Rhetorical Values Ancient and Modern: Hermogenes’s On Types of Style and Italo Calvino’s Six Memos for the Next Millennium

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The new millennium, it seems, is likely to produce some strange bedfellows. Plato and Derrida were perhaps a few decades ahead of their time in this respect. But, finding ourselves inextricably ensconced in the postmodern era, we are liable also to find that the warp of the future is all woven in with the weft of the past, and that the present consists largely of our own attempts to make sense of this perplexing tapestry.

Italo Calvino, as his writings will show, was no stranger to the literature of classical antiquity. It was in perusing his posthumous Six Memos for the Next Millennium that I was struck by its resonance with the tradition of stylistic analysis that is the legacy of classical rhetoric. Whether in writing this work Calvino was inspired by a single classical model, we shall not know; but he is clearly not only master of the tradition, but proves himself able to transcend it in some forceful ways. To demonstrate this, I propose to orient his recent work to the ancient material with which it resonates.

1. In antiquity there evolved a number of indices for rhetorical style; these may be broadly categorized as kinds of style and virtues of style. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric (3.2–12), we find the embryonic form of a theory of style that takes account of both these categories. His pupil Theophrastus seems to have elaborated the theory of the virtues of style, under the headings of Clarity, Correctness, Ornament, and Propriety. In Cicero we find a clear schematization of the kinds of style under the headings of Plain, Middle, and Grand, and furthermore a correlation of each of these with a particular purpose: to prove, to delight, and to move. Demetrius’s On Style harmonizes the two schemata; he elaborates four good kinds of style—Plain, Elevated, Elegant, and Forceful—and four corresponding vices—Aridity, Frigidity, Affectation, and Unpleasantness. In the Demetrian system the vices are conceived of, one might say, as virtues manquées.

Assuming that the kinds of style will be deployed as appropriate to the subject-matter, the theorist may turn to the particular contemplation of one or another of the virtues of style. This is the tactic of Pseudo-Longinus, whose powerful essay On the Sublime derives that virtue (hupsos) from five sources:
nobility of soul, powerful emotion, rhetorical figures, noble language, and a general effect of dignity. In the same category we might place the late Greek rhetorician Hermogenes of Tarsus, among whose extant works we find one entitled Peri ideôn. And this is a treatise that I want to discuss in some detail.

2. Hermogenes’s Peri ideôn might be subtitled “Seven Memos for the Post-Classical Orator.” Born in about 161 C.E., he was an oratorical child-prodigy; Philostratus tells us that the emperor Marcus Aurelius came to hear him speak (Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 2.577). He is evidently enamored of the style of Demosthenes; one is reminded of Quintilian’s remark that “‘Cicero’ was the name, not of a man, but of eloquence” (Quintilian 10.1.112). Thus the Demosthenic style is Hermogenes’s touchstone for excellence; all seven ideai of style may be found in Demosthenes’s orations.

It seems that Hermogenes knew, and may have modelled his Peri ideôn on, a similar system of twelve stylistic ideai included in the so-called “Aristides Rhetoric,” a compendium dating from the second century C.E.

We may conveniently represent the schema underlying Hermogenes’s work in tabular form. I subjoin such a table here, together with the Greek terms he uses in each case:

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<tr>
<th>1. CLARITY</th>
<th>2. GRANDEUR</th>
<th>3. BEAUTY</th>
<th>4. RAPIDITY</th>
<th>5. ETHOS</th>
<th>6. SINCERITY</th>
<th>7. FORCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>purity</td>
<td>meghethos</td>
<td>kallos</td>
<td>gorgotês</td>
<td>ëthos</td>
<td>alêtheia</td>
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<td>distinctness</td>
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This list immediately shows its classical pedigree. Clarity, with its subheadings of purity and distinctness, harks back to the Aristotelian demand that one strive for a style clear and free of ambiguity. Grandeur, in its various manifestations, is not perhaps to be sought above all else—simplicity, after all, is a subheading of Ethos or Character—but it is redolent of the Sublime
of Pseudo-Longinus. That the arts should exhibit Beauty was perhaps taken for granted until our own century; the Greek word for "ornament" or "adorning," kosmos, is the same as that for "order" (as opposed to chaos), and this polysemy indicates something of the premium the Greeks placed on order. Rapidity is of course an index of virtuosity, but Hermogenes opposes it expressly to flatness and carelessness.11 Sincerity is connected with speech that is endiatethos, "unaffected" or "spontaneous,"12 but also with that which is empsukhos, "animated" (we might translate this "heartfelt"). Its subcategory of "indignation" seems akin to this latter phenomenon. Force is characterized by the proper use of the other six kinds of style—knowing what to do, and when. This term, deinotês, has a celebrated past: deinos legein was a fifth/fourth century colloquialism for being particularly skilled in rhetoric.13 Literally deinos means "terrible," "fearsome"; we use the words "terrific" and "awesome" with similar colloquial force.

