Defaux agrees that it is easy to see where Rabelais' sympathies lie, but this is not to say that Alcofrays is Rabelais, any more than one can confuse Folly with Erasmus; and the parallel is clearly indicated by the subtitle of this article: *Sophista loquitur*. This stress on the wo creative aspect seems somewhat to diminish certain of Defaux's arguments on the dating of *Gargantua*. If Rabelais is primarily a creative artist it would seem that he would appreciate that the comic possibilities of the bells episode, for example, did not depend solely on its topicality—though it is no doubt less true of the satirist than of other writers that in his subconscious he stores up incidents to be reborn later in a different form. This poses in effect the question of how far Rabelais was a satirist and how far a purely comic writer.

This volume also contains articles by Rita Guerlac showing the close links between what Rabelais wrote on education and the *De Disciplinis* of Vives, published in Antwerp in 153 (pp. 63-72), and by A. P. Stabler on Thevet's accusation of plagiarism by Rabelais in his account of the Isle of Demons and the "paroles gelées." Since Thevet's version did not appear until after Rabelais' death the boot would, if anything, be on the other foot. In fact the source for both authors is a passage from G. Postel. There are also notes by M. Downes on the interpretation of *arbres* as mast, not rudder-bar (pp. 73-80), by D. Russell on the meaning of Panurge's "Pusse en l'Aureille" (pp. 183-88), by E. V. Telle on the origin of "Leur Robidilandique Loy"—he has found the name of Martin Robillard in a list of lawyers—(pp. 143-44), and by P. Burrell on "aubelie," which, formed on *aube* (meaning "the anus") by analogy with *muselière*, signifies "an ass muzzle" (pp. 145-46).

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This is a most disconcerting book. Excellent in some of its parts, it is uneven in quality and unconvincing in structure. From a study of Montaigne's stylistic and rhetorical device in the *Essais* the author concludes that "There is a considerable distance between the spontaneity which Montaigne initially wants the reader to imagine as giving form to his ideas, and the studied naïvety which, in fact, he used." Of course, perceptive readers have long recognized that Montaigne's insistence on his amateur status as a writer and on his "natural" style should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. A careful and systematic study of his "deceits" would therefore have been most welcome.

If this book is disappointing, it is chiefly owing to the fact that it simply does not hang together except, in a most superficial way, through the nature of the examples under study. It does not progress logically from the general to the particular, building a convincing thesis as it goes. Instead, it begins with two chapters, "Montaigne's Modesty" and "Consciousness of Style," which are little more than a collection of examples, and it is only in the third chapter, "Of the 'Craftie and Secrete Methode,'" that the author relates Montaigne to the general rhetorical tradition of his period and begins to reveal the substance of her argument. To spread before the reader numerous examples of "studied naïvety" and to conclude from other selected passages that Montaigne was falsely modest reveals nothing substantively new about the essayist.
If we are patient, however, we are rewarded at last in Chapter III where there is an excellent discussion about the influence of dialogue on Montaigne. Margaret McGowan neglects the element of inner dialogue in the *Essais* but certainly examines with care the development of the dialogue between the essayist and the reader. The fourth chapter on “Paradoxes” is also very good and among other interesting questions underlines the difference between Erasmus and Montaigne in their respective treatments of the traditional “sagesse-folie” paradox. In Chapter V, which deals with affirmation in the *Essais*, and again in Chapter VI, which relates Montaigne’s observations and examples to their historical and cultural context of political upheaval and the religious wars, the author makes a strong case for looking at Montaigne as an often impassioned and skillful polemician. With a basic need to express himself (one might even say to dramatize himself), Montaigne gradually assumed, concludes the author, a didactic role in his *Essais*. But Montaigne’s didacticism was peculiar insofar as he had no illusions about reforming men and the world but sought rather to equip men to face the world as it was or at least as Montaigne saw it to be. Montaigne was, in fact, launching in French literature and thought what we sometimes call the “moralistic” tradition.

