TONGUES OF FIRE AND FRAUD IN BOLGIA EIGHT

GABRIELLA ILDIKO BAika

Summary: The article revisits Inferno 26-27 from the perspective of the medieval pastoral debate on peccata linguae and focuses on the controversial phrase consiglio frodolente (Inf. 27.116). I begin my analysis by examining the notion of pravum consilium ‘evil counsel’ in two tracts on verbal sins: William Peraldus’ “De peccato linguae” (c. 1236) and Domenico Cavalca’s Il Pungilingua (1330-1342). In the second part of my essay, I analyze the figure of Ulysses in relationship to that of Guido da Montefeltro and argue that consiglio frodolente is not a misnomer for the sin of bolgia eight, as some commentators have contended. In the above-mentioned ethical tracts, the most salient feature of pravum consilium is its connection with fraud. In coining the phrase consiglio frodolente, Dante highlights this connection and renders this verbal sin perfectly consonant with the system of Malebolge. Cantos 26 and 27 of the Inferno mark a significant stage in the history of pravum consilium as a moral notion that situates itself at the intersection of speech, ethics, and politics.

A close reading of Inferno 26-27, the narrative of which unfolds in the eighth pouch of Malebolge, gives rise to two main hermeneutical difficulties. The first one stems from the apparent absence of the name of the sin punished in this location. In Inferno 11, where Virgil provides the taxonomic list for the transgressions of lower Hell, he does not specify the names of the sins assigned to pouches eight and nine but refers to these trespasses as simile lordura (60). This strongly pejorative but vague phrase is partially disambiguated in the narrative of the ninth pouch, which focuses on the “seminator di scandalo e di scisma,” a textual denomination gen-

1 The ambiguity of the phrase arises not so much from the noun lordura, for medieval ethics typically defined sinfulness as moral filth, as from the enigmatic simile. This adjective suggests that the sins from bolgias eight and nine are similar in their sordidness to those punished in the previous bolgias, since the phrase simile lordura occupies the last position in a long enumeration in which the adjective simile functions as a deictic pointing back to the previous terms: “ipocresia, lusinghe e chi affattura, / falsità, ladroneccio e simonia, ruffian, baratti e simile lordura” (Inf. 11.58-61).
erally accepted by scholars. For the eighth bolgia, however, the label *consiglio frodolente*, given in the text in reference to Guido da Montefeltro’s sin, has not been as widely accepted, mainly because it does not seem to fit Ulysses, who is in the same pouch. As *Inferno* 26 does not name the sin for which the Greek warrior is punished (an omission that only compounds the mystery of the phrase *simile lordura*), Dante’s interpreters have felt justified in disambiguating Ulysses’ trespass in various ways: fraudulent counsel, *astutia*, *falsa prudentia*, *superbia*, *vana curiositas*, betrayal, or evil use of *ingegno*. The second hermeneutical node related to *Inferno* 26–27 derives from the nature of the *contrapasso* (the tongue-shaped flames enveloping the sinners) and has also engendered heated debates. Here, however, the *contrapasso* has best served the interpreters defending the thesis of Ulysses being punished for wrongful use of speech, since there is a figural correspondence between the tongue, an anatomic organ used to utter words, and the souls represented as tongues of fire.

In an attempt to clarify these interpretive questions, I investigate the moral category of *consiglio frodolente* from the angle of two authoritative analysts of speech: William Peraldus (c. 1190-1275) and Domenico

---

2 For an overview of the major interpretive engagements with Dante’s Ulysses, see Anthony K. Cassell, and more recently, Massimo Seriacopi. The latter offers ample recollections of the main discussions around Ulysses from the early commentators to the most recent. For an analysis of the interpretive flaws in the problem of Ulysses, see Teodolinda Barolini, who highlights the paradoxes inherent in the arguments of either the “pro-“ or “the contra-Ulysseans.” Those who glorify Ulysses forget the relevant fact that he is punished in Hell, whereas the “moralists” deny to Ulysses his thematic significance for the whole poem (49-51).

3 Among the early commentators, Pietro Alighieri notes that the source for the *contrapasso* is the famous passage from the Epistle of Saint James (3: 5-8), where the tongue is described as a dangerous fire, harbouring a great destructive potential (*Super Dantis*, 232). Richard Bates and Thomas Rendall have further substantiated Pietro’s reference to the biblical source and concluded that the Epistle is undoubtedly the source that served Dante in his figuration of the *contrapasso* for fraudulent counsellors (35). Giuseppe Mazzotta makes a splendid connection between this *contrapasso* and Alain of Lille’s description of rhetoric as *ignis in ore*, in *Anticlaudianus* (*Dante, Poet of the Desert*, 92). For Boitani, too, this form of retribution figures a “tragedy of language” (38). In the same vein, James C. Truscott, speaks of the flames as punishing the “misuse of the gift of counsel in speech” (54). More recently, Edwin Craun has pointed out that, along with the sword, fire is a central biblical representation of the tongue, “recast endlessly in medieval texts.” In Craun’s view, the metaphor of the tongue as fire is meant to illustrate the destructive power of speech (*The Hands of the Tongue*, ix).
Cavalca (c. 1270-1342). Evil counsel, a scriptural term, was a common notion in the Christian literature before Peraldus and Cavalca, but it is only with these authors that *pravum consilium* becomes a moral category within well-structured systems of verbal sins. The two theologians examine this ethical class by means of psychology, philosophical definitions (mostly metaphorical in Peraldus, more concrete in Cavalca), and *exempla* (a few in Peraldus, very numerous in Cavalca).° Dante also treats fraudulent counsel as an ethical category by placing it in Malebolge and by exemplifying it with Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro. My interpretation of *Inferno* 26-27 through the lenses of the medieval debate on the “Sins of the Tongue” invalidates the critical position according to which Ulysses and Guido are not punished for *consiglio frodolente* because there was no such moral category in the Middle Ages.° An examination of Peraldus’ and Cavalca’s theories of speech reveals that *pravum consilium* was an ethical class tightly connected with fraud.