3. Six Memos for the Next Millennium is actually a set of five lectures on a group of related topics: Lightness, Quickness, Exactitude, Visibility, and Multiplicity. (Calvino died on 19 September 1985, before he could compose the sixth one, Consistency). He calls each of these topics "values"14 and imputes some virtue to each, but (as we shall see) in such a way that this imputation need not exclude the opposite value. It is worth working through his list, value by value, and remarking briefly on each.

Lightness came to have value for Calvino as a result of his own growth as a writer of fiction, when he found himself "becoming aware of the weight, the inertia, the opacity of the world . . . . I felt that the entire world was turning into stone" (4). But we are not to equate lightness simply with frivolity: "... there is such a thing as a lightness of thoughtfulness, just as we all know that there is a lightness of frivolity" (10). Calvino suggests that "lightness" is a way of looking at the world based on philosophy and science, as mediated by the writer's art (ibid.). His exemplars are Lucretius and Ovid here. Going on to discuss Italian literature, he invokes Cavalcanti and Dante as representatives of two opposite literary tendencies: the former, of one that "tries to make language into a weightless element that hovers above things like a cloud," the latter, one that "tries to give language the weight, density, and concreteness of things, bodies, and sensations" (15).

Quickness is recommended as a thing of beauty. Here Calvino borrows from the diaries of Leopardi: "Speed . . . is most pleasurable in itself; that is, for the vivacity, the energy, the strength, the sheer life of such a feeling. Indeed it almost gives you an idea of the infinite—elevates the soul, fortifies it" (41). The idea of strength is central here: the virtue of quickness in literature entails not simply brevity but also a kind of grace. Calvino himself goes on to say: "Quickness of style and thought means above all agility, mobility, and ease" (46). His emblem for this virtue is the Roman god Mercury. But he recognizes that this principle implies its opposite, which
we might term deliberateness, and which he personifies in the god Vulcan: "Implicit in my tribute to lightness was my respect for weight, and so this apologia for quickness does not presume to deny the pleasures of lingering" (45–6); he comments on strategies of repetition and of digression as ways of slowing down time in the text. The chapter ends with a Chinese tale that embodies, in a single marvelous stroke, the principles both of deliberateness and of quickness.

In the chapter on exactitude, as in the previous one, Calvino employs the medium as part of the message; that is, he begins by attempting a precise definition of literary exactitude, subdivided (or, as the classical rhetoricians would say, "partitioned") under three headings: first, the precise planning of the work in question; second, the evocation of clear, incisive, memorable visual images; and third, precision of language. Even the rhetorical effect of *il vago*, which in Italian can mean not only "vague" but also "lovely," "attractive," turns out to depend upon "a highly exact and meticulous attention to the composition of each image, to the minute definition of details, to the choice of objects, to the lighting and the atmosphere, all in order to attain the desired degree of vagueness" (59–60). Art, in such a case, conceals art.

This virtue of exactitude appeals to Calvino as the common goal of two different types of knowledge: one is the exploration of "the mental space of bodiless rationality," i.e. by theoretical abstraction; the other path "goes through a space crammed with objects and attempts to create a verbal equivalent of that space by filling the page with words, involving a most careful painstaking effort..." (74). It is a measure of Calvino's own formidable powers in this chapter that he makes considerable progress in both these directions, without sacrificing his own lightness or quickness in the process.

