefices of all sorts were acquired and traded, and generally treated as personal property, the economic rewards of office. Pluralism was normal among these cardinals and they devised all sorts of methods to increase their control over bishoprics or give (or in some cases lend) them to their dependents. Hierarchy always implies dependency and patronage, and the cardinals had to find posts for a large number of hangeron and relatives. Reformers called for an end to such practices, but it took a long time before cardinals would accept a limit on pluralism as an ideal and even longer before they would accept it as a fact.

The extent to which ecclesiastical offices were accepted as real personal property can be seen in the rental market for them. Cardinals leased their offices to assure themselves of regular cash supplies. This meant that ever more laymen (especially Italian bankers) came to administer these offices. As Prof. Hallman so rightly points out, "... if the church of God ceased to be for sale between 1497 and 1563, it was certainly for rent" (p. 66). Further augmenting this laicization was the ability of a cleric, with papal permission, to will church monies to relatives. Canon law (being, like all law, the servant of the *status quo*) soon followed practices and legitimized these procedures. Of course, the trafficking in church wealth meant that some family fortunes were made through ecclesiastical manipulations. Indeed, there was a certain social mobility that resulted from the acquisition of curial ecclesiastical offices and was fostered by their manipulation. Even women and children were allowed to participate in the system. Many unimportant Italian families became rich and noble through a relative who reached the cardinalate. Ultimately, however, this was all part of the nobilization and economic depression of Italy, a system that became too heavy for the institutions which spawned it.

Thus, a few Italian families were able to exploit their relatives' ecclesiastical prominence into patters of nobility and economic security. Not surprisingly there was a good deal of intermarriage among these groups. Ecclesiastical money tended to follow ecclesiastical money. To demonstrate the closely-knit structure that developed, Professor Hallman supplies a "Kinship among Cardinals" diagram, which looks like a large ball of string tying together the various members of the College of Cardinals and the popes. The Curia and the wealth to be made from it were controlled by a limited number of Italian families and their dependents, content with the system as it was and determined to prevent any reform of it. Ultimately, it seems that all ecclesiastical reform in the Counter-Reformation was a matter of fine tuning or of rationalizing the system, never a matter of fundamental change.

The story Professor Hallman tells is not doubt depressing to those who believe that the upswing in religiosity of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries changed people's natures. However, to the historian her story is an important one,

one that places the Curia at the center of large-scale economic and administrative changes in European history. With luck, other scholars will follow her lead and make the history of the Curia Romana a standard element in early modern historiography and one appealing to English speaking scholars.

JOHN F. D'AMICO, *George Mason University*

Barbara L. Estrin. *The Raven and the Lark: Lost Children in the Literature of the English Renaissance*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press / London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1985. Pp. 288. \$29.50.

When a social historian, such as this reviewer, picks up a work of literary criticism and scholarship contemporary to his historical interests, he generally hopes to find insights that move beyond the strictly literary. Reverberations of the ideologies of literate elites, general cultural assumptions, characters and plot events that closely mimic what is known of actual people and events from other sources – these are all elements a historian would seek from the literary scholar. Nor would these elements be desired solely by the historian. While it is certainly true that a text is susceptible to a variety of approaches, a historical contextual reading is a very valid way to proceed to unlock meanings in the works of authors like Shakespeare.

At first glance Barbara L. Estrin's *The Raven and the Lark* would seem to be the sort of book a historian would find interesting. She attempts to set her literary analysis in a historical context developed in the second and third chapters. But, above all, she chooses a promising approach – the foundling motif. According to the foundling formula as she describes it, an exposed child of noble lineage is raised in primitive surroundings, ignorant of his true parentage, his identity is later revealed by a talisman or mark, and he is returned (usually at the point of marriage) to his biological parents to carry on the lineage. "Analogous foundling" is the term she applies to literary characters whose experiences approximate those of formulaic foundlings: "they know their parents but are separated from them . . . they endure the same separation, the same loss" (p. 13). However, Estrin does not confine the analogy very closely to this model. To treat a character like Cleopatra as an analogous foundling seems absurd.

The lost-child plot, Estrin insists, boils down to the dichotomy between art and nature. Art is carried by the fostering relationship in the adoptive sections; nature triumphs in the ultimate reunion. Authors were able to exploit this "minigenre" (p. 17) in a variety of ways. She confines her remarks to literary texts. Theological, philosophical, legal, and artistic treatments of the art/nature problem do not figure in her account. Nor does she go into the related issue of Renaissance notions of fiction (no citation, for example, of William Nelson's *Fact or Fiction: The Dilemma of the Renaissance Storyteller* [Cambridge, Mass., 1973]), although her insights into Sidney and Spenser should contribute to scholarship in this area.

What she does with the foundling motif casts doubt on the adequacy of the book's subtitle. "Literature of the English Renaissance" turns out to be essentially