Maria Corti and Bruno Porcelli have made important assertions about Dante’s possible connections with the medieval theorists on the “Sins of the Tongue.” Corti has placed Ulysses’ trespass in relationship to the *topos* of the *lingua ignea* from the pastoral tradition, and Bruno Porcelli has linked the sin of the eighth *bolgia* to the notion of *pravum consilium* as defined by William Peraldus. Recalling previous works by Siegfried Wenzel, Franco Mancini, and Carlo Delcorno, who have highlighted textual links between Peraldus’ *Summa vitiorum* and the *Comedy*, Porcelli argues for Peraldus’ influence on Dante’s decision to incorporate the category of *consiglio frodolente* into the moral structure of Hell (425-26). Porcelli does not ana-

---

For an extended study of the tracts on verbal sins in the Middle Ages, see Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, *I peccati della lingua*. The two historians argue that the late thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century witnessed an intense cultural debate on the dire social consequences of abusive speech, a debate engaging some of the most prominent figures of the French and Italian cultures, such as William Peraldus, Vincent of Beauvais, John of La Rochelle, Albertan of Brescia, Thomas Aquinas, and Domenico Cavalca. In the wake of Casagrande and Vecchio’s findings, Edwin Craun has published two books dealing with the sphere of influence of Peraldus (and his followers) on medieval English culture: *Lies, Slander and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature* and *The Hands of the Tongue*.

It is mainly Ahern who has denied the existence of *consiglio frodolente* as an established moral concept: “Nor do most readers realize that there is no Christian tradition of a sin of Fraudulent Counsel” (275). For a synopsis of the controversy around fraudulent counsel, see Michael Papio’s note in the *Dante Encyclopedia* (422-23).
lyze the treatment of this sin in the Peraldian tract, but I believe that a closer look at this text reveals subtle affinities with *Inferno* 26.

**Pravum consilium in Peraldus’ “De peccato linguae” (c. 1236)**

Among the five main works attributed to Peraldus, the *Summa virtutum ac vitiorum* is by far the most celebrated. Written in its entirety before 1250, it is a work of moral theology with a bipolar structure; its first part deals with the cardinal and theological virtues, as well as with the beatitudes, and its second part with the capital vices. The *Summa vitiorum* adopts but at the same time explodes the traditional Gregorian scheme of the capital vices. By treating verbal trespasses in an eighth chapter (“De peccato linguae”), separately from the previous seven dealing with the capital sins, Peraldus confers to the verbal abuses the status of an eighth capital sin.  

The theologian establishes twenty-four manifestations of evil speech, among which *pravum consilium* occupies a central position (the twelfth vice), and posits five reasons that should move people to the detestation of this speech act: 1. it is rooted in fraud and injures friends; 2. it is practiced by people capable of all evils; 3. it is self-destructive; 4. it is highly harmful to the Church; and 5. it upsets God and attracts divine punishment.

Peraldus attempts to define *pravum consilium* through a description of the moral profile of its perpetrator, the *pravus consiliarius*. Compared to a traitor, the evil counsellor uses deceitful words to betray the confidence of the people who seek him for spiritual guidance, and he harms his friend through fraudulent speech:

> Pravus consiliarius proditor est. Decipit enim eum qui in eo confidit; scilicet eum qui ab eo consilium petit; quod non est parvum peccatum.

---

6 In Gregory’s and Cassian’s systems, verbal abuses were treated as progeny of various capital vices. For an overview of Peraldus’ tract on verbal sins, see Casagrande and Vecchio (103-140). The last four decades have brought a marked change in the attitude of medieval scholarship toward Peraldus. Kent Emery Jr., Joseph Goering, Richard Newhauser, Catherine Pinchetti, and Siegfried Wenzel have initiated *The Peraldus Project*, a semi-critical edition of the *Summa Vitiorum*. “De peccato linguae” has recently been edited and published at http://www.unc.edu/~swenzel/peraldus.html.

7 As far as the terminology is concerned, it is important to note that Peraldus does not make any distinction between the notions *vice* and *sin*; he uses the two terms interchangeably all throughout his *Summa*. In the *trattatistica* of the time, it is only a few decades after Peraldus that Thomas Aquinas introduces the distinction between vice, as a natural predisposition to evil, and sin, as an execution of this predisposition.
Unde Prov. 26, Sicut noxius est qui mittit laceas et sagittas in mortem: ita vir qui fraudulententer nocet amico suo. (579)

(The evil counsellor is a traitor. For he deceives the one who trusts him and turns to him for counsel; and this is no small sin. Hence, the Proverb: ‘like a mad man who casteth firebrands, arrows and death’—so is the man who does harm to his friend through fraud.) (emphasis added)

Endowed with astutia, evil counsellors are expert in vices and their verbal activity stems from great malice. Since they commit more evils than they can emend in a lifetime, there is no sin that hinders man’s salvation more than evil counsel (“nullum peccatum est quod magis impediat homines a salute, quam istud”). Pravum consilium has tragic consequences not only for one’s soul but also for the integrity of two major institutions—the militant Church and the body politic:

Pravi consiliarii quasi omnia malum faciunt: sic tamen ut nihil mali fecisse videantur. Ipsi dant palmas in faciem Christi et in membris eius dicentes: “Prophetiza nobis, Christe, quis est qui te percussit?... quasi Dominus ignorare possit astutias eorum. ... [P]eccatum istud multum nocivum est Ecclesiae Dei. Unus enim malus consiliarius destruit quandoque totem unam patriam. ... [I]lli qui astuti sunt ad dandum consilia nociva aliis, in consulendo sibi iusto Dei consilio fatui inveniuntur. (579-80)

(Wicked counsellors do evil like any other things, but they do it in such a way as to look like they did nothing wrong. They strike Jesus’s face and limbs, saying: “Prophesy to us, Christ, who it is that beat you?”... as if God could not know their ruse. ... This sin is very harmful to God’s Church. For one evil counsellor destroys an entire country at one stroke. ... They who are astute in advising others, in advising themselves are shown to be fools in God’s just judgment.) (emphasis added)

Peraldus’ description of the depraved counselor is relevant to my discussion since several aspects underlying the sin of pravum consilium—fraudulence and astutia, in particular—are salient in the literary portraits of Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro.