With visibility we come to the genesis of images, of imagination itself. Here Calvino is concerned not only with how an artistic project is conceived of by the artist, but also with how it is received by the audience. He sketches out, in its briefest contours, a semiology of imagination: "We may distinguish between two types of imaginative process: the one that starts with the word and arrives at the visual image, and the one that starts with the visual image and arrives at its verbal expression" (83). These, of course, are the mechanisms at work in the typical rhetorical schema of rhetor/logos/audience, a schema that is (as Calvino knows) applicable to literature and even to cinema. For the artist, Calvino surmises, visual imagination precedes verbal expression (86); he corroborates this from his own experience as a writer (89).

In discussing the stimulation of the imagination of the audience (or reader), we are on ground well-trodden by the classical rhetoricians; it was traditionally called *enargeia* (or *phantasia*) in Greek, *evidentia* in Latin. In the creation of fiction, as in oratory, the artist strives to bring the audience not simply to understand a concept—if that were the only requirement, exactitude might fill the bill—but at times to *see an image just as the artist sees it*. Such visibility becomes for Calvino a "value to be saved" because he envisions
a "pedagogy of the imagination" that will protect this fundamental human faculty (92).

The skilled writer must understand what is visible, not only to the audience, but also to the fictional characters: "The poet has to imagine visually both what his actor sees and what he thinks he sees, what he dreams, what he remembers, what he sees represented, or what is told to him, just as he has to imagine the visual content of the metaphors he uses to facilitate this process of visual evocation" (82–3).

Multiplicity in the textual sense is, as one might imagine, multiple in kind: "There is such a thing as the unified text that is written as the expression of a single voice, but that reveals itself as open to interpretation on several levels . . . . there is the manifold text . . . on the model of what Mikhail Bakhtin has called the 'dialogic' or 'polyphonic' . . . . There is the type of work that, in the attempt to contain everything possible, does not manage to take on a form, to create outlines for itself, and so remains incomplete by its very nature . . . . There is the type of work that in literature corresponds to what in philosophy is nonsystematic thought, which proceeds by aphorisms, by sudden, discontinuous flashes of light . . . .” (117–8). All this is akin to Hermogenes’s concept of abundance, which is discussed under the heading of grandeur (see Hermogenes 277–96).

But the principle of multiplicity has its most far-reaching implications in the kind of metaphysics espoused by thinkers such as Carlo Emilio Gadda, whose view of the world as a “system of systems” is adduced by Calvino. Such a view seeks "to represent the world as a knot, a tangled skein of yarn; to represent it without in the least diminishing the inextricable complexity or, to put it better, the simultaneous presence of the most disparate elements that converge to determine every event” (106). Literature, then, is to be set the task of “weaving together the various branches of knowledge, the various 'codes,' into a manifold and multifaceted vision of the world” (112).

These five "values" are, I suggest, all values one would first and foremost prescribe for the dancer: lightness, quickness, exactitude, are all crucial if one is to achieve what is called "grace" in dance; visibility is, of course, central to any event of stage-performance; and multiplicity, as Calvino sketches it out, is the faculty of drawing the many into the one—no less important for the compelling performance. It is interesting that the same Greek word, skhēmata, was used to refer both to the various figures of a dance and to the configurations of language in prosody, diction, and thought.17

In light of the principle of multiplicity, one would like to see what Calvino would have done with consistency, the sixth, unwritten memo. I would not be surprised to find that he had conceived of it as something of a counterbalance, an anchor to the barque of multiplicity; for the very possibility of valorizing such "literary values" as he has enumerated here depends from a kind of consistency. But I shall have further speculation to offer about this sixth memo shortly.
4. It will immediately be clear that Calvino’s work has a close kinship with that of Hermogenes. There are, by the same token, some differences, subtle as well as obvious, and these demonstrate inevitably that Calvino, like Hermogenes—like all of us—is a child of his age.

