exposition of the book's shortcomings he reveals that he had read the typescript and had not recommended publication; he then declares that he wishes to dissociate himself from the book, and questions how it came to be published (apparently in a shoddy but expensive format).

Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England is a handsome volume, but is not without misprints which begin in the listing of the Editorial Board and can be found in running titles as well as scattered through the text. Most saddening to me is the repeated "elegaic" (p. 100); most cheering are the "British cultured materialists" on p. 245 (colonial deference?), and the pleasing concept of Cohen's "eclectic Marxism" on p. 351.

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Sebastian De Grazia. *Machiavelli in Hell*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp. 497.

First a word about the title. The Hell in which De Grazia places Machiavelli is not the Dantean or the traditional pulpit hell, but rather a place in the afterworld where makers of states gather. Membership in this club is reserved for those who founded states either through their deeds (princes) or their writing (authors). The last category includes famous political theorists, such as Aristotle, Plato and, of course, Machiavelli. The fresh conception of Hell, which is actually a corner of paradise or simply the "dwelling place of heroes" (p. 385), proceeds from a moral philosophy whereby the new political leader, the "prince new" or the founder of states (and implicitly, his counselor/tutor) is indeed the savior, the redeemer of a fallen or corrupt principality. In carrying out this redemption or in founding a new state, the prince at times is "necessitated to enter evil:" if necessary he must kill even his own sons, and he would do so for love of his country, which supposedly he loves more than his soul (p. 352). But in so doing, the prince risks eternal damnation, for "entering into evil" means to sin. Here, De Grazia draws a pivotal distinction between sin and sinner, act and actor, deeds and doer. His point is predicated on the semantic difference between cruelty and cruelties: the first is an intrinsic trait of a wicked individual, the latter is an act which a person (a prince) is often "necessitated" to commit or perform, even though he is not cruel by nature. But unless one accepts Isaac Berlin's suggestion that Machiavelli places the prince with a pagan or Greco-Roman morality, the dilemma still remains, for in Judeo-Christian conventions a sin is a sin, whether committed by sheer cruelty or by necessity of state. De Grazia resolves the issue by arguing that in Machiavelli's view God was favorably predisposed toward political leaders who sinned for the good of the state. The strength of the argument is primarily derived from Chapter XXVI of *The*

Prince, where Machiavelli, in exhorting his "prince new" to heroic action, elevates him to the level of biblical, historical and mythological figures such as Moses, Cyrus and Theseus. Their towering stature notwithstanding, these men and their enterprises, Machiavelli argues, were not necessarily "juster" than the liberation of Italy "nor was God more a friend to them than to you [the prince'new']." God, in fact, forgives a prince who sins for the benefit of the whole, as He forgave Moses, David, St. Peter, etc. Pursuant to this political theology in which the "beloved of God are makers of states in deed and writing (p. 385), the princes, the armed prophets, and, of course, their counselors emerge as the real heroes. They are, indeed, the few saints of a religion that condones sins committed in the name of the common good. After all, De Grazia remarks, Machiavelli believes that "the greatest good that one can do and the most gratifying to God, is that which one does for one's country" (p. 381).

This resolution of Machiavelli's long-discussed (im)moral dilemma within the premises of christian orthodoxy echoes a view proposed by Machon in his *Apologie pour Machiavel* (1643). But, whereas for Machon (whom De Grazia does not acknowledge) a prince is endowed with a sacred nature and, therefore, enjoys divine exemption from moral consideration, for De Grazia, he is basically a sinner whose princely evil deeds God ultimately forgives. Without pretending to do so, De Grazia squares off against those who have viewed Machiavelli's prince operate within a non-christian morality. In his position there is also the implied repudiation of Croce's seminal view that Machiavelli divorces politics from religion or that politics has its own morality.

But the attempt to reconcile Machiavelli's political theory with christian morality, however interesting and revolutionary, is not always convincing. For instance, the idea that the "prince new" is motivated by "love of country," and thus for the good of those governed, is hardly in keeping with Machiavelli's well-known belief that individuals are driven primarily by personal ambition. Think of Cesare Borgia's ambitions! Also, De Grazia's immense undertaking comes with the price of having to accept often at face value and in haste raw and unmitigated evidence. In fact, the reader may have difficulty distinguishing between historical and literary evidence, for De Grazia often presents evidence from the *Histories* or the *Letters* together with quotations from the plays, the poems, and other writings: the distinction between the historian and the poet is not always clear. In addition, the predilection for textual evidence can be so overwhelming that it often obfuscates the argument, as in the case of his treatment of Fortuna. The long discussion aimed at establishing the sexual connotation of Fortuna = woman vs. *virtù* (from *vir*) could have been easily handled with a reference to Pitkin's in-depth study on the same topic (*Fortune is a Woman*, 1984). But inexplicably De Grazia does not take into account nor does he acknowledge previous Machiavellian scholarship. At times, this causes him to arrive at hasty conclusions. For instance, his rather instinctive view of Timoteo as a monk who seeks to make money for charitable purposes

ignores the established view that Timoteo is one of those greedy friars populating the *novellistica* and the theater of Renaissance Italy. And, his assertion that in *The Prince* "you" (for which Machiavelli uses the singular pronoun *tu*, or the plural *voi*, depending on the context) refers to one person (p. 32), disregards studies that have argued for distinct functions of the two pronouns. Also, commenting on the October 1525 letter to Guicciardini, De Grazia writes that Machiavelli finally "turns his attention to his literary efforts, to the history of Florence he is still working on" (p. 343). Actually Machiavelli had already presented the work to the Pope in May of that year.

These reservations are minor points vis-à-vis the scope of De Grazia's well documented study of Machiavelli's life and thought. Indeed the book is a biography, an intellectual biography to be specific, pieced together, like a mosaic, mainly from Machiavelli's own works, including references seldom seen before. De Grazia's encyclopedic knowledge of the Machiavellian text helps to produce a biographical tour de force unprecedented in Machiavellian scholarship. The result is a complete picture of Machiavelli, the family man, the citizen, the individual with all his beliefs and views, with all his habits and contradictions. The personal traits and mental patterns serve as the base for the book's central argument which seeks to place Machiavelli's political philosophy within the context of christian morality.

Certainly, the book would have gained considerably from a critical apparatus that would take into account past and present scholarship. However, its absence does not detract from a book that affords easy and pleasurable reading partly because the reader is not interrupted by constant references to other sources. Reading is also facilitated by De Grazia's decision to keep the text all in English, placing the original Italian in the notes. His translations from the Italian are flawless. Although De Grazia's study may not be the last word on Machiavelli's life and thought, it is nonetheless an important critical contribution to Machiavelli scholarship and should have a place not only in every library but on the shelves of every Machiavelli scholar.

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Peter Pierson. *Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. xiii, 304.

Perhaps the most welcome result of anniversary celebrations for significant historical events is the interest they stimulate in researching and reinterpreting old subjects. Certainly, this is the case with the recent 400th anniversary (in 1989) of the Spanish Armada, which has produced a number of important new books and articles based on fresh approaches and new evidence. One such book is Peter