---

8 As there is no translation of “De peccato linguae,” the English version of the passages I quote is mine.
Male consigliare in Domenico Cavalca’s Il Pungilingua (1330-1342)

Like Peraldus, Domenico Cavalca was a Dominican friar, one of the most prolific writers of his order. Born about 1270 near Pisa, Cavalca wrote numerous sermons and moral treatises in a Tuscan language considered a model of language and style by literary critics. His texts became very popular again in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when they were reprinted and widely circulated. Il Pungilingua is an original translation of Peraldus’ popular tract on the sins of the tongue. It follows the general pattern of the Peraldian treatment (the division into twenty-four sins, for example), but at the same time, it takes many liberties with respect to it, in the form of new ideas, additions, and amplifications. Unlike Peraldus, who structured “De peccato linguae” in twenty-four sections corresponding to the twenty-four sins of the tongue, Cavalca divides his book into thirty chapters, as he considers some sins more serious than others and treats them in greater detail. Displaying a deeper adherence to the social reality of the time than “De peccato linguae,” Il Pungilingua offers major developments of Peraldus’ ideas. Representing one of the longest sections of the book, the chapter devoted to evil counsel—“Del peccato de’ mali

9 The last few decades have witnessed a renewal of the critical and philological research on Domenico Cavalca, a research channelled mainly in two directions: an investigation of the sources of Cavalca’s writings (in order to establish the extent of the author’s originality) and a study of the rich manuscript tradition (with the purpose of assessing Cavalca’s popularity and sphere of influence as a vernacular writer). The former trend of investigation is represented by A. Olga Rossi and Renzo Lotti, who propose textual readings of Il Pungilingua (Rossi) and of I frutti della lingua (Lotti), in contrast with Peraldus’ Summa. The latter critical trend is represented by Carlo Delcorno (who wrote several studies on Cavalca), Marcello Ciccueto, and Alfredo Troiano. A synopsis of the life and works of Domenico Cavalca has more recently been offered by Edoardo Barbieri, in La Bibbia in Italiano tra Medioevo e Rinascimento (291-328). A note on Domenico Cavalca by Steven Botterill has also been included in Medieval Italy: An Encyclopedia (197-98), whereas the prestigious series Patrimoine littéraire européen has devoted several pages to the literary activity of Cavalca and included two nineteenth-century French translations of works by Cavalca (5: 198-205).

10 Carlo Delcorno explains this revival by the interest of the eighteenth-century religious culture in the devotional works of the friar, which are now presented to the public as models of both spiritual and linguistic value. In the age of the purismo, the Italian philologists promote Cavalca as the perfect representative of the pure language of Trecento (“Cavalca, Domenico,” 585.
consilieri e confortatori al male”—is significantly longer than Peraldus’ section on *pravum consilium*, bespeaking the importance the matter of evil counsel had for the Italian moralist.\(^\text{11}\)

That a very productive and successful writer like Cavalca translated “De peccato linguae” attests to the popularity that Peraldus’ moral treatise had in Italy in Dante’s time.\(^\text{12}\) *Il Pungilingua* was written shortly after the completion of the *Divine Comedy*, but the thoroughness of its approach to verbal sins and its skilful use of the Florentine dialect render this ethical tract an excellent analytic grid for Ulysses and Guido’s sin. Since the relationship between Dante and Cavalca has never been explored in Dante studies, I use *Il Pungilingua* as an interpretive tool and do not investigate it as a possible source for the *Inferno*.

*Male consigliare*, Cavalca argues, has two subspecies corresponding to its two possible roots. It can be caused by ignorance when the counsellor, on account of his poor judgment and advising skills, gives a piece of advice that further developments will prove wrong. This type of evil counsel is epitomized by a blind man who guides another blind man on the road and both fall into a ditch. And if physical blindness is so debilitating for the general health of the body, spiritual blindness is even more nocuous, for it causes prelates and clerics to give poor advice to Christians and to place the

\(^\text{11}\) For an overview of Cavalca’s ethical theories, see Francesco Falco. More recently, Carla Casagrande has analyzed the relationship Cavalca established between disorders of the soul and moral transgressions (“Motions of the Heart and Sins”). Carlo Delcorno has investigated Cavalca’s narrative techniques in the vernacular (“Modelli agiografici e modelli narrativi. Tra Cavalca e Boccaccio”).

\(^\text{12}\) Peraldus’ popularity in Italy increases the circumstantial likelihood that Dante was acquainted with the texts of the French Dominican. Jean Thiéabaut Welter has long pointed out that the second part of Brunetto Latini’s *Livre du Trésor* is imbued with Peraldian notions (168-69). Also noteworthy is the activity of Servasanto da Faenza, a Franciscan friar who, between 1277 and 1285, wrote an adaptation of Peraldus’ *Summa* in Florence. Entitled *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*, da Faenza’s work offers a summary of Peraldus’ tract on verbal sin (*De vitio lingue et eius multiplici speciei*) and deals with selected verbal sins, such as blasphemy, murmur, slander, flattery, sowing of discord, and double-talking. Dante’s biography attests that he had a strong sympathy for the Franciscan order, and da Faenza’s work in Florence during the years preceding Dante’s exile further increases the probability of Dante’s familiarity with Peraldus. To my knowledge, no one has yet explored the possible link between Dante and Peraldus via Servasanto da Faenza. For more information about Dante’s relationship to Peraldus, see Siegfried Wenzel, Franco Mancini, Carlo Delcorno, and Richard A. Shoaf.
Church in danger (181). Although it is caused by ignorance, not by an evil intention, this type of *male consigliare* is still a sin because evil counsellors are motivated by material profit, losing sight of an important moral precept: that one should not commit to a mission if one is not well prepared or qualified for it. In this instance, Cavalca speaks of the negligence of those who, in need of advice, do not search for the best counsellor but are satisfied with random advisors. Seeking good guidance in life is paramount, for a counsellor is like a physician of the soul. If it is natural for a sick man to look for the best physician for his bodily condition, it is all the more urgent for a Christian to find the most appropriate counsellor for afflictions pertaining to the soul (181).