The history of rhetoric shows that there is a tendency to move, over time, from a concern with issues of invention to a concern with issues of style. This is concomitant, it would seem, with a shift of focus from the oral to the written: a phenomenon of “slippage” recently identified in Italian as letteraturizzazione. To a certain extent one is inclined to consider Hermogenes’s treatise historically in light of this phenomenon. Yet it is not that Hermogenes’s system takes no account of invention, but rather that this whole treatise focuses on style per se. Calvino’s work, on the other hand, seems to hover between questions of style and those of invention—as if, for the new millennium, he wants to urge an emphasis different from that of the age we are leaving behind, one in fact closer to the older (classical) values that gave the palm to invention. As for the oral/written dichotomy, I think it is ironic that Hermogenes presents his ideas in written form, for training in oration; Calvino would have presented his ideas in oral form, as observations on writing.

Calvino’s work is, in a sense, like the salmon swimming upstream: in an adventurous mood, one might term it antileteraturizzazione, an endeavor to undo the effects of this slippage. Over and over again he insists upon the intricate connection of style with invention. See, for example, his remarks on Cavalcanti: “... there is a lightening of language whereby meaning is conveyed through a verbal texture that seems weightless, until the meaning itself takes on the same rarefied consistency” (16). And this should not surprise us, because he conceives of literary invention as itself intricately connected with the profoundest of philosophical formulations: “There remains one thread, the one I first started to unwind: that of literature as an existential function, the search for lightness as a reaction to the weight of living... I am accustomed to consider literature a search for knowledge.” (26) Time and again he intimates that his agenda are not merely stylistic but invented and indeed metaphysical: “This talk is refusing to be led in the direction I set myself. I began by speaking of exactitude, not of the infinite and the cosmos” (68); “I think that this bond between the formal choices of literary composition and the need for a cosmological model (or else for a general mythological framework) is present even in those authors who do not explicitly declare it” (69).

And so rhetoric and philosophy, those quarrelsome siblings, are once again inevitably brought face to face. Six Memos requires that we face the metaphysical and ethical issues raised by the uses of literature: Calvino, aware of the perils of a liminal time such as our era, speaks of values “to be saved” (92): “... the danger we run in losing a basic human faculty: the power of bringing visions into focus with our eyes shut... of thinking in terms of
images” (92, emphasis his). Rhetors and audiences need such a faculty too; that is what underlies the use, in oratory, of ἑθοποιία — the rhetor’s projection to the audience of a character that is realistic, plausible, and trustworthy.21 Thus the issue of focus, of imaginal thought, is of crucial importance for all art that is readily seen as mimetic — but also for occasions of oratory. Just what is mimesis? How shall we situate such a phenomenon in our “postmodern” world? Postmodernism is defined by Calvino as “the tendency to make ironic use of the stock images of the mass media, or to inject the taste for the marvelous inherited from literary tradition into narrative mechanisms that accentuate its alienation” (95). We have left behind the more ingenuous epoch where such irony was not universal; in oratorical situations now we find ourselves ineluctably haunted by the discrepancy between seeming and being: what of an orator that embodies the Hermogenic principles of sincerity or modesty? Is he indeed sincere, modest, or is this empty mimesis, the merest figment and masquerade? If, as Calvino says, “all ‘realities’ and ‘fantasies’ can take on form only by means of writing” (99), then we need to consider the extent to which the orator, by virtue of speaking, inscribes a “reality” — or indeed a “fantasy” — onto the rhetorical situation. In our oral communication, as well as on our literary pages, these issues take on a far-reaching significance.

5. As a kind of frontispiece to Six Memos is added the photograph of a sheet of paper with a handwritten list of the five lecture-titles; the sixth is there too, ever so faintly — literally “under erasure” — and this is most fitting for the work of a child of the postmodern era, the age of the opera aperta, a man who knew intimately the boundaries of determinacy.22

It is a poignant coincidence, in fact, that this sixth, unwritten lecture was to have been on the topic of consistency. We live in an epoch where we are reminded, more acutely than ever before, of the deep truth of Heraclitus, “All is in flux.” In fact this becomes for us one of the hallmarks of life itself, to such an extent that the change is the consistency. While Calvino did not complete his memo on consistency, he did leave behind, in his fiction, some provocative observations on the topic:

So here you are now, ready to attack the first lines of the first page. You prepare to recognize the unmistakable tone of the author. No. You don’t recognize it at all. But now that you think about it, who ever said this author had an unmistakable tone? On the contrary, he is known as an author who changes greatly from one book to the next. And in these very changes you recognize him as himself. (If on a winter’s night 9)

It may well seem that, in the strict sense, the only consistency in human life is to be found in death. In that sense Calvino left his sixth memo unwritten on the page, but composed it in his own passing in 1985. Here again we may turn to his fictional work:
... for Mr. Palomar being dead means resigning himself to remaining the same in a definitive state, which he can no longer hope to change. This is the most difficult step in learning how to be dead: to become convinced that your own life is a closed whole, all in the past, to which you can add nothing and can alter none of the relationships among the various elements. (Mr. Palomar 124–5)

Yet I wonder whether Calvino himself quite subscribed to this notion. Mr. Palomar is a notoriously tentative character; his most endearing quality is his penchant for musing, for contemplation, for ruminating (or, put another way, his most maddening quirk is his tendency to vacillate, to equivocate, even to prevaricate). So it is not entirely surprising to read, in the same chapter, the following:

The wave strikes the cliff and hollows out the rock, another wave arrives, another, and still another; whether he is or is not, everything goes on happening. The relief in being dead should be this: having eliminated that patch of uneasiness that is our presence, the only thing that matters is the extension and succession of things under the sun, in their impassive serenity. All is calm or tends toward calm, even hurricanes, earthquakes, the eruption of volcanoes. But was this not the earlier world, when he was in it? When every storm bore within itself the peace of afterward, prepared the moment when all the waves would have struck the shore, and the wind would have spent its force? Perhaps being dead is passing into the ocean of the waves that remain forever, so it is futile to wait for the sea to become calm. (Mr. Palomar 122)

If this new perspective is seriously entertained, the whole traditional contrast between life and death may be turned inside-out: the immemorial Western notions of life-as-change and death-as-fixity begin to slip, to blur, to metamorphose, both suffused with the luminosity characteristic of Calvino’s writing.

Whither literature will proceed in the next millennium, we can from this vantage-point only speculate; but we are the richer to be able to carry under our arm, not only the surviving remnants of the classical tradition, but Calvino’s Six Memos as well.23

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NOTES

1 See, for example, the collection of essays translated as The Uses of Literature, which includes “Why Read the Classics?,” “The Odysseys within the Odyssey,” and “Ovid and Universal Contiguity.” Specific references in Six Memos for the Next Millennium itself attest to Calvino’s familiarity with the classical tradition.

2 These chapters were to have been the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures for 1985–6; they were prepared for publication by Calvino’s widow. The Italian original is published as Lezioni americane: sei proposte per il prossimo millennio.

3 The Theophrastan virtues of style are referred to by Cicero in De oratore 3.37 and Orator 79. The disappearance of Theophrastus’s writings is a great loss to us; for more on his work see Mayer’s edition of the fragments; Grube, “Theophrastus” and “Thrasymachus”; Kennedy, “Theophrastus”; and Fortenbaugh.
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4 See Cicero’s Orator 20–1; 69; 106–9, etc. On the correlation of the three genera dicendì with the officia oratoris see Douglas.

5 See Demetrius On Style 36. The importance of this treatise—apparently not by Demetrius of Phalerum—is not to be underestimated. Its date, and probable sources, are keenly disputed; see e.g. Solmsen; Grube, A Greek Critic; and Kennedy, Art of Persuasion 286.

6 On the Sublime 8.1. Which is not to say that this author gives no attention to “vices” of style; see e.g. On the Sublime 3–5. The best introduction, with commentary, for On the Sublime is that of Russell.

