
In 1984, Kenneth R. Andrews, author of books on Elizabethan privateering, Sir Francis Drake, and the Spanish Caribbean, published his important study of the prehistory of Colonial America and the genesis of the British Empire between 1480 and 1630—Trade, Plunder and Settlement. He has now added to his studies of British maritime history a close examination of naval affairs during the reign of Charles I (1625-1649).

Rather than providing a general account of Caroline maritime enterprise, however, Ships, Money and Politics consists of eight essays on specific topics, which, the author explains in his preface, particularly interest him and which, he trusts, will “form a meaningful cluster” (p. ix). The book is not intended, then, to be a comprehensive history, though it does attempt to touch on certain key dimensions of maritime history—economic, naval and political. Such an approach may raise questions concerning balance and focus. The matter of ship money is appropriately dealt with in one lengthy essay, for example, but other essays appear at first glance to deal with relatively less central matters, e.g. Sir Kenelm Digby’s famous act of unauthorized privateering in 1628 at the Turkish port of Scanderoon (now known as Iskenderun or Alexandretta) and William Rainborowe’s expedition to Sallee in 1637. The former may arguably have been “the only episode during those wars which the English could celebrate as a victory, albeit a victory over Venice rather than Spain or France, their proper enemies” (p. 127). The latter, though a side-show, may indeed have demonstrated “the success of ship money which gave the government the resources and the confidence to seize [an] opportunity and exploit it” (p. 183). Both topics, however, though valuable for the detailed material and the insights about maritime affairs they present, are essentially exempla within the much larger historical framework. For the historian already familiar with the broad framework, Andrews’ essays will be of considerable interest, though they may just as easily, perhaps, have come separately in article form. For the non-specialist, the book is certainly fascinating in what it reveals about Caroline naval affairs, but at first sight it may appear inadequate as a substitute for the single-volume account that Andrews considers in his preface would be “potentially boring” (p. ix).

That at least may be the initial response of most readers. However, Ships, Money and Politics has certain unifying concerns that quickly capture the reader’s attention, and Andrews argues his case concerning them so persuasively that the reader’s reservations are quickly set aside. Central to Andrews’ argument is the contention that the study of Caroline naval affairs requires that one deal both with the navy and the mercantile marine together, the two being intricately interconnected. At the same time, the whole complex network of interacting forces that led to the failure of the early Stuart regime must include naval affairs. By insisting on these two points, Andrews
attempts to demonstrate that by neglecting maritime and naval matters students of early Stuart polity have missed something of vital significance in the economic and political turmoil of the times.

Extremely useful, and itself filled with challenging ideas, is Andrews’ introductory section. Andrews notes that Caroline maritime history has been generally neglected because of its relative lack of romance and heroics in comparison to the Elizabethan era, and also the assumption that as a maritime power England had become ineffective. Critical of that assumption, Andrews argues that in fact masters and ships’ officers were now superior to their predecessors in handling ships, in navigation, and in entrepreneurial initiative. Though England by the 1630s “could no longer match the naval forces exercised by either side in the intensive conflict waged for the sea-lanes of western Europe” (p. 7), the forces financed by ship money through their “regular presence and steady work did much to ensure the extraordinary prosperity of England’s merchant shipping in those years” (p. 11).

In the chapters that follow, Andrews provides a great deal of documentation and analysis of specifics in support of his main contentions. In particular there is much to show how complex the relationship was among ships, money and politics. Beginning with a highly-detailed account of the growth of the shipping industry and the shipping boom of the 1630s, a matter primarily linked with commercial activity, and noting the manner in which the combined needs of commerce and warfare led to an overwhelming commitment to the “defensible” merchantman, Andrews comes to the somewhat startling conclusion that for ship owners “average profitability was a remote and practically irrelevant concept; what impressed them rather—and should impress us as more significant historically—was the variability of profits, losses and everything connected with the business of seafaring” (p. 33). This chapter then leads into an equally fascinating one on the shipowners, a highly complex topic where Andrews’ mastery of archival materials is at its best. Andrews then turns his attention to Caroline seamen, addressing the assumption that they were generally a discontented and mutinous lot. Considerable understanding is offered as to why this may have been so, but what is more interesting is Andrews’ argument that Charles I’s reign marked a turning point in the nature of mutinous behaviour. Mutiny, hitherto a matter of individual indiscipline, became a collective phenomenon and “a regular feature of seafaring for the next century and a half” (p. 83).

Chapter Four focuses upon the career as purser of one Thomas Anthony, whose surviving papers in the records of the High Court of Admiralty provide rare evidence of the financial transactions involved in the shipping business. Chapters Five and Seven discuss, as already mentioned, Digby at Scanderoon and William Rainborowe and the Sallee Rovers. Sandwiched between them is a discussion of the purposes and uses of ship money, a complicated poorly-understood topic that Andrews does much to illuminate, though the topic remains a baffling one. Concerns over matters of maritime security, foreign policy, national prestige, protection of commerce and fishing, and sovereignty claims over the “English seas” all mingled with the desire of
the Crown to achieve some form of independence of Parliamentary taxes. With this topic, naval affairs, economics and politics dovetail so inextricably that, as Andrews shows, the three concerns must be treated together, and simple answers cannot be expected.

Andrews’ chapter on Parliamentary naval enterprise forms a natural conclusion to his book, though it is in some ways less provocative and engaging than some of the earlier material. Even so, this does little to detract from the fact that Ships, Money and Politics is an extremely useful study that is well-researched, elegantly written, and cogently argued. Its somewhat diverse chapters do indeed form “a meaningful cluster” and add greatly to the understanding of the significance of maritime and naval matters within the larger pattern of early Stuart political and economic history.

ALAN R. YOUNG, Acadia University


On a parfois contesté que Michel de Nostredame ait été astrologue: l’usage qu’il fait du symbolisme astrologique n’est-il pas l’expression d’un simple recours à un langage allégorique? Pierre Brind’amour montre que l’auteur des Centuries se réfère bel et bien à l’astrologie en tant que telle. Pour ce faire, il explique que les formules employées par cet auteur correspondent le plus souvent à des configurations planétaires réelles. Par ailleurs, l’activité astrologique de cet auteur provençal est mise en évidence par l’étude de sa correspondance qui le fait s’entretenir avec ses clients et par ses almanachs annuels. Si donc Nostradamus est prophète, il est à n’en pas douter également sinon d’abord astrologue.

Toutefois, la démonstration effectuée, nous ne sommes pas encore tirés d’affaire, car si Pierre Brind’amour nous familiarise avec les activités de Michel de Nostredame, astrologue, il reste à répondre à une seconde question: ce dernier est-il l’auteur des Centuries, ou plus exactement de quelles Centuries l’est-il? Le problème de leur paternité vient recouper celui de leur inspiration.

La préface de Nostradamus astrophile constitue certes une bonne mise au point méthodologique: Pierre Brind’amour y insiste sur la nécessité des recoupements, des comparaisons, pour essayer de cerner les contrefaçons. Il y regrette la difficulté qu’il y a à rassembler toutes les pièces du puzzle nostradamique en raison de la dispersion des lieux de conservation.

On est dès lors d’autant plus surpris en abordant le corps de ce savant ouvrage de ne pas toujours voir de tels principes respectés. Il semble en effet qu’en pratique, Pierre Brind’amour ait jugé quelque peu fastidieux de rester constamment dans l’expectative et qu’il ait finalement préféré adopter une représentation assez traditionnelle de la