The second species of evil counsel is even more harmful because it is prompted by *malizia* and executed in perfect awareness and with deliberation:

Ma vie più sommamente e più pericoloso e diabolico è il peccato di quelli, i quali saputamente ed a malizia danno mali consigli, ed a male inducono e confortano. E questo peccato è grave più e più, secondo la qualità della perversa intenzione di chi consiglia, o secondo il male che ne seguita, o può seguitare. (182)

Focusing on this second type of *male consigliare*, Cavalca isolates two important criteria in his definition: 1) malice as the root of evil advising and 2) the consequences resulting from a piece of advice. Either the perverse intention that underlies advising, or the dire consequences that may derive from a piece of advice, helps the moralist—or the catechumens—identify a counsel as malicious. The speech of the evil counsellor is fraudulent (*parlare fraudolentemente*) and has diabolic roots, because just like the devil, the perverse counsellor makes evil pass as good: “sotto specie di bene e di cosa lecita, a male induce e consiglia” (182). The terms Cavalca uses to describe this deceit that takes place in language are strikingly similar to Dante’s description of Geryon as a “sozza imagine di froda” (*Inf.* 17.7); the monster has the face of an honest man, but the lower part of his body is that of a dragon. Taking up Dante’s imagery and transferring it to speech, we could label the verbal activity of the fraudulent counsellors as Geryonic; their words bear the appearance of righteousness, whereas the essence of their speech is sheer evil.

The verbal suggestion of an advisor motivated by evil intentions is an unjust counsel—*iniquo consiglio* (183)—that eventually turns against the perpetrator himself. Most often, the deceiver falls into the trap set by his fraudulent suggestions, since Divine Justice not only alters the wicked advice but also ridicules the counsellor’s *astutia* by changing the course of
events and re-establishing equity.\textsuperscript{13} For instance, it is known that the Pharisees and leaders of the Jews advised the slaying of Christ in order to stop people from believing in him, but the exact opposite of their wicked plan occurred. People began worshipping Christ, and the new faith spread from Judea into the Roman world.\textsuperscript{14}

For Cavalca, the biblical archetype of the evil counsellor is the serpent, which advised Adam and Eve to taste the forbidden fruit, thereby deceiving them and causing them to sin. The fall of humankind from its Edenic state is thus the result of an astute counsellor who, with skilful words, prompted two human souls to break a divine interdiction (\textit{trapassar il segno} is the phrase Dante uses to describe the same event in the \textit{Paradiso}). In a Christian world, the counsellors who, like snakes, use their words to induce other people into evil, in fact, betray those who trust them. The virtual betrayal that hides underneath friendly counselling makes it imperative for everyone to take extreme care in choosing counsellors: “molto si debbe l’uomo guardare d’avere mali consiglieri e procurare d’avergli buoni” (189). The same imperative prevails for Dante when he analyzes the social consequences of the counsellors’ words and draws attention to the risks that political leaders incur when they choose inadequate advisors: “... e dico a voi, Carlo e Federigo regi, e a voi altri principi e tiranni— ; e guardate chi a lato vi siede per consiglio, e annumerate quante volte lo die questo fine de l’umana vita per li vostri consiglieri v’è additato” (\textit{Convivio} 4.6.20).

In Cavalca’s view, the only perfect counselor is Christ. He is the only one who does not betray and who, in His great wisdom and charity, cannot err in His advice. As to the degree of gravity of evil counselling, no

\textsuperscript{13} “Comprende Iddio i savi colle loro astuzie, e dissip, e perverte i loro consigli, sicch’è non gli possano reducere ad effetto…. Sono alquanti enfiati d’umana stolitzia e sapienza che vedendo che Iddio co’ suoi giudici impedisce i suoi mali desideri, s’assottigliano con astuti consigli e pensano di contrastare al consiglio ed alla disposizione di Dio. Ma per mirabile modo Dio sapientissimo gli conchiude si, e comprende che al tutto per quella astuzia e per quella via, e per quello ingegno e consiglio, col quale credevano contrastare a Dio, si fanno venire fornito il consiglio divino, sicch’è appunto serve alla disposizione di Dio ciò che per l’umana astuzia gli contraddice” (183-84).

\textsuperscript{14} Cavalca reproduces several biblical stories (from both the Old and the New Testaments) as \textit{exempla} of wicked counsel, stories meant to illustrate the catastrophic repercussions of perverse suggestions. At the end of these stories, he concludes: “Or così potremmo contare molte istorie, per le quali si conchiude, e mostra che molti mali e guerre, e grandi ingiustizie sono fatte per gli consigli ed impronti” (188).
other sin seems to be more dangerous for one’s soul and for the social harmony and peace. In Peraldus this notion was mentioned only in passing, whereas in Cavalca it is amply developed and reiterated throughout the chapter:

E dico, che singolarmente questo peccato si grava per gli mali di colpa e di pena che ne seguita; che tutto di per continua esperienza veggiamo, che uno male consigliere più guasta e dannifica in uno punto che non racconcia e non edifica tutto il tempo della vita sua in ciò che, consigliando ed ordinando una guerra, n’escono danni e guasti ed omicidi, e danni tanti e mali tanti e di colpa e di pena … Sicché chi ben guata, nessun peccato è, che tanto impedisca la salute dell’uomo, quanto questo, per lo molto danno e male che ne procede, del quale tutto è tenuto a restituzione chi consigliò ed ordinò; senza la quale nessuno assolvere lo può, se egli è in istato che restituire possa. Ma pognamo che non possa, rade volte avviene che questi consiglieri di guerra bene si pentino e bene finiscano. (186)

Cavalca minutely describes the economic and social disasters that can result from evil counsel. When a perverse piece of advice leads to war, many men lose their properties and become thieves or fall ill; women, by losing their families, become whores. All this collective sinfulness attracts divine anger and results in terrible punishments. Since every human being needs guidance in life, the individuals who assume the spiritual function of *consiglieri* take on a great responsibility. If they are bad counsellors through poor judgment, they fail like a blind man leading the blind. If they are bad counsellors through malice, they distort a Christic function and lose their souls.