7 The standard edition of the Greek text is that of Rabe. Wooten, Hermogenes’s On Types of Style provides an excellent English translation, with notes; see also the perspicuous discussion of Hermogenes in Wooten, Cicero’s Philippics, 22–42. N.B.: an alternate title for Hermogenes’s work is Peri ideôn logou. This is not easy to translate: logos is tremendously polysemous, and in rhetoric can mean a simple utterance, an entire oration, a story, a specific line of reasoning, or the use of enthymeme considered generally. Here it may mean “language” or “oratory”; yet another title found in some ancient mss. is simply “Hermogenes’s Rhetorical Handbook.” Idea is of course one of Plato’s words for his famous concept of the Forms; but it can designate a species, sort, or class of things, and is etymologically related to the Greek word for “see”; the notion was probably that by examining a thing’s appearance, one might determine its nature. So the title of Wooten’s translation, On Types of Style, should not be taken to associate Hermogenes’s work with the kinds of style, but rather with a number of species of good style. On the ms. evidence for the title of the work, see Rabe xxi–xxiii.

8 See e.g. Hermogenes 215 (section-numbers in Hermogenes are actually the page-numbers in Rabe; these may be found in the margins of Wooten’s translation).

9 Greek text in Schmid, Libri rhetorici. See also Schmid, “Aristidesrhetorik,” and Kennedy, Art of Rhetoric 628–32. Kennedy (ibid. 629 & n. 34), following Schmid, attributes this work to Basilicus of Nicomedia.

10 Rhetoric 1404b 2, saphê einai, and 1407a 32, mè amphiropolis.

11 Hermogenes 312, aneimonon kai huption.

12 endiathetos, from en + diatithêmi “arrange in,” has in some contexts the meaning “innate” or “deep-seated.”

13 See for example Sophocles, Oedipus the King 545; Plato Symposium 198c, Euthydemus 304d, Protagoras 341a–b. The quality of deînôtês is discussed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Thucydidés 23) and by Pseudo-Longinus (On the Sublime 12.4; 34.4); and the Forceful (deînos) style is one the four praised by Demetrius (see especially On Style 240–301).

14 Calvino, Six Memos 45. Esther Calvino reports, in her introductory “Note on the Text,” that Calvino had toyed with some other titles, including the terms “Literary Values” and “Literary Legacies.”

15 Just how this may be so is considered at length in Kirby, “Toward a Rhetoric of Poetics.”

16 Enargeia: Hermogenes 343; phantasia: On the Sublime 15. Aristotle had discussed pro ommatôn poiein, or “bringing before the [audience’s] eyes,” in Rhetoric 1410b–1411b. The fullest treatment in Latin (sub uoc. evidentia) is in Quintilian 4.2.63, 6.2.32, 8.3.61. I suspect it is no coincidence that Calvino begins his chapter with a discussion of fantasy.

17 Dance: Aristophanes, Peace 323; Wasps 1485; Euripides, Cyclops 221; Xenophon, Symposium 7.5. (Isocrates 15.183 refers to the exercise-routines of athletic training as skhênata). Language: Plato, Ion 536c; Aristotle, Rhetoric 1401a, 1410b; Cicero, Brutus 141; Quintilian 9.1.11.

18 For this concept see especially Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 5. He adopts the term from Florescu.

19 The extant On Invention attributed to Hermogenes may be spurious: see Wooten, Hermogenes xi; Drury 860. Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric 102 dates it tentatively to the fourth century C.E.

20 He is not alone in this: I think particularly of the work of Chaim Perelman.
21 Significantly, formal orations in ancient Greece were often "ghost-written" by professional logographoi (speech-writers). Their work was in this respect closely parallel to what we might term the writing of fiction, since theirs was the charge of crafting ethos for another person to project when the oration was actually delivered. For more on this, see Kirby, "Aristotle's Poetics," 200–3.

22 I have in mind, of course, Umberto Eco's Opera aperta; the English edition, The Open Work, is a partial translation of this but includes a good deal of other material as well. In Calvino's own work, see If on a winter's night, whose very table of contents—not to mention its remarkable opening chapter—invites the reader to relate to the book in a variety of ways. Each different act of reading virtually transmogrifies the work into a different novel. On the way in which the grammatical person of the narrator contributes to this openness, see Kirby, "Toward a Rhetoric of Poetics."

23 Thanks are due to Anthony J. Tamburri and Edward Schiappa for their critique and suggestions. An earlier version of this essay was delivered in October 1990 in Chicago, before the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, as part of a special program honoring George A. Kennedy. It is to him that I now dedicate this small offering, con affetto.

WORKS CITED


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