In this main body of her study Margaret McGowan is most thorough, concentrating her examination on fewer essays and developing her argument more convincingly. Unfortunately the final chapter, instead of capitalizing on this excellent analysis, leads the surprised reader into a discussion of the rhetorical dimensions of Montaigne’s fascination with Socrates. While this presents an aspect of the essayist’s rhetorical bent which can be made to support the general thesis, it is surely not important enough, in relation to the whole, to form the conclusion of the book. But the author surprises us further. The second half of the concluding chapter, dropping Socrates, turns abruptly to review, in the light of how subsequent writers and thinkers began to see through the essayist’s “deceits,” the “fortunes of Montaigne.” This is an unfortunate way to acknowledge a debt to Alan Boase and there can be no doubt that this material would more properly belong in an introduction, where it might serve further to justify the author’s study. It is a pity that so many fine insights should be so badly served by the careless structure of the book.

A further observation must be made. Central to the author’s thesis is the view that “Montaigne’s method of communication is an integral part of his search for and his discovery of Truth.” This is undoubtedly well demonstrated but we are tempted to ask: “Truth about what? Truth about whom?” Montaigne’s rhetoric was not just directed at the reader. It was, in fact, often directed at himself. While he performed for others, he was for himself both performer and audience. This explains much of his wit and humour and his obsession with presumption. Margaret McGowan, had she investigated a few recent studies of the comic elements in Montaigne, might have been less uncomfortable with his attacks on philosophy. Montaigne’s assumption that “learning and goodness are natural opposites” is surely not difficult for an academic to appreciate. It is even more understandable in the context of Montaigne’s own scarcely concealed (in fact, implicitly confessed) vanity. There are, of course, “chinks in Montaigne’s armour,” but it was his good fortune and ours that he developed a style filled with “deceits” to deal with them. The rhetorical devices reflect a fascinating and complex moral and psychological reality that has remained beyond the scope of this book.
Scholarly apparatus includes a body of reference notes which follows the text, a bibliography which could be somewhat more comprehensive and an alphabetical index.

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Professor Tetel's handsome (although slim: there are fewer than 100 pages of actual text) study of Montaigne is extremely disappointing. One's initial surprise that so major and complex a writer should receive such grudging attention is somewhat allayed by the editor statement that this book "will lead to a comprehensive work on Montaigne and Italy." One's surprise is, however, compounded by the discovery that little in the four chapters anticipates such a comprehensive study: in fact, mention of Italy is conspicuous because of its absence.

The stated purpose of this study and the way in which it is realized raise further questions in the reader's mind. Professor Tetel states in his preface that whereas he has not discussed every problem contained in the *Essays*, "we have attempted to include all important topics and some that have not traditionally attracted much attention ..." One can reasonably ask just what "all the important topics" are. Montaigne's own comment (quote by Professor Tetel, p. 78) that "there are more books about books than about any other subject" applies as much, if not more, to the *Essays* than to many other works. It would be most difficult indeed to achieve general consensus that the specific problems dealt with in this study or in any other are the only important ones.

One might also challenge the claim that some of the matters dealt with have been neglected. For the specialist, much of what Professor Tetel says is not new at all and, in fact, seems quite unnecessary. Do we need a discussion of the nature of the essay as a form (see chapter I, "Essaying")? Is it a surprise to anyone that Villey's famous three periods are not really distinct but contain considerable overlap? Does the Montaigne scholar not already know that the *Essays* become progressively more introspective and why? Although there are no definitive statements about these and other matters, they are the sort of questions we all discuss in our seminars, and Professor Tetel's remarks on them do not advance our learning very much. Curiously, one really new aspect of the study of the *Essays* is mentioned only in passing: Professor Tetel notes (p. 103) that "if the structure within an essay is concentric, the structure among essays remains unexplored." It is to be hoped that the forthcoming volume promised by the editor will plunge into these uncharted waters with substantial results.

Another disconcerting feature is the rather off-handed way the author makes certain statements about specific essays and presents them as received truths: for example, one can take serious exception to the interpretation of the last words of "Of Cannibals" (that "They don't wear breeches" is a remark that "clouds his earlier perhaps idealistic outlook, [p. 25]), to the claim that in "Of Repentance" Montaigne advocates nonrepentance (p. 27), and to the view that in "On Friendship" we see "the complete transformation of this concept into that of love, and conjugal love in his eyes becomes friendship" (p. 27). At best, such judgments are hypothetical and require considerable substantiation.