Cavalca’s treatment of *male consigliare* as a form of fraudulent speech rooted in malice helps us better understand the narratives of the eighth pouch of Malebolge. In Dante’s system of Hell, the disposition toward evil that is *malizia* is punished in Malebolge; fraudulent counsel is located in the eighth pouch of Malebolge as a sin of malice. Here, Dante encounters the mythic hero Ulysses and the Italian *condottiere* Guido da Montefeltro, both represented as tongue-shaped flames.

**Dante’s Ulysses**

What is particular about Ulysses’ soul is that it is entwined in death with Diomedes, his companion from the Trojan war. Whereas every other soul inhabiting this pouch is enveloped by an individual flame, the souls of these two mythical heroes share the same, forked flame. The only difference is that the horn of the flame representing Ulysses is bigger than the
one hiding Diomedes. The reasons for the two Greeks’ presence in this pouch are three, explains Virgil: the ambush of the horse, the “art” that caused Déïdamia’s pain at the loss of Achilles, and the story of the Palladium (Inf. 26.55-60).

Evidence gathered by most modern critics supports the view that all three crimes involve, more or less manifestly, deceitful rhetorical habits related to Ulysses.¹⁵ Sinon, thanks to whose lies the Trojans accept the horse into their city, is instructed by Ulysses on how to speak and what to say. The Trojan horse itself is a major fraud and the way it is introduced into Troy is based on verbal fraud and manipulation. Cavalca’s identification of a malicious counsel based on the consequences deriving from that counsel applies very well to this mythical episode. The destruction of the city following the success of Ulysses’ stratagem confirms that Sinon’s persuasive advice to the Trojans to accept the horse, a verbal performance orchestrated by Ulysses, was a malicious one. In the second crime as well, we deal with a fraudulent form of persuasion, with verbal suggestions that bear the appearance of truth but hide the repulsive face of a lie. Ulysses lures Achilles into joining him in the war with skillful words depicting the bright side of it: personal military fame. Ulysses does not mention what war really entails, the hideous, fatal side of it. The test of the consequence applies once again, since Achilles will die on the battlefield, triggering the great pain of Déïdamia, his wife. It seems that every time Ulysses opens his mouth, people around him die or suffer. As to the third crime evoked—the one related to the Palladium—David Thompson points out that, on the one hand, Dante’s text does not mention the word theft, and on the other hand, the giant Antenor, not Ulysses, is the real author of the theft (15). Thompson does not exclude the possibility that Antenor stole the Palladium at Ulysses’ and Diomedes’ promptings. Thus, it is likely that even in this mythic episode Dante saw an indication of malicious counsel.¹⁶

In short, all three sins indicated by Virgil in relation to Ulysses and Diomedes involve verbal suggestions with a tragic consequence; in this case, the destruction of Trojan civilization. But God alters human counsels,

¹⁵ According to James C. Truscott, the trap of the Trojan horse is based on an “implicit suggestion of false promise” (62). Truscott qualifies Sinon’s speech to the Trojans as “eloquence commanded by Ulysses,” and Giorgio Brugnoli calls Sinon “l’agente di Ulisse” (25).

¹⁶ As regards the real author of the theft, Thompson relies on an Italian source contemporary with Dante: Guido delle Colonne, who in Historia destructionis Troiae maintains that, although Ulysses was eventually accused of stealing the Palladium, it is Antenor who actually did it.
Cavalca says, and turns the tragedy into the seed of renewed prosperity. There is a divine counsel (here, in the sense of judgment and decision) that alters and corrects the wicked human counsels (understood as verbal suggestions), and we see this correction at work in Dante’s interpretation of the myth. Ulysses’ and Diomedes’ judgments and words were oriented toward the annihilation of the Trojan nation, but Divine Providence intervened and changed the disaster into the birth of a new people, the Romans. For, in Dante’s reading of the mythical events, the ambush of the horse made it possible for the noble seed of the Roman nation to spring (Inf. 26. 59-60).

In the story of Ulysses, Dante imagines a completely different end than the one we know from Homer. Instead of ending peacefully in his country, surrounded by his faithful family, Ulysses abandons everything again and sets out on new adventures. Despite his old age, he is animated by one main desire: experience of the world, not just in a geographical sense, but also in a moral one. He wishes to become expert in human vices and worth. A major element in Dante’s reworking of the myth is the way in which Ulysses enlists the support of his crew for his adventurous projects: he talks to them. The reproduction of this speech is made in Hell by Ulysses himself, who recounts to Virgil with what words he convinced his men to follow him:

“O frati”, dissi, “che per cento milia
perigli siete giunti a l’occidente,
a questa tanto picciola vigilia
d’i nostri sensi ch’è del rimanente
non vogliate negar l’esperïenza,
di retro al sol, del mondo sanza gente.
Considerate la vostra semenza:
fatti non foste a viver com e bruti,
ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.” 17 (Inf. 26.112-20)

Ulysses’ handling of the ethical vocabulary projects a shadow over the moral quality of his speech; there is a tension between the notions vice and virtue that he withholds from his crew. He reserves for himself the expertise

17 Ulysses’ speech to his aging crew represents one of the factors of controversy around Ulysses. Massimo Seriacopi points out that the early commentators did not consider this discourse a trap; only the modern interpreters have done so. Seriacopi himself considers that Ulysses’ orazion is free from any sign of deceit, despite the hero’s blatant persuasive qualities (and here, Seriacopi notes that he is following Forti’s interpretation). The prevalent opinion among modern critics is, however, that the orazion is a fraud.
in vices, whereas to his men he speaks only about virtue and knowledge. The wish to be an expert in human sinfulness is itself intriguing, for how can one be an esperto other than by experiencing the vices, by exploring the entire spectrum of evil inclinations? The tradition of Ulysses hortator scelerum on which Dante relies excludes the option of the Greek's gaining expertise in vices only by watching them in others. Ulysses' desire to become a specialist in li vizi um ani is one of the most interesting things he says about himself. Other than Dante, who at the end of his poetic journey through the three realms will be the Comedy's true expert in vices and virtues, there is only one other being who can lay claim to expertise in sins in the Inferno. This is Minos, the monster who judges the newly arrived souls in Hell and who, with the flickering of a tail, sends the souls to specific infernal areas (Inf: 5.7-12). Ulysses' plan to become an expert in human sinfulness, far from being a noble ideal, tarnishes him and dooms him to Hell.

