In short, Schleiner's book is one that everyone interested in melancholy in the Renaissance should read simply because it adds so much to the work already available on the subject. Having said that, however, I must add that the author might have produced an even better book had he resisted the temptation "to include all of life" in a piecemeal way in his discussion.

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Political Writings*, translated and edited with an introduction and notes by Patrick Riley. Second Edition. (Cambridge texts in the History of Political Thought). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. xi, 249.

Leibniz (1646–1716) is best known as a logician, mathematician and metaphysician; by training, however, he was a lawyer and made his living as the legal and political adviser to a succession of German princelings. Some of the writings in this collection result directly from his official duties; others represent more detached reflections on the nature of justice, authority and the state. Leibniz was born during the last agonies of the Thirty Years War; notions of peace, order and concord occupy a central position in his thinking, at all levels. His own efforts to promote peace and concord included attempts to reunite the churches of Christendom and to design a universal language in which all mankind could communicate and in which calculation would replace controversy. Concomitantly he strove to establish learned academies, to shore up the Habsburg Empire and to protect the states of Germany and the Low Countries from the rapacity of Louis XIV. Although he had little success in these endeavours, he did found and was the first president of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, and he assisted in raising the House of Hanover to the Imperial College of Electors and to the British throne.

Leibniz's "Manifesto for the Defense of the Rights of Charles III" (1703) was written to uphold the Habsburg claim to the Spanish throne against Louis's promotion of his grandson. His "Mars Christianissimus" (1683) – "very Christian god of war" – is a scathing satire on Louis's Christian precepts and bellicose practice. The "Portrait of the Prince" (1679), written for the edification of his own employer, presents the contrasting picture of a good ruler. Many of his writings are directed against Hobbes and his influence: these include the "Caesarinus Fürstenerius" (1677), selections from which are given here, the "Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice" (c. 1702–3), and the "Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf" (1706). The Preface to his *Codex Iuris Gentium* (1693), included here in part, applies his principles of justice to the relations between sovereign states. The collections also contains several shorter papers and letters.

The decision to bring this material together in a single volume, in English translation, was an excellent one. Many of the papers included are unavailable in translation elsewhere and some of them are quite inaccessible even in the original. The first edition of Patrick Riley's *Leibniz: Political Writings* appeared in 1972, with a lively, informative and controversial introduction by the editor. In this new edition the first 198 pages consist in an unaltered reprint of the first edition, typos included. Another forty two pages of text have been added, comprising three short papers by Leibniz and 31 pages of introduction by the editor. This new material, which consists in revised versions of three journal articles published since 1972, adds little to our understanding of Leibniz's political thought.

How reliable are Riley's translations? A quick spot-check is not reassuring: Leibniz's "ne fais ou ne refuse point aisement ce que tu voudrois qu'on te fit ou qu'on ne te refusast pas" is translated as "do not do or do not refuse lightly that which you would not like to be done to you or which one would not refuse to you" (p.82); Leibniz's "Il est tres vrai... qu'on ne sçauroit aimer Dieu sans aimer son frere" becomes "It is most true... that one cannot know God without loving one's brother" (p.84). When Leibniz refers to "des verités universelles et eternelles, qui expriment l'Estre parfait" Riley buries the key notion of *expression* in the vague statement that universal and eternal truths "are manifested in the perfect Being" (p. 83). "Mars Christianissimus" contains the curious remark that the French ambassadors "avoided this unfortunate passage no more than the devil makes holy water" (p. 123). We are told that the translation is based on the Academy edition's French version but that "a few textual variants preserved in the Foucher de Careil edition have been interpolated." Sure enough, Foucher says that the devil "fait l'eau benite". But why prefer this to the Academy edition's "fuit", especially when the Latin original has the devil fleeing the cross? By substituting "fuit" and noting that "moins" means "less", not "more", we arrive at the statement that the ambassadors shunned this passage no less than the devil flees holy water.

The bibliography, described in the blurb as a "full critical bibliography", has been half-heartedly updated for this new edition. It is critical to the extent that it has brief comments on each item listed; it is certainly not full. Whether a bibliography of works in half a dozen languages is quite what is needed in a collection of translations, in a series primarily intended for students, is another question. But it ought at least to list accurately the relevant major articles and the latest editions of major books available in English, and for the rest it could list the latest edition of Müller's *Leibniz-Bibliographie*. It does none of these things, and when it refers to the splendid Academy edition it ignores the fact that a dozen additional volumes have appeared since 1972 and continues to direct "general readers" to inferior editions of the original texts.

In spite of these shortcomings, Riley's *Leibniz: Political Writings* is a valuable contribution to Leibniz studies. But it is a pity that so little advantage has been taken of the opportunity provided by the preparation of a new edition.

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Montaigne et la Grèce. Actes du colloque de Calamata et de Messène (23–26 septembre 1988), présentés par Kyriaki Christodoulou. Paris, Aux Amateurs de Livres, 1991, Pp. 254.

“Quant au grec, duquel je n’ay quasi du tout point d’intelligence” (I, 26) ... Kyriaki Christodoulou, par bonheur, ne s’est pas arrêtée à cette confidence des *Essais* et, à l’occasion du quatrième centenaire de l’édition de 1588, a réuni à Messène et Calamata (Péloponnèse) des chercheurs désireux comme elle de faire le point sur la dette de Montaigne envers la Grèce et sur l’image qu’en propose son livre. C’est d’ailleurs à la première de ces deux villes, fondée par cet Epaminondas tant admiré de l’auteur des *Essais*, que l’organisatrice de la rencontre a consacré une communication, qui retrace l’histoire de la résistance héroïque contre Sparte, son encombrante voisine.

Sparte, “Eldorado de la vertu:” de là cette “sorte d’utopie à coloration lacédémonienne” qu’Hélène Moreau voit “continuellement tissée à l’arrière-plan des *Essais*.” La vaillance stoïcienne, la densité du dire, la grâce sublime affirmée face à la mort serviraient-elles d’images de compensation pour l’homme au “moi oreiller?” Pas seulement. Montaigne jette un pont hardi entre la divine police dont Sparte est redevable à Lycurgue et l’anarchie heureuse des peuples d’Amérique. Les deux rêves, estime H. Moreau, se nourrissent l’un de l’autre et Montaigne se prend à regretter que les Spartiates n’aient eu connaissance de cette “naïveté si pure et simple” des gens du Nouveau-Monde. Contre l’Athènes des discours pipeurs (et, faut-il ajouter, la France de “feintise” et dissimulation), Sparte et l’Amérique font entendre cette parole “de bonne foy” dont se réclame Montaigne.

Du plafond de la librairie au livre, ou d’un lieu constellé de sentences grecques à un autre où les citations en cette langue, moins nombreuses, sont soumises au bricolage d’une “autotextualité flamboyante:” J. O’Brien montre comment la traduction, ici transfert concrétisé, actualise la double métaphore de la topique, à la fois lieu et thème.

“C’est mon homme que Plutarque.” Soit, mais à bien entendre dans le contexte, et Barbara Bowen souligne que cette affinité ne vaut pas allégeance: confiance commune dans le pouvoir du langage, mais désaccord sur son usage (Montaigne revendique une parole plus privée que publique), sur l’éducation, sur l’interprétation: Plutarque est friand de fables, d’oracles et d’allégories et à ces multiples