Isidore of Seville's thought on sin can best explain the ambiguity of Ulysses' moral profile. The medieval theologian notes that it is typical only of the hypocrite to masquerade his vices as virtues through slyness. Whereas all other sins can be committed by simple-minded people, deceit and hypocrisy can be practiced only by those endowed with a superior type of intelligence that allows them to disguise their evil habits into virtues (3.24.3). At the same time, we should not forget that both “De peccato linguae” and Il Pungilingua posit the expertise in vices as one of the main characteristics of the depraved advisor. Cavalca's treatment of malicious counsel validates the orazion as a form of linguistic fraud. The moralist defines the notion of consiglio as "una esaminata ragione d’alcuna cosa fare, o non fare" (190). Four things have to be considered when giving a piece

18 As to the sources for Dante's story of Ulysses, critics have indicated two main texts: Virgil's Aeneid, where the spare references to Ulysses are mainly negative, and Statius' Achilleid (Musa, 187-93). Brugnoli finds in Achilleid I the most significant of Ulysses' fraudulent discourses, most of which are addressed to people of good faith who trust him – the good king Licomedes and the young Achilles (27-38). Suzanne C. Hagedorn also points out that it is in this part of Achilleid (1.472) that Ulysses is described as "sleepless in counsel" (57).

19 In this light, I cannot agree with Mario Trovato, who reads Inf: 26. 90-105 as "il momento giulivo della conversione di Ulisse alla sapienza; distacco non solo dal mondo del peccato, ma degli affetti più puri" (49). There is not enough evidence in the text to support a moral conversion of Ulysses. There is, indeed, a detachment from family life and love of country, but the idea of expertise in vices undermines Trovato's claim that Ulysses also detached himself from the world of the sin.
of advice: one, what is expedient and useful; two, what is easy; three, what is certain; and four, what is safe. By the same token, in order for one to give good counsel, one has to choose and recommend the useful and necessary thing over the non-useful, the easy over the difficult, the certain over the uncertain and, finally, the safe over the dangerous.\footnote{\ldots [Q]uattro cose in ciò si debbono considerare; cioè quello che è speditente ed utile, quello che è leggieri, quello che è certo, e quello che è sicuro. E così i contrari; cioè, che sempre si debbe proponere, e preelegere la cosa utile e necessaria alla non utile; la leggieri alla difficile; la certa alla incerta; la sicura alla pericolosa\textsuperscript{(190); emphasis added).}

In the address to his crew, Ulysses does not observe any of these requisites for good counsel. The new adventures in which the Greek asks his fellow men to accompany him are neither useful nor necessary to them, but to himself alone. This new enterprise is not easy since it requires the exploration of land hitherto uncharted. It is a project that involves dangers, for the sailors do not know what awaits them beyond Hercules’ pillars. These pillars are markers beyond which no living man has ever ventured; they are signs of a divine interdiction. Like the evil-counselling serpent in the biblical story told by Cavalca, Ulysses has his companions transgress this interdiction—a new \textit{trapassar del segno} of which he is the unique cause. The end result of his exhortations is the death of the entire crew. Ulysses’ speech to his men has a Geryonic aspect insofar as the Greek’s high-flown rhetoric manipulates and promises something it cannot offer. This is why, in Hell, the character is punished in the “post-Geryon world,” to take up Barolini’s phrase (75). Unmoored from the context of the Malebolge, Ulysses’ speech could convince readers of its sincerity, but the fact that this speech is framed by the infernal area of fraud undermines its claims to sincerity and nobility.

Giuseppe Mazzotta points out that the weakness of rhetoric is that it promises things of which fulfillment depends on extra-discursive conjunctures.\footnote{Giuseppe Mazzotta has devoted memorable pages to the connection between Ulysses’ rhetoric and fraud (69-106).} In this context, the end Dante reserves for Ulysses and his crew highlights the \textit{orazion}’s emptiness and speciousness. The words of the “little speech” fall into the same category as Jason’s; they seduce because they promise but eventually give nothing in return. Like Jason’s, Ulysses’ words are merely \textit{parole ornate} that deceive through their false beauty. Ulysses’ speech is a Geryonic speech, inasmuch as his dual rhetoric seduces but ultimately leads to disaster. As a symbol of human failure, the shipwreck marking the death of the sailors invalidates the nobility to which the \textit{orazion} lays claim. Thus, although I do acknowledge Ulysses’ intelligence, my sense is
that we have to focus not on the intellectual but on the moral type Dante proposes through him. The classical nobility conveyed by the orazion is what Ulysses could have represented, had he really converted his vices into virtues. But the Greek’s statements in the “the little speech” are different from his actual deeds. This is why he is not among the spiriti magni in Limbo but is punished in the spiritual area of fraud.22

Guido

A companion of Ulysses in Dante’s underworld, in the sense that they share the same location and the same punishment, is Guido da Montefeltro, an important political leader in Dante’s time. Famous for his political cunning, Guido was a public figure whose movements and gestures could have hardly escaped popular attention. One of his publicly known gestures was his conversion to Franciscanism, a conversion that occurred in his later years and that earned him Dante’s esteem in the Convivio.23 A vague echo of this esteem still resonates in Inferno 27, where Guido’s speech is couched in courteous terms. Here, the soul reverently asks the travelers to give him news about Romagna, his native land. It is worth mentioning that Guido does not inquire about the fate of his relatives, but about the state of his country. He wants to know whether Romagna is at war or not. Like his reverent speech, this noble concern for the good of the earthly community to which he belonged projects Guido as an almost positive figure. Prompted by Virgil, Dante gives Guido disturbing news about the socio-political situation of the Italian cities, torn apart by war, mal governo and tirannia.

22 As to Dante’s relationship to Ulysses, excellent studies have been written over the years by Jurij Lotman, John Freccero, Giuseppe Mazzotta, Teodolinda Barolini, and others. Repeating their theories about the (non) identity Ulysses-Dante would be, as Barolini justly points out, echoing what is by now “critical dogma.” I will only quote the latter who, analyzing the Ulysses theme in rapport with Dante’s writerly undertaking, reaches the conclusion that “Ulysses reflects Dante’s conscious concern for himself…. [He is] the lightning rod Dante places in his poem to attract and defuse his own consciousness of the presumption involved in anointing oneself God’s scribe” (52).

23 “Bene questi nobili [lo cavaliere Lancelotto e lo nobilissimo nostro latino Guido montefeltro]…. ne la loro lunga etade a religione si rendero, ogni mondano diletto e opera disponendo” (Convivio 4.28.8). Critics point out that at the time when Convivio was written, news about Guido’s last fraudulent action had not yet spread.
Against the dark background of this ethical-political denunciation, Guido introduces himself as a renowned politician, whose works had been not those of a lion, but of a fox. A professional of moral and political duplicity, Guido was well aware of the spiritual consequences of his methods; therefore, he says, when he grew old, he had a moment of metanoia and took shelter in the religious life. His new status as a penitent was, however, interrupted by a last temptation offered by Pope Boniface VIII, who, unable to conquer the city of Palestrina, appealed to him for advice. In exchange, il gran prete—for whom now, in Hell, Guido reserves the harshest words—offered the counsellor the promise of absolution before the sin was committed.

The terms of negotiations between the two men reveal their awareness of what was ultimately at stake: eternal salvation, the supreme Christian good. Boniface’s great promise translates his acknowledgment of the fact that what he was asking of his counsellor was not something right but an encouragement to evil, a confortare al male, as Cavalca would put it. The earthly “shepherd,” the one who is supposed to be the supreme spiritual guide, the most honest of counsellors, comes in all awareness to ask for the endorsement of an evil plan. Boniface is a Jack-of-all-trades type of politician who comes to another reputedly malicious politician to ask for a suggestion they know is not righteous. For both men, religiosity and sacred concepts are just masks that fall off when greed or deeply ingrained patterns of corruption are activated.

The words that Guido, the former political advisor, uses to describe the pope’s mental state—guerir, febbre, and ebbre—are remarkably similar to Cavalca’s lexicon of counselling as healing. Guido himself, at hearing Boniface’s request, is conscious of what is expected of him; the term peccato he uses in his dialogue with the pope is indicative of this awareness. He knows that, by giving the pope the advice he needs to conquer the city (and only devious ways will work here), he commits a moral transgression.

---

24 As far as the phrase di volpe is concerned, a good deal of light is shed on its medieval meaning by Alain of Lille’s dictionary, where the word vulpes ‘fox’ designates fraudulent people: “Dicuntur etiam homines fraudulenti, qui in fraudibus suis delectantur quas abscedunt in corde” (1011B).

25 For Lino Pertile, who does not trust Guido’s rhetoric, this conversion is not a deeply-felt act but a cold, calculated move meant to win the ultimate prize in life—salvation (153). In Pertile’s view, Guido and Ulysses are punished for their astuteness, and Guido’s reproduction of the black cherubim’s phrase (consiglio frodolente) is just an attempt to minimize his sinfulness and shift the pilgrim’s attention from him to the pope (153-54, 163).
Manipulating words and their effects was presumably one of Guido’s best *opere di volpe*. Here, his sin consists in teaching Boniface how to make false promises (indiscreta promisio is itself a sin of the tongue, according to the medieval discourse on transgressive speech). The sin of *male consigliare* is in a synonymic relationship with the inducement into evil (confortare al male), in Cavalca’s ethical system, and this synonymy illuminates Guido’s placement in the same zone with Ulysses. Through their verbal suggestions, both Ulysses and Guido induced other people into transgressive actions. As a spiritual advisor, Guido realized that the pope was a morally ill man; the series of words with medical resonance and the half-medical, half-moral term *consiglio* placed in the middle of this series contribute to the idea of fraud as illness. And yet, instead of healing the pope with a truly Christian message, Guido aggravated his fever and state of frenzy with the exhortation to further sins.

After death, however, one has to give account for one’s malicious advice. Cavalca repeatedly warns that unrighteous counsellors never end up well; the divine penalty for evil counselling is, unavoidably, the loss of the soul (“il misero consigliere pure ne pierde l’anima”; 183). This severe moral pronouncement is splendidly exemplified in the dramatic account of Guido’s death, when St. Francis comes down to take his soul to heaven but is ‘defeated’ by a black cherubim, who establishes that the friar’s place is with the infernal orders. As a religious man, Guido was supposed to know that the divine punishment for the kind of *peccato* of which he spoke to Boniface was very serious. The same holds for Boniface, who, as a leader in spiritual matters, knew what type of risks and consequences sins incurred. Otherwise, the entire discussion about absolution from sins as recompense for Guido’s help would have been futile. And yet, the papal power eventually turned out to be a kind of fraud as well, for the pope was unable to deliver what he had promised.

Both Dante’s handling of this episode and *Il Pungilingua*’s treatment of *male consigliare* convey the notion that no human promise, judgment, or decision can compete with higher, divine laws. Cavalca asserts that very

26 Analyzing the brief explanatory speech that the black cherubim gave to St. Francis (a speech cited by Guido), Gabriele Muresu reaches the interesting conclusion that this episode actually never happened; it is only Guido’s invention. Guido would in fact try to excuse himself, by implying that he became aware of his sin only when the black cherubim explained it with the words *consiglio fraudolente* (84-85). I cannot agree with Muresu’s conclusion, since Guido’s presence in Malebolge actually proves that the black cherubim had the ‘last word’ in his claim for the sinner’s soul.
often evil counselors themselves fall into the traps they set: “Sicchè egli
ero giusto giudicio di Dio caggiono in quella fossa ed in quello lacciolo ch’egli
apparecchiavano per altrui. Sicchè bene si verifica il detto de’
Proverbi, che chi ordina lo iniquo consiglio, si gli torna in capo” (183).
Guido’s end can be read as an exemplification of Cavalla’s notion, since the
promoter of false promise falls prey to Boniface’s own (impossible to keep)
promise of absolution. The forgiveness of sin granted by the corrupt father
of the Church availed Guido nothing at the moment of his death, for the
devil still prevailed over St. Francis in the conflict for the counsellor’s soul.
Both Dante’s text and Cavalla’s treatment of malicious counsel tell us that,
however great the power of forgiveness held by ecclesiastics is, there is a
greater power, above the Church, which, if the Church is corrupted by
wicked leaders, annuls the ecclesiastic absolution and ridicules the so-called
wise. No power in the world, however great and cunning that power may
be, can change (or challenge) God’s laws. The prelates’ capacity for abso-
lution is stymied if it contravenes fundamental moral values such as justice
and charity. This is the lesson that Inferno 27 sets forth and this is also the
conclusion that Domenico Cavalla, Dante’s contemporary, reaches in his
chapter devoted to evil counsellors:

Or ecco dunque, come Iddio perverte i consigli umani; e, come dice il
Salmista: Il suo consiglio sta fermo in eterno. Sicchè, come dice la
Scrittura: Non è consiglio, nè prudenza, nè sapienza contra a Dio. … Che
poichè immutare non si può il divino consiglio e la divina sentenza, in
ogni cosa dobbiamo inchinare le spalle, e sottometterci alla sua santissim a
volontà. Or questo sia detto contro agli stolti savi del mondo che credono
con loro astuzie fuggire o impedire i giudici, o i consigli divini. (185)

Conclusion

A reading of Inferno 26-27 from the perspective of the pastoral discourse
on peccata linguae proves that the sin punished in the eighth pouch of
Malebolge is consiglio frodolente. Ahern’s argument that “neither consiliari
male, nor pravum consilium are synonymous with consiglio frodolente” (276)
is not tenable, since in the trattatistica morale of the time pravum consilium
was tightly connected with, and defined in terms of, fraud. Of all the fea-
tures of pravum consilium, for Dante, the most salient one was fraudulence.
This aspect was also the most relevant to his ethical system (to Malebolge,
in particular). The two main moral readings I have proposed—Peraldus
and Cavalla—demonstrate that the other transgressions that critics have
posed as alternatives: astutia, injustice, betrayal, are not different from
consiglio fraudolente, but typical traits of it. Far from being a “preposterous misnomer,” as Anna Hatcher has argued (110), consiglio fraudolente is an appropriate label for the sin punished in the eighth pouch of Malebolge. Written after “De peccato linguae” and before Il Pungilingua, cantos 26 and 27 of the Inferno mark an exceptional moment in the history of an important moral concept linking speech, ethics, politics, and salvation.

With the psychological sharpness germane to a moralist, Dante lifts up a modern ethical category and applies it like a psycho-analytical grid not only to his contemporaries but also to the cultural material of Classical antiquity. Thanks to the poetic enterprise of the Comedy, the notion of pravum consilium leaves the stern and abstract sphere of the late-medieval Latin ethics and enters the realm of vernacular poetry, coming to life through the memorable characters of Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro. The Greek warrior represents the long history of fraudulent verbal practices, whereas Guido the presence of these practices in contemporary Italy. If Peraldus and Cavalca sketch out the moral profile of the malicious counsellor, Dante gives his readers concrete examples of fraudulent counsellors in action, examples that continue to fascinate generations of readers.

FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

WORKS CITED

Alain of Lille. Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologicalium. PL 210: 685-1012.
Alighieri, Dante. See Dante Alighieri.

27One of the reasons why Hatcher argues against this denomination is the distinction she makes between “the use of fraud in counseling” (as embodied by Ulysses) and “counseling the use of fraud” (as personified by Guido da Montefeltro). This distinction is, however, inoperative, since the medieval notion of evil counsel is extremely elastic and encompasses both meanings. A reading of the dozen of exemplary stories told by Cavalca to illustrate this sin reveals a much greater variety of fraudulent facets than these two detected by Hatcher.
Internazionale, Firenze, Certosa del Galluzzo, November 8-9 1996. Ed. Lino
Barolini, Teodolinda. The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante. Princeton:
Boitani, Piero. “Beyond the Sunset: Dante’s Ulysses in Another World.” Lectura
197-98.
Casagrande, Carla and Silvana Vecchio. I Peccati della lingua. Disciplina ed etica
della parola nella cultura medievale. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana,
1987.
Casagrande, Carla. “Motions of the Heart and Sins: The Specchio dei peccati by
Domenico Cavalca, OP.” In the Garden of Evil: The Vices and Culture in the
Middle Ages. Ed. Richard Newhauser. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, 2005. 128-44.
Cassell, Anthony K. “Ulisseana: A Bibliography of Dante’s Ulysses to 1981.”
Corti, Maria. “Le metafore della navigazione, del volo e della lingua di fuoco nel-
l’episodio di Ulisses (Inferno XXVI).” Miscellanea di studi in onore di Aurelio
Craun, Edwin. Lies, Slander and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature.
Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 2007.
—. Il Convivio. Ed. Maria Simonelli. Bologna: Casa Editrice Prof. Riccardo
Delcorno, Carlo. “Cavalca, Domenico.” Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Rome:
—. “Dante e Peraldo.” Exemplum e letteratura: Tra Medioevo e Rinascimento.
—. La Tradizione delle Vite dei Santi Padri. Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze,
—. “Modelli agiografici e modelli narrativi. Tra Cavalca e Boccaccio.” La Novella


Isidore of Seville. Sententiarum libri. PL 83: 699A-B.